67 Wis. 1 | Wis. | 1886
As stated on the former appeal, “the theory of the defense” was, and it still is, “that the train backed np until the front end of the fifth car from the rear was at or near the north line of the sidewalk in question, when it stopped to uncouple the rear four cars; and that while standing in that position the deceased came along’ on the sidewalk from Yan Burén street to the place where the train was standing, and then undertook to pass through under the draw-bar between the front end of the fifth car and the one ahead of it, and while in the act of so doing the train started south, and she was caught under the fifth ear and killed as stated.” 62 Wis. 668, 669. It is also there stated that “ the plaintiff’s theory ” was, and still is, “ in effect, that the deceased reached that part of the sidewalk covered by track No. 10 just as the rear end of the train, backing north unobserved, approached her and pushed or knocked her off into the water, between the rails, immediately north of the north line of the sidewalk; and that, stunned by the occurrence,' or otherwise, she there remained while the five cars were backed over her; and that, when the train started back, she was caught by the brake-rod, or some other projection on the under side of the car, and dragged up out of the water onto the plank, and from thence onto the pavement; and that the first scream mentioned was when she was first struck by the rear end of the rear car, and that the last two screams occurred after she was so caught, and while the train- was moving south.” 62 Wis. 610, 671.
The judgment of nonsuit was then reversed, because the evidence did not conclusively establish the defendant’s theory, nor negative the plaintiff’s theory; and the further facts that there was evidence tending to show “ that no bell was rung, no light or other signal on the rear end of the train, and no guard at the crossing at the time the train backed over the street;” that Mrs. Hoye’s body was found
The facts and circumstances disclosed by this record are very much the same as on the fonner appeal, and hence need not be here repeated, except as herein otherwise indicated.
Were the impediments to affirming the judgment upon the former appeal removed by the evidence upon the last trial? To ascertain this, we have very carefully examined all the evidence in the voluminous printed case. It will be remembered that Buffalo street ran east and west; that defendant’s track No. 10, upon which the accident occurred, crossed that street at right angles, and ran north to the bumper, a distance of about 231 feet north of the north sidewalk, and descended to the bumper from about the middle of the street, which was crowning; that the next street west of the place of the accident was Jackson street, and at right angles with Buffalo street; that from the place of the accident to the street-lamp, lighted at the time, at the northwest corner of Jackson and Buffalo streets, was about 243 feet; that from the place of the accident to the southwest corner of the same streets was about 250 feet; that the distance from the northwest corner of Buffalo and Tan Burén streets to the east side of track No. 10 was about 76 feet; that the several streets named were each 80 feet wide; that the average length of each car, including draw-bars, was about 31 feet; that there had been heavy rains up to 4 p. m. of that day, and north of Buffalo street the tracks were mostly or partially
Mrs. Hoye lived southwest of the place of the accident, and had that evening been to visit a relative northeast of the place of the accident, and had started for home just before the accident, accompanied by a friend nearly to the north side of Buffalo street, and she was supposed to have gone along westward, on the north sidewalk of that street, until she reached the place of the accident.
It is claimed that the defendant further guarded the safety of passing travelers upon the crossing in question, by placing a man with a lighted lantern at or near the north end of the backing train. The only persons who appear from the evidence to have been employed in managing the train at the time, or guarding the crossing, were John Crowley, as engineer, Fred Haley, as fireman,— who were both upon the engine,— and Louis D. Wandell and James Mahoney, as switchmen. Mahoney was not sworn,- and rumor said he had died before the trial.
On cross-examination he testified, in effect, that when Mahoney got down from the northeast corner of the twelfth car to the ground he might have been 20, 30,- 40, or even 50 feet south of Buffalo street; and also, among other things, said: “It was my duty to keep a sharp look-out for signals. It was my duty to observe the exact location of that light that Mahoney carried. I mean by that to observe the movement of it. Well, I would have to observe
The evidence of Wand ell leaves it doubtful as to just what did occur. If this last portion of his testimony is correct, the pin was not pulled until the “bunt;” and, as the train moved south 18 or 20 feet before the other signal to stop suddenly was given, then, as the train moved south 18 or '20 feet more after the last signal, it is evident he must have pulled the pin at a point 40 feet or -more north of the sidewalk, and where the water stood upon the track. If this is all so, it is difficult to perceive the object of Ma-honey in setting the brake on the twelfth car, as he testi-heel, and thus hold the slack, so that “ by pitching from the crossing they [the cars] would not break off,” unless he pulled the pin before starting back, as intimated might have been done, in which event it would have uncoupled itself. On the other hand, if the uncoupling was done near the middle of the street,— the divide,— then the object of setting the brake is apparent, and the other portion of his testimony as to Mahoney walking southwTard from the north side of the street to the place of pulling the pin would be consistent with it, and also with the engineer’s testimony, which will be presently noticed. The want of precision in Wandell’s testimony, however, is not removed by the testimony of the fireman and engineer.
The fireman, Fred Haley, testified, in effect, that he looked out of the east side of the engine; that Wandell was on, the car next to the engine all the vTay backing up, giving signals to the engineer; that he got no signals on the east side of the train; that Mahoney was not on that side; that the north end of the train was up against the bunting post when the train stopped, because he heard and felt the jar.
