82 Kan. 367 | Kan. | 1910
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This action, has been reconsidered by the court after argument upon a rehearing heretofore allowed. The facts are stated in the first opinion. (Howerton v. Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553.)
Upon a careful consideration of the arguments made upon the rehearing and of the authorities the court is satisfied with the former opinion, except in one particular. It was held that there was no adequate remedy in damages for the default of the defendant. Upon a review of the findings of the district court, and of the evidence upon which the conclusions of law of that court were based, we now hold that the plaintiffs failed to show, as they were required to do in order to obtain equitable relief, that damages would.not afford an ade
It should be observed that this is not a case where royalties payable in a share of the product are provided for, but is an agreement to pay $50 per annum for each gas well. The measure of damages, therefore, is the sum the plaintiffs have lost or may lose by the failure of the defendant to complete the number of producing wells reasonably necessary to develop the resources of the leased land and to protect its lines. When the plaintiffs shall have received $50 per year for each well from the time it should have been drilled they will have received the full compensation agreed
If it shall be ascertained upon another trial that such a rule can not be applied, an alternative decree may be entered, upon proper proof adduced to support it, providing that the defendant shall proceed within a reasonable time, fixed by the court, to drill wells and develop and protect the land leased, as before indicated, and pay the amounts stipulated in the lease for such wells, as well as for the well already completed, or, failing to do so, that the lease be canceled. To this end proper amendments of the pleadings should be allowed if 'requested or found to be necessary.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with these views.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially) : I think the court should declare as a matter of law, from its knowledge of conditions in the oil-and-gas territory, that witnesses of experience can testify with reasonable accuracy to what number of wells would be required properly to develop .the land embraced in the lease, including such wells as would reasonably be necessary to protect
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) : A reexamination of this case has confirmed the views expressed in the first opinion. I am unable to see how the rule of damages announced by the court can be applied to afford adequate relief. How many wells should be drilled, and when they should be drilled, will, I believe, result in mere conjecture, even after the most patient judicial inquiry. The plaintiffs had a right to expect an actual demonstration by a reasonably diligent use of the drill. The opinions of witnesses, however confidently given, must necessarily be speculations. ' The evidence shows that wells were drilled around this tract dyring the year before the trial, some of which were dry. Who can say how many wejls to be drilled on this tract will produce gas in marketable quantities? The result of drilling each successive well may change the prospect and consequently vary the obligation of the lessee. If a new well or .wells should diminish the pressure in the. Others, the prospect would be affected unfavorably; if that result should not follow, the prospect might be improved. If the operations should result in several dry wells, the situation would be again changed. In each contingency an estimate of the number reasonably necessary would be varied. If it be suggested that in case the probable result can not be foretold the plaintiffs Have no equity to be preserved, the answer is that in just such cases equity furnishes the only adequate relief. The plaintiffs had sufficient faith in the resources of the land to contract for its development and encumber it with a lease. The defendant had sufficient faith to agree to .make such
The right of the plaintiffs to reasonable returns from their property under this lease is disregarded, and no promise is given to proceed. In this situation the remarks of the Pennsylvania supreme court in Munroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. St. 307, is pertinent, viz., that the lessee is “bound to operate or quit.” (Page 310.) While the terms of the lease referred to in that case were different from the one now under consideration, in view of the obligation of the parties here, as interpreted by the coui“t, the foregoing language seems applicable. The alternative decree provided for will, I fear, be found difficult to frame or to enforce, and may only serve to perpetuate litigation. It is hoped, however, that it will be the means of administering justice, in case that end is not reached by an award of damages — which seems to the writer improbable.