373 S.E.2d 216 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1988
Deborah Howell appeals from her conviction of theft by taking of a purse.
1. Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. The evidence adduced at trial revealed that Henry Taylor, the floor manager of the nightclub where appellant was a customer, was apprised by Hope Henderson, a co-employee, that she thought appellant was stealing purses. Taylor testified he observed appellant reach under a desk at the front of the nightclub where employees and regular customers kept their purses, but when Henderson called out to appellant that it was her (Henderson’s) purse, appellant straightened up, waved a cap that was under the desk, then returned the cap before walking back into the nightclub. Taylor had Henderson contact the police. Upon their arrival, Taylor testified he asked appellant to come to the front of the club to talk to the police. Taylor stated that while appellant was carrying a purse on her arm or shoulder when he approached her, when he spoke to ask her to come speak
Appellant testified that she picked up Carlton’s purse, mistaking it for her own, after stopping to chat with friends at a table in the middle of the room and that she told the bartender about it when she discovered the mistake. She stated that Taylor startled her by grabbing her arm when he asked her to walk to the front and that caused her to drop the purse, but that it was she, not Taylor, who picked the purse off the floor. She testified that she then handed the purse to Taylor and walked to the front to talk to the police.
The weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses are questions for the jury. Davis v. State, 180 Ga. App. 299, 300 (1) (349 SE2d 29) (1986). Although appellant argues the State failed to prove she acted with the intent necessary to constitute theft by taking under OCGA § 16-8-2, “whether or not mens rea, the specific intent to do an unlawful act, exists, is a question of fact. ‘The question of criminal intent is for the jury and not for the court.’ [Cit.]” Jerome v. State, 143 Ga. App. 649 (239 SE2d 541) (1977). The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in a light favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Freeman v. State, 184 Ga. App. 678, 681 (6) (362 SE2d 413) (1987). We thus find the evidence sufficient to meet the standard of proof required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Appellant contends Taylor’s testimony regarding what Henderson told him was hearsay evidence, the admission of which constituted reversible error. The record reveals that the trial court overruled appellant’s hearsay objection to Taylor’s testimony regarding the initial conversation he had with Henderson on the basis that the testimony was submitted to explain Taylor’s subsequent conduct in observing appellant and directing that the police be contacted. OCGA § 24-3-2. At the request of appellant’s counsel, the trial court thereafter instructed the jury that “[n]ormally we do not allow one person to testify what another person said, because that’s usually not the best
Following the trial court’s curative instruction, appellant made no objection to Taylor’s testimony upon the ground that its substance was inadmissible hearsay; “instead, it appears appellant was satisfied that the court had cured what was objectionable.” Mullins v. State, 176 Ga. App. 439, 440 (336 SE2d 343) (1985). Although appellant complains now for the first time that the admission of Taylor’s testimony pursuant to the provisions of OCGA § 24-3-2 was improper under Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867 (294 SE2d 482) (1982) and Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 536 (314 SE2d 910) (1984), the trial court was not asked to rule on that ground and thus there is nothing to review. Mullins, supra; see also Cooper v. State, 188 Ga. App. 297 (372 SE2d 679).
Judgment affirmed.