Josie Howington appeals from the trial court’s order setting aside a divorce decree and directing her to reimburse her former spouse, Douglas Howington, for certain pension benefits she received. Finding no error, we affirm.
Josie (Wife) and Douglas (Husband) Howington were married in 1989. They separated six years later, and in May 1997 Wife filed an action for divorce in DeKalb County, the county in which she lived. Wife served the complaint for divorce on Husband’s son, who lived in Fulton County, although at the time the action was filed Husband was living in North Carolina. Husband did not answer the complaint and he did not appear at a scheduled November 1997 hearing, at the conclusion of which the trial court issued a final judgment and decree of divorce. In addition to granting a divorce, the court awarded Wife one-half of Husband’s civil service pension for life. An amended qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) was issued on February 17,1998 in accordance with Part 838 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Husband filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree in June 2004, claiming he was not properly served. In her response, Wife argued that the motion was barred by laches because Husband knew *243 Wife filed the complaint for divorce, he received a copy of the complaint, and he discussed the terms of the divorce with her. The trial court granted the motion to set aside on December 15, 2004, finding that Husband was not formally served with the complaint and that he did not waive service of process. An amended order setting aside the final decree was entered in October 2005 to further “set aside any subsequent Order which purports to distribute any assets between the parties including the Amended [QDRO] dated February 17, 1998.”
Despite entry of the orders setting aside the final decree and QDRO, Wife continued to receive one-half of Husband’s pension benefits. Following a second divorce proceeding, where both parties were represented by counsel and presented evidence, the trial court entered a new divorce decree ordering Wife, inter alia, to reimburse Husband in an amount equal to the pension benefits she received after the December 15, 2004 order setting aside the first decree. We granted Wife’s application for discretionary appeal pursuant to this Court’s pilot project. See
Wright v. Wright,
1. Wife contends Husband was barred by laches from asserting his claim to set aside the original divorce decree. We agree that laches can be a defense to an action attacking the validity of a divorce decree. See
Watson v. Watson,
The trial court in this case made no specific findings regarding the defense of laches. However, even assuming all of the facts alleged by Wife are true, there is no allegation or evidence in the record demonstrating that she was harmed by the delay. In the absence of such evidence, we must conclude that the trial court correctly rejected her defense of laches. See generally
Carroll,
supra,
2. Contrary to Wife’s assertion, the trial court did not err by granting relief beyond that sought in Husband’s pleadings. Although Husband did not include in his counterclaim a prayer for reimbursement of pension benefits paid after the trial court’s December 15, 2004 order, the transcript of the final hearing reveals that Wife permitted the issue to be litigated without objection. See OCGA § 9-11-15 (b) (amendments to conform to evidence). “When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” OCGA§ 9-11-15 (b). See
Conner v. Conner,
Judgment affirmed.
