62 Colo. 131 | Colo. | 1916
delivered the opinion of the court.
“Any person who, with the intent to commit any crime, breaks and enters any building and, for the purpose of committing any crime, uses or attempts to use nitroglycerine, dynamite, gunpowder or any other explosive, is guilty of burglary with explosives.”
It is charged that defendants, with intent to commit larceny, broke and entered the banking house of the La
Complaint is made because the pleader used the word, “with” instead of “for,” where the statute provides: And “for” the purpose of committing any crime uses or attempts to use an explosive. Also it is claimed the information is faulty because the corporate existence of the bank is not affirmatively alleged, but only by way of recital. Whatever merit there may be in either of these contentions, they should have been called to the attention of the lower court before verdict. It is too late after trial and conviction to raise matters of this character for the first time. Sections 1956, 1978, 1986, R. S. 1908; Poole v. People, 24 Colo. 510, 513, 52 Pac. 1025, 65 Am. St. 245; Laycock v. State, 136 Ind. 217, 36 N. E. 137.
*135 “Individuals or co-partners engaged in banking shall not use the word ‘state’ as a part of the bank or firm name. ’ ’
It would seem that by reason of this banking act, the name, ‘ ‘ The La Jara State Bank, ’ ’ imports corporate existence just the same as if the proof had shown that it was a national bank. The corporate existence of the bank is a mere incident to the crime charged and we think under the evidence and our banking act, could be lawfully inferred from the name itself.
Affirmed.