Howard v. Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc.Howard v. Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc.
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Howard, Appellant, v. Catholic Social Services of Cuyahoga County, Inc., et al., Appellees.
[Cite as Howard v. Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 141.]
Custody -- Juvenile law -- Writ of habeas corpus does not lie in child custody matter, when -- Courts -- Jurisdiction -- Appellate procedure -- Appeal divests trial court of jurisdiction to consider
(Nos. 94-11 and 94-153 -- Submitted May 10, 1994 -- Decided August 31, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 66594.
In 1986, petitioner-appellant, Timothy Howard, entered into a common-law marriage with respondent-appellee, Julie Howard. When the parties separated between 1990 and 1992, appellant visited their two children, who had primarily resided with Julie. On March 14, 1992, Julie gave birth to Mary Beth, the child at issue during these proceedings. Julie had concealed her pregnancy and Mary Beth‘s birth from appellant, advising him that she went to the hospital to have a cyst removed. At the time of Mary Beth‘s birth, Julie had stated that she did not know the child‘s biological father‘s identity and denied that appellant was the child‘s biological father.
On March 17, 1992, Julie agreed to give temporary custody of Mary Beth to respondent-appellee, Catholic Social Services of Cuyahoga County, Inc. (“CSS“), a private child-placing agency. On June 1, 1992, Julie executed a permanent surrender of the child to CSS because she was “unable to care for the child” and believed that “adoption is in her best interests.” In a complaint filed on November 24, 1992 in case No. 9214817, CSS alleged that the child was dependent and prayed for permanent custody. Following a hearing at which all of the parties were present, the court granted emergency temporary custody of Mary Beth to CSS on December 14, 1992. In a report of a DNA parentage test dated February 1, 1993, appellant was determined to be the biological father of the child. Following an adjudicatory hearing, but prior to an adjudication of Mary
Prior to the actual dismissal of case No. 9214817, Mary Beth, through court-appointed counsel, filed a complaint on September 1, 1993 in case No. 9311338 alleging that she was a dependent child and requesting that permanent custody be awarded to CSS. The complaint further alleged that appellant was an alcoholic who had been accused of being violent by his wife, Julie. The juvenile court granted Mary Beth‘s motion for emergency temporary custody of her to CSS on the same day that the complaint was filed. The juvenile court subsequently vacated the emergency temporary custody order but granted a second motion for emergency temporary custody on September 14, 1993.
In November 1993, adjudicatory hearings were held on the complaint in case No. 9311338. On November 30, 1993, i.e., ninety days after the complaint for permanent custody was filed, appellant‘s counsel instructed appellant to leave the courtroom following his direct examination during a continuation of the adjudicatory hearings. That day, appellant‘s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to
According to a transcript made of the November 30, 1993 hearing by appellant‘s counsel and incorporated in appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment in the court of appeals, the juvenile court allowed CSS to file a third complaint, case No. 9315631, and another motion for emergency temporary custody of the child. The complaint, verified by CSS employee and licensed social worker Shirley Lee, stated that appellant (1) had not provided any care or support to the child, (2) was unable to care for the child because of his alcoholism, substance abuse, inability to provide necessary economic resources, and violent disposition, (3) had two prior children as a result of his common-law marriage to Julie but was not seeking custody of either of those children, (4) had an unstable home environment, and (5) was an unfit or unsuitable parent. CSS‘s motion for emergency temporary custody of Mary Beth claimed that neither appellant nor Julie was presently able to care for the child.
The juvenile court, in the presence of appellant‘s counsel, stated that it had heard testimony by appellant that he could not take care of the child at that time and that it was unaware of appellant‘s whereabouts since he had left the courthouse. The court stated that it would dismiss the complaint in case No. 9311338 without prejudice, and grant the motion for emergency temporary custody in case No. 9315631, allowing the new case to proceed. Appellant‘s counsel did not object to the court‘s analysis of appellant‘s testimony or request a hearing on the emergency temporary custody motion during the November 30, 1993 proceeding. Instead, he left the
On December 9, 1993, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, naming CSS and Julie Howard as respondents. Appellant claimed that he was entitled to immediate possession and legal custody of Mary Beth. On December 15, 1993, the court of appeals dismissed the petition sua sponte on the basis that appellant possessed an adequate remedy by appeal to challenge the juvenile court‘s award of preadjudicatory emergency temporary custody of Mary Beth to CSS. That judgment was appealed to this court as case No. 94-11. On January 6, 1993, the court of appeals overruled appellant‘s
The cause is now before this court upon the consolidated appeals as of right.
Michael D. Slodov, for appellant.
Albert E. Fowerbaugh, for appellee Catholic Social Services of Cuyahoga County, Inc.
Per Curiam. In his first proposition of law, appellant asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. CSS contends that appellant was not entitled to habeas corpus relief because the juvenile court possessed jurisdiction to issue the preadjudicatory emergency temporary custody orders. CSS relies upon
In the case at bar, the juvenile court possessed basic statutory jurisdiction pursuant to
Nevertheless, as we recently held in State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 635 N.E.2d 26, this conclusion does not end our inquiry into the propriety of habeas corpus, since
In the instant case, it is evident that the due process violations alleged by appellant, i.e., the juvenile court‘s repeated failure to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements set forth in
Further, the verified complaint in case No. 9315631 alleged that appellant was an unfit parent because of, inter alia, alcoholism and substance abuse. As CSS notes, the juvenile court merely acted in the best interests of the child when it granted its emergency temporary custody order where the verified complaint indicated that neither parent was then able to care for her. Under these circumstances, any alleged failure by the juvenile court to fully comply with the statutes did not violate appellant‘s constitutional right to due process.
Finally, as the court of appeals held, habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy and as with every extraordinary remedy is not available as a means of relief where there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In re Davis (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 226, 227, 18 OBR 285, 286, 480 N.E.2d 775, 776. Therefore, habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. McNeal v. Miami Cty. Children‘s Serv. Bd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 208, 210, 594 N.E.2d 587, 588. Habeas corpus relief is the exception to the general rule in child custody actions. Id.; cf. Marich v. Knox Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 163, 543 N.E.2d 776 (appeal not speedy enough where undue influence invalidated a permanent surrender agreement with a natural parent).
While appellant implicitly claims a jurisdictional defect by the juvenile court‘s continued grant of emergency temporary custody to CSS, a party challenging the court‘s jurisdiction generally has an adequate remedy at law via appeal from the court‘s holding that it has jurisdiction absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Sanquily v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 78, 80, 573 N.E.2d 606, 608. As noted previously, appellant‘s jurisdictional claim is meritless. Moreover, as to his constitutional due process claim, although appellant is correct that he possesses no immediