On August 24, 1983 claimant-appellant Howard suffered an on-the-job injury while working for employer-appellee Scott Housing Systems, Inc. The accident was accepted as compensable and claimant began receiving workers’ compensation benefits for temporary total disability. In July 1984, while still reсeiving these benefits, claimant was arrested and jailed on felony charges. On August 10, 1984 employer offered claimant a job which had been approved by claimant’s physician as suitable employment for his impaired physical condition. Claimant did not accept the job or report for work because he was incarcerated pending trial.
A hearing was held on January 16, 1985 on employer’s requested suspension of claimant’s benefits due to his rеfusal to take the offered job. The record was left open for receipt of additional evidence. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an award оn April 22, 1985 which stated in pertinent part: “On April 1, 1985, claimant pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with murder and armed robbery. Claimant was sentenced to life imprisonment. Accordingly, claimant has unjustifiably refused to accept the tendered employment as his inability to accept was brought about by his own wilful misconduct. Thе employer/insurer are authorized to suspend payment of the income benefit for total disability effective from January 17, 1985.” The ALJ’s award was adopted by the full board. The superior court affirmed the award and claimant’s application for discretionary appeal was granted by this court.
1. Clаimant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, specifically that in support of the finding that the job offered him on August 10, 1984 was suitable to his physical capacity. It is axiomatic that a finding of fact by the full board, when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding upon the superior court and this court.
Walton County v. Williams,
2. Claimant enumerates as error that рart of the award which orders the suspension of his workers’ compensation benefits effective January 17, 1985. To the contrary, claimant argues that he is entitled to receive such benefits until the date of his adjudication of guilt, April 1, 1985. We agree and reverse.
OCGA § 34-9-240 provides: “If an injured employee refuses еmployment procured for him and suitable to his capacity, he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of the board such refusal was *691 justified.” On August 10, 1984 employer offered a suitable job to claimant who did not accept the рosition by reporting for work because he was incarcerated pending trial and final adjudication of guilt. The award of the ALJ, adopted by the board and affirmed by the superior court contains the following: “Claimant was sentenced to life imprisonment. Accordingly, claimant has unjustifiably refused to accept the tendered employment as his inability to accept was brought about by his own wilful misconduct.” Benefits were then suspended effective from Januаry 17, 1985, the date following the hearing.
The general problem created by the post-injury incarceration of the workers’ compensation claimant has been dealt with in the reported cases of only a handful of states. See 1C Larson, Workman’s Compensation Law, § 47.31(g). We have found no case law addressing the precise issue in this case, which is whether claimant’s incarceration
pending adjudication of his guilt
justified his refusal of suitable employment within the meaning of OCGA § 34-9-240.
1
However, among those cases falling into the broad category involving imprisoned claimants, it is clear that incarceration standing alone is not a valid ground fоr termination of workers’ compensation disability benefits. See, e.g.,
Matter of Injury to Spera,
We are aware that “the board is vested with a broad discretion in detеrmining whether proffered employment is refused justifiably.”
Clark v. Ga. Kraft Co.,
3. Claimant also asserts that the superior court erred in affirming the boаrd’s award denying payment to Dr. J. W. Bickerstaff for medical care rendered to claimant. The record contains employer’s notice to cоntrovert payment to Dr. Bickerstaff dated June 7,1984. The only other indication that payment to Dr. Bickerstaff was challenged appears in the hearing bеfore the ALJ at the point claimant’s counsel tendered claimant’s medical bills. Counsel for employer objected to Dr. Bickerstaff's medical bills аnd bills for claimant’s prescription drugs as unauthorized medical expenses. We find no evidence in the record in support of employer’s claim thаt Dr. Bickerstaff’s treatment of claimant was unauthorized. While certainly not dispositive of the question, we notice that on numerous occasions throughout the record employer refers to Dr. Bickerstaff as claimant’s treating physician and his attending physician. Indeed, after the notice to controvert payment of Dr. Bickerstaff’s bills was filed, employer presented Dr. Bickerstaff with the job description for the position offered claimant on August 10, 1984. It is Dr. Bickеrstaff’s approval of that job which forms the basis for employer’s claim that it was “suitable employment.”
Because the record is devoid of any еvidence to support the employer’s claim that Dr. Bickerstaff’s treatment was unauthorized, the part of the award denying payment of his medical bills is аlso reversed and remanded to the board for findings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
We note that the factual posture of this case raises the possibility of payment of benefits during incarceration only until the adjudication of guilt. Claimant does not challenge the suspension of his benefits effective from the timе of the adjudication of his guilt. We specifically do not address any question of whether workers’ compensation benefits for a pre-arrest injury arе available to an incarcerated claimant who, either before or after adjudication of guilt, is physically unable to return to work or to whom no offer of suitable employment is tendered. See
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Roberts,