54 Conn. 60 | Conn. | 1886
This is an amicable suit reserved for
Soon after the deed was given Mrs. Robertson and her husband mortgaged the same property to Skiddy. In 1860 Skiddy quit-claimed his interest therein to W. H. H. Robertson. The plaintiff is now the owner of the premises.
In 1870 William Skiddy died, leaving a will, by which, after making provision for his wife, his property was given in trust for his children during life, remainder in fee to his grandchildren. He left surviving him three children, all of whom have children. The children, by deed dated February 26th, 1886, quit-claimed all their interest in the property to the plaintiff; and on the same day the administrator of the estate of said Skiddy with the will annexed, with the consent and advice of the court of probate, conveyed to the plaintiff all interest which the deceased had in the premises at the time of his death.
The defendant has contracted to purchase the property, and is willing to accept a deed and pay for it, provided the provision in the deed from Skiddy to Mrs. Robertson is not an incumbrance, or defect in the title; and the question is— whethei; that provision is such an incumbrance or defect.
1. That the language quoted is a restriction and not a condition; that it is in the nature of a personal covenant, and that, after the death of the grantee, neither the grantor nor Ms heirs can enter for condition broken; and that the grantee being dead the restriction is now removed.
In Warner v. Bennett, 31 Conn., 468, tMs court held that similar language in a deed was a condition subsequent and not a limitation. As the language here used is apt and appropriate to raise a condition subsequent, we must, upon the authority of that case, hold it to be a condition and not a restriction merely or personal covenant.
2. In the next place, the plaintiff contends that the quitclaim deed from William Skiddy to W. H. H. Eobertson releases to Eobertson the right of entry, and so destroys the condition and makes the title absolute in the plamtiff, he having all the title and interest wMch Mrs. Eobertson and her husband had, including the right of reversion. It is conceded that in this state a quitclaim deed is an ordinary and primary mstrument of conveyance and conveys to the grantee whatever interest the grantor has in the property. Counsel for the defendant, without controverting tMs proposition, insist that tMs deed did not have that effect, for two reasons: First, that the right to enter for condition broken is not assignable. That is doubtless so at common law, and tMs com’t so decided in Warner v. Bennett, (supra); but such an interest is now assignable by statute. Gen. Statutes, p. 47, sec. 1, of part 5. Secondly, it is said that that deed was- made solely to release the mortgage, and that the parties did not intend that any other interest should be discharged.
Ordinarily the meaning of a written instrument is to be gathered from the language used; and when that language is explicit and free from ambiguity, the court is not at liberty to give it a different meaning or limit its effect, for the reason that it is probable that the parties did not intend all that its language imports. The secret, unexpressed intention of the parties cannot be permitted to vary or change
In Ely v. Stannard, 44 Conn., 528, the present Chief Justice speaking for this court says:—“ A quitclaim or release deed is one of the regular modes of conveying property known to the law, and it is almost the only mode in practice where a party sells property and does not wish to warrant the title. Dr. Webster says in his dictionary—6 In law a release or deed of release is a conveyance of a man’s right in lands or tenements to another who has some estate in possession.’ This is a strictly technical definition; but by long established practice it makes no difference whether the re leasee has an existing estate in possession or not. The release will convey to him, in any circumstances, whatever interest the releasor has in the property.”
Besides, as is well said by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, “ it is the universal rule that a deed must be construed strictly against the grantor, and must be taken to convey the entire property and interest of the grantor in the premises, unless something appears to limit it to a partial interest.”
If Skiddy had intended to limit the effect of Ms deed to discharging the mortgage it would have been an easy matter to say so; or he might have excepted this reversionary right from its operation. As he has not done so the law conclusively presumes that he intended to convey all his interest to Robertson. This result is reached by whatever rules of construction the matter is tested. It may be that it was an inadvertence, and that the releasor did not intend to discharge tMs interest. Nevertheless he has in fact done so and the lav) will afford him no relief.
The Superior Court is advised that the plamtiff has good title to the property.
In tMs opinion the other judges concurred; except Park, C. J., and Beardsley, J., who concurred in the result, but preferred to rest the case solely on the deed given by the admiMstrator.