Howell v. HowellHowell v. Howell
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Harris
delivered the opinion of the court.
If the theory of the plaintiffs is correct, Joseph H. Howell and his son John M. Howell were tenants in common, owning equal interests in two tracts of land which aggregated 35 acres; upon the death of John *544M. Howell Ms undivided one half, by operation of law, descended to Ms three children subject to the dower interest possessed by Amy N. Howell; the writing, which Joseph H. Howell prepared and no doubt believed would serve as his will, did not provide for or mention John M. Howell or his children, and was therefore not binding upon the plaintiffs (Sections 7325 and 7348, L. O. L.); and if the decree rendered in the partition suit is annulled, the grandchildren become the owners as tenants in common of the 35 acres, subject only to the unadmeasured dower interests of Amy N. Howell and Fiducia F. Howell. The grandmother combats the contention made by plaintiffs and in part rests her asserted rights upon the claim that she furnished money with which to buy the land in dispute; she affirms that the partition suit was free from fraud and therefore effective; and she insists that her title is impervious to attack because the plaintiffs acquiesced in and apparently were satisfied with the division of the land and without protest permitted her to expend money in the construction of a house when they knew that she believed the structure was being erected on her own land.
It is not necessary to ascertain how much money Fiducia F. Howell furnished for the Thomas and Watt 20-acre tract. She does not claim any interest in that property, nor is she in a position to do so, because the partition suit cut off all her rights to any part of the 20 acres which were allotted to the grandchildren and their mother.
The partition suit did in fact accord recognition to the contributions made by Fiducia F. Howell by awarding her an equal interest with Joseph H. Howell in the Mohney or 15.61-acre tract. It clearly appears that Joseph H. Howell and his son borrowed the funds which were used to purchase the Mohney tract; they gave a mortgage on the Santiam farm to secure the loan; they satisfied the mortgage from proceeds of the sale of the Santiam farm; and consequently the Mohney tract was purchased with their money. It is *547true that Fidueia F. Howell paid $2,500 of her money on the attempted purchase of the Santiam farm, hut no title or interest was gained by the payment because the title had not passed from the government. Her money was lost. “When title did finally pass, it went to Joseph H. Howell and to J. M. Howell by virtue of the homestead entries made by them. Fidueia F. Howell had confidence in her husband and son, and each had unbounded faith in the other; they worked in harmony and formed a happy partnership; it is quite likely that the strongest hand at the helm was that of the grandmother, and it is probable that her energy and industry contributed most to the common savings; but, the evidence fails to supply the essentials of a resulting trust: Sisemore v. Pelton, 17 Or. 554 (21 Pac. 667); De Roboam v. Schmidtlin, 50 Or. 393 (92 Pac. 1082); Williamson v. Roberts, 70 Or. 126 (138 Pac. 840, 140 Pac. 633); Chance v. Graham, 76 Or. 199 (148 Pac. 65). It must be remembered, too, that the grandmother is vouching for the fairness of the decree in the partition suit, because she is claiming under a decree which awarded the Mohney tract, not to her alone, but to her and Joseph H. Howell.
The allegations of fraud found in paragraphs 11 and 12 appear many times throughout the complaint and particularly in paragraphs 10, 13, 14 and 15. Every allegation of fraud in the complaint is especially denied, except the two paragraphs numbered 11 and 12, and the denials are supplemented by a separate defense which affirms that the partition suit was free from fraud. While the answer fails to deny paragraphs 11 and 12, it did traverse the substance of those two paragraphs as found elsewhere in the complaint. It is true that the answer was assailed by a motion and also by a demurrer; but at no time, until after the appeal, was attention called to the failure to deny paragraphs 11 and 12. Evidence was offered by all the parties concerning the allegations of fraud, and the trial proceeded on the theory that the integrity of the partition suit was in issue. It must be borne in mind that :
“Procedure is not the end for which law was instituted, but the means by which justice may be administered in an orderly manner”: Williams v. Pacific Surety Co., 66 Or. 151, 156 (127 Pac. 145, 131 Pac. 1021, 132 Pac. 959, 133 Pac. 1186).
Since the plaintiffs are relying upon a technical defect, they must comply with the requirements of strict technical rules: Jackson v. Sumpter Valley Ry. Co., 50 Or. 455 (93 Pac. 356). It is plain that the defendant *549intended to deny every allegation of fraud, and she did deny the charge as it appeared in every paragraph of the complaint except 11 and 12. The plaintiffs did not direct the attention of the trial court to the exact state of the pleadings, but the question of fraud was tried and determined as though in issue, and consequently the plaintiffs have forfeited their right to take advantage of the inadvertence of Piducia P. Howell: Minard v. McBee, 29 Or. 225 (44 Pac. 491); Missoula Mercantile Co. v. O’Donnell, 24 Mont. 65 (60 Pac. 594, 991); Williams v. Hayes, 20 N. Y. 58.
The decree of the trial court is modified, without judgment for costs or disbursements in the court.
Modified.
Mr. Justice McBride, Mr. Justice Eakin and Mr. Justice Bean concur.