The trial court denied the motion, finding that it did not have continuing jurisdiction to consider the motion and directed the Howeths to file a new lawsuit for
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Howeths own a beachfront house in Oceanside. Coffelt's house next door is a mirror image of the Howeths' house, with the two houses separated by a shared driveway that straddles the property line and provides the only vehicular access to their rеspective garages. When the houses were built in 2013, the developer recorded a reciprocal easement that governs use of the driveway. The easement permits both homeowners to use the driveway to access their garages, but provides that "[n]o vehicles shall be parked within the Easement Area."
The Howeths allege that Coffelt and her guests ignored the easement and repeatedly parked in the driveway. In turn, Coffelt asserts that the Howeths' guests and staff often park in the driveway in violation of the easement. Coffelt also generally complains that the Howeths are using their house for short-term vacation rentals, leading to excessive noise and crowds at the house. Both the Howeths and Coffelt allege the other has engaged in abusive behavior arising from the dispute over the driveway and use of the properties.
After the relationship between the neighbors had completely deteriorated, the Howeths filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief to prevent Coffelt from parking in the driveway.
After several months of litigation, the parties appеared for a mandatory settlement conference and reached an agreement to settle the dispute. The parties recited the agreement orally before the court and, as such, it is not a model of clarity. Nevertheless, the parties appeared to agree that they could both park on the driveway, but only within a 7-foot by 20-foot rectangle in front of the respective garage doors. Maintenance vehicles for major repairs could park outside this area if the owner provides 24-hour notice via e-mail, with another exception for emergencies. The parties also agreed to not (1) post disparaging signs about each other, (2) take photographs of the inside of each other's home or garage, or (3) take photographs of each other's guests beyond the shared driveway. Next, the neighbors agreed to keep their trash cans in a specific area along the back wall of the driveway. The parties agreed not to address each other or guests except to ask for removal of vehicles from the driveway.
To enforce the agreement, the parties stipulated that any violation of these rules would permit the nonviolating party to notify the violating party via e-mail and would subject the violating party to a $500 fine. In anticipation of
The trial court declined to enter an "interim judgment" and denied the motion. In its order, it concluded the court "is without jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs' motion, and the parties' remedy is to pursue a breach of contract claim for any purported breach of the settlement agreement." The Howeths now appeal that order.
DISCUSSION
This cоurt cannot entertain an appeal taken from a nonappealable judgment or order. "[T]he question of whether an order is appealable goes to the jurisdiction of an appellate court, which is not a matter of shades of grey but rather of black and white." ( Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. (2008)
The Howeths contend the court's order is an appealable order after judgment pursuant to section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), of the Code of Civil Procedure.
As plainly stated in the statute, the order must be made after an appealable judgment. ( § 904.1(a)(2).) Here, the resulting judgment was a consent judgment, entered pursuant to a settlеment agreement between the parties and a stipulation for judgment based on that agreement. "A
Consent judgments, however, are not appealable. ( Norgart v. Upjohn Co. , supra ,
The Howeths cite two cases that create exceptions to this general rule. First, in Water Replenishment District of Southern California v. City of Cerritos (2012)
Second, in Ruiz v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau (2013)
On appeal, the court in Ruiz declined to apply City of Gardena to find the fee order to be nonappealable. The court held that "where the Agreement expressly contemplated further court proceedings and a separate ruling on the
The exception discussed in Ruiz does not apply here. In Ruiz , the parties expressly recognized a discrete issue that remained outstanding at the time of judgment and reserved jurisdiction for the trial court to determine the proper amount of reasonable attorney fees. Thus, Ruiz is unlike City of Gardena , where the parties expressed that the settlement agreement was intended by the parties "to settle their dispute fully and finally." ( City of Gardena , supra ,
Here, the agreement between the Howeths and Coffelt did not "expressly contemplate[ ] further court proceedings and a separate ruling." Instead, they agreed that "this agreement, stipulated judgment, represents a final resolution of all their disputes as of today's date." Although they acknowledged the judgment "shall be enforceable via contempt proceedings," they did not acknowledge they were expressly contemplating further court procеedings on a discrete issue that was not resolved at the time of entry of judgment. The Howeths and Coffelt manifested an intent to settle their dispute fully and finally and no exception to the rule set forth in City of Gardena applies here.