On cross-examination he testified, in effect, that the train struck the cars on the north end, and stopped at the bumping post, he should judge, a minute or a minute and a half; that that was the first time it stopped after it commenced backing north; that he did not know of any brake being put on; that he got signals in car lengths and half car lengths, while backing up, and before he got to the bumping post; that he received no signal to stop from the time the train commenced backing until it bunted against the oars; that at that time he could not see Mahoney,— was
If the engineer is correct in stating that Mahoney did the uncoupling at or near the center of the street, or on the south part of it, and that is corroborated by a portion of Wandell’s testimony, then it is very certain, contrary to other portions of the testimony of both, that the train backed at least two car lengths or more after the pin was pulled; for that occurred at the north end of car Eo. 8,122, the south end of which was only about 20-feet south of the north line of the north sidewalk when it finally stopped after the accident; and, besides, it is admitted by all that it had started south before the signal to stop suddenly, and ran some 18 or 20 feet after that signal was given.
The three witnesses on the part of the defense, a,s to the management of the train, make it certain that, although Mahoney got down from the twelfth car on the east side of the train just as it was approaching the south side of Buf
Since Mahoney v7as on the west side of track Ho. 10, and assuming that Mrs. Hoye was then going towards that track from the east, it would follow that if Mahoney with his lantern was some distance south of the end of the moving train, it would afford her very little or no protection whatever, as, in that event, a portion of the car or train would be between her and the lantern. If the four cars were uncoupled by Mahoney in the street, or on the south side of the street, as testified to by the engineer and indicated-in a portion of Wandell’s testimony, then he 'was at the time four car lengths, or about 124 feet, south-of the north end of the twelfth car. In view of the want of precision as to just where Mahoney was dui’ing all the time with reference to the rear end of the train, and the inconsistency or confusion in different portions of the evidence of Wandell and the engineer as to the management of the train, we cannot say that the jury would not have been justified in finding from the evidence that the defendant was negligent in backing the train over the street without sufficient signals or guards upon or near the rear end to warn travelers thereon; and especially is this so since three witnesses on the part of the plaintiff, each on one of the west corners of Jackson and Buffalo streets, and nearer to the north end of the train than Wandell, and each in a better position to tell whether there was a man with a lantern on the wrest side of track Ho. 10, at or near the end of the train, and each of wfiom testified that he saw the end of the train passing over the street northw.ard, but saw no man with a light at or near it, and could have seen one had
Upon the whole evidence, the jury would have been justified in finding that Mahoney did not go north of the center of the street, and that his lantern was between him and the train, so that his body prevented the plaintiff’s witnesses from seeing it, or else, from some other cause, it was unobserved by thorn; especially, in view of the fact that Mrs. Hoye was found dead upon a public street. The question does not come within the rule of positive and negative testimony mentioned. It does come within the restrictive rules as to trial courts taking causes from the jury where portions of the evidence are conflicting, some facts are disputed, and the inferences to be drawn from some admitted facts are such as might lead to a difference of opinion among fair-minded men. We are asked to definitely state such rules in this case, but we deem it unnecessary, since the rules have been firmly settled by this court through a long series of decisions, and may as easily be read in one volume as another,— when they can all be found upon the same shelf where this will eventually go. For some of the more recent cases, citing the earlier cases, see Townley v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 53 Wis. 626; Spensley v. Lancashire Ins. Co. 54 Wis. 433; Sabotta v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 54 Wis. 687; Hill v. Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242; Johnson v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 56 Wis. 274; Nelson v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 60 Wis. 320; Kaples v. Orth, 61 Wis. 531; Hoye v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 62 Wis. 666.
Without committing- ourselves upon the question as to whether, in the absence of any statute or ordinance upon the subject, a jury -would be authorized to determine the necessity of a flagman, or to predicate negligence upon the
Can we say, as a matter of law, that Mrs. Hoye was, at the time and place in question, guilty of contributory negligence? She must have known of the crossing, and that trains were liable to pass over the street and sidewalk at that point. Undoubtedly she was bound to use her eyes in looking, and her ears in hearing, and to act prudéntly upon the knowledge thus acquired. Williams v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 64 Wis. 4. But it must be remembered that the burden of proving contributory negligence is, ordinarily, upon the defendant. Randall v. N. W. Tel. Co. 54 Wis. 147; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405; Kelly v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 60 Wis. 482. Such contributory negligence, when not disclosed by the testimony on the part of the plaintiff, is purely a matter of defense. Ibid.; McNamara v. Clintonville, 62 Wis. 209. This being thé fixed rule of law, it cannot be conclusively presumed that Mrs. Hoye did not, at the time and place in question, look, listen, and prudently act upon the knowledge thus acquired. It was in the night. The restrictive rules against trial courts taking causes from juries, above mentioned, are equally applicable to contributory negligence, and are supported by the authorities cited. Certainly, numerous cases might be cited from this and other courts where the question of contributory negligence was held properly submitted to the jury, or ought to have been, notwithstanding the injured person walked upon the track in front of the passing train. Some of these cases occurred
Upon all the facts and circumstances in this case, we must hold, as upon the former appeal, that the question of contributory negligence was one of fact for the jury, and not of law for the court.
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.