dehvered the opinion of the court:
Aрpellants appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Du Page County dismissing their complaint without leave to amend.
Only a brief statement of facts is necessary. Milton Hoyt is insured under a group hospital policy issued by defendant-apрeUee Continental Casualty Co. The policy provides a cash payment of $35 (described in the policy as “Dаily In-Hospital Indemnity”) when an insured person is “* # « confined within a hospital (as defined in the pohcy) * * * for each day of such confinement but not to exceed the number of days payable stated in the schedule, as the result of any one aсcident or sickness.”
The appellant entered the hospital on November 4, 1971, and was discharged on November 7, 1971. Hе was paid $105 as daily in-hospital indemnity, based on 3 days of confinement in the hospital, whereas he claims he is entitled to $140 for 4 days of hospital confinement.
The gist of appellant’s argument in support of his claim for $140 is that the word “day”, sincе it is not otherwise defined or restricted in the policy, means any part of a day in which the insured is confined in a hospital and, therefore, since he was confined in the hospital for part of November 4, all of November 5 and 6 and pаrt of November 7, he should be paid for 4 days, even though the total time of confinement was only 69 hours. He says that, if the word “dаy” is ambiguous, then, as is customary in resolving ambiguities in insurance policies, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the insured.
Apрellee, on the other hand, contends that the legal meaning of the word “day” is 24 hours but if any other standard is used to determine its meaning it should be based on custom and usage and in this case should be held to mean “hospital day”.
Both sides have citеd cases purportedly establishing either that a “day” is 24 hours (People ex rel. Harless v. Hatch (1863),
It is our view of this case that both appellant and appellee here have concentrated too narrowly on a single word—the word “day”—in construing the language of the policy. The word “day”, appearing in the section of the policy entitled “Daily In-Hospital Indemnity”, dоes not stand by itself and should not be interpreted as though it did. Rather, it is part of a phrase, “each day of such confinеment” appearing in the policy as part of the sentence “When as a result of injury or sickness * * * the Insured Person is confined within a hospital * * * the Company will pay the Daily In-Hospital Indemnity * * * for each day of such confinement * * The promise to pay is with reference to “each day of such confinement,” and we must interpret the phrase in a manner to give a common sense meaning to the whole contract.
While the contract is not truly one of indemnity, but is rather а contract to pay money without reference to hospital charges, nevertheless, it is fair to assume that the contract was not entered into in total disregard of what the hospital itself considered a day of confinemеnt. It would be absurd to suppose that the insured believed at the time he took out the insurance that he would be paid fоr 4 days of confinement if he was only in the hospital 69 hours and was only charged for 3 days. We cannot believe that the аppellant in interpreting the policy in this manner was in any way misled to his detriment.
On the other hand, the interpretation of thе word “day” as meaning a full 24 hours is legalistic and would likewise produce unfair results.
We feel therefore impelled to examine the language of the contract from a somewhat broader viewpoint in order to give it reasonablе meaning and effect.
In United States Trust Co. v. Jones (1953),
If considered in isolation the interpretation of “day” must inevitably be arbitrary, therefore unsatisfactory, not only to the parties but to the court. It is a word not susceptible of meaningful interprеtation without reference to the context in which it is used. That is no doubt why the Random House Dictionary of the English Language gives not less than 15 different examples of its meaning in various contexts.
Accordingly, we refuse to construe the word in isolation as being an arbitrary period of time, either possibly 1 minute, as the appellant might contend or 24 hours, as the apрellee contends. Instead, we give it meaning within the phrase, “for each day of such confinement” and thereforе we interpret the policy as saying that it will pay for each period of confinement for which the particulаr hospital makes its customary daily charge. We do not believe this interpretation of the contract does аny violence to the intention of the parties and it provides a rational basis for performance of the сontract.
In the light of this holding, appellant received proper payment under the policy and has no more coming.
Since the appellant has no cause of action in his own right, the* class action must likewise fall. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed,
T. MORAN, P. J., and GUILD, J., concur,