47 Vt. 262 | Vt. | 1875
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This meeting-house and land appear to have been subject to three kinds of ownership. At the bottom of all was the right of- George Howe to the reversion of the land, if his deed of it conveyed an estate upon condition; or to the remainder of the estate in it, if his deed conveyed an estate with a conditional limitation. Then there was the right of the brick meeting-house society to the house, and to the land so long as the condition in that deed should be kept. And besides these, there were the rights of the pew-holders, of whom the plaintiff was one, to the pews. The source and extent of the interest of the plaintiff as one of the pew-holders, do not appear, further than that it is stated that he owned one pew in his own right, and one undivided fifth part of five others in the right of his wife, unless other facts stated show a different interest. The other facts stated do not
This action is stated to have been brought for breaking and entering the house and taking out and destroying the pews. The mere entry into the house would not be any invasion of the individual rights of the plaintiff as a pew-holder; and he could not recover in this action for such entry; and it is insisted in argument that, therefore, he cannot be entitled to recover for anything done to the pew after the entry. But the pew itself, as it belonged to the plaintiff, was his real estate; and although he did not so own the materials of which it was made, nor have such exclusive right to it, that he could maintain the action of trespass for every interference with it, still, he could maintain that form of action for its destruction. The tearing up and removal of the pew.were equivalent to a destruction of it, and were a material and substantial part of the injury sued for, that the plaintiff could maintain the action for, without suing for the entry with it, and which he could recover for when sued for with the entry, without recovering for the entry. If the injury to the pew was a mere matter of aggravation, it would-be different-; but it is more than that; it is of the gist of the action. His right to the exclusive possession of
Judgment affirmed.