Even assuming City of Gardena does not apply here, the trial court's order would still not be appealable under well-established rules. As we will explain, the court's order does not relate to the underlying judgment and, therefore, is not an appealable order after judgment.
The Howeths' assertion the trial court's order denying their motion is an appealable order after judgment necessarily implies that the underlying judgment was an appealable, final judgment. A judgment is final, and therefore appealable, only if it terminates the trial court proceеdings and completely disposes of the matter in controversy. ( Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com'n (2001)
Indeed, the judgment, although a consent judgment, appears to be a final judgment completely disposing of the Howeths' lawsuit. As stated by the Howeths' attorney, "[t]he parties have agreed this action shall be resolved by a stipulated judgment between the parties." The judgment entered
By seeking an award of damages, the motion was instead aimed at enforcing the settlement agreement. In addition to stipulating to the entry of judgment to fully and finally settle the current disрute, the settlement agreement established an enforcement mechanism to be applied in the case of future disputes. The language of the agreement supports this conclusion. The agreement repeatedly referred to "bringing an action to enforce payment of the fine." In regard to the judgment, the parties agreed that it "shall be enforсeable via contempt proceedings on an expedited basis pursuant to the judgment entered by this court today." The parties agreed that enforcement of the judgment would occur via a contempt proceeding-which does not permit an award of damages, as discussed above-and enforcement of the settlement agreement wоuld occur via a separate "action," not motion.
It is undisputed that the order denying the Howeths' motion was entered after judgment. But this temporal circumstance, standing alone, is insufficient to establish the appealability of the order. To be appealable, a postjudgment order " 'must either affect the judgment or relate to it by enforcing it or staying its exеcution.' " ( Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993)
To avoid this conclusion, the Howeths are attempting to have it both ways by contending the judgment was final and appealable, but also asserting that the judgment itself included the enforcement mechanism and contemplated judicial review in the same proceeding to resolve future disputes in perpetuity. In this conception of the judgment, the trial court would be entering successive interlocutory judgments determining imposition of fines for as long as the Howeths and Coffelt own their homes. This, however, would suggest the judgment is not final and would violate the " 'one final judgment' rule, which provides 'interlocutory or interim orders are not appealablе, but are only "reviewable on appeal" from the final judgment.' " ( Doran v. Magan (1999)
Thus, to constitute a final judgment, the stipulated judgment here cannot be construed as an interlocutory judgment that
The Howeths attempt to invoke section 664.6, which permits a court to "retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until рerformance in full of the terms of the settlement." The application of section 664.6 is irrelevant to the issue of whether the trial court's order is appealable.
Section 664.6, however, does not apply in this circumstance. The retention of jurisdiction pursuant to section 664.6 is intended to allow the court to ensure all parties perform pursuant to а settlement agreement that results in a dismissal of a lawsuit. ( Wackeen v. Malis (2002)
The Howeths cite no authority suggesting a trial court may retain jurisdiction pursuant to section 664.6 to summarily enforce the terms of a settlement agreement as applied to new disputes that arise after a final judgment is entered. Even when applied expansively in unusual circumstances, the power of the trial court under section 664.6 "is extremely limited." ( Hernandez v. Board of Educ. of Stockton Unified School Dist. (2004)
Regardless, even applied expansively, section 664.6 does not authorize the Howeths' motion. The motion is not seeking to compel Coffelt's performance to effectuate the settlement agreement and resolve the dispute at issue in the Howeths' complaint. Instead, the Howeths are seeking to litigate new issues that arose after the settlement and entry of thе resulting judgment. To allow
As the trial court recognized, determination of whether the Howeths are entitled to collect the fine from Coffelt for each of her 12 alleged violations of the settlement agreement requires the Howeths to pursue a cause of action for breach of contract. The motion did not attempt to enforce the judgment that resultеd from the agreement
Anticipating that this court would hold the order is nonappealable, the Howeths ask this court to еxercise its discretion to construe the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. The Howeths, however, do not establish any exceptional circumstances warranting that relief. (See Olson v. Cory (1983)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Coffelt is entitled to her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
BENKE, J.
Notes
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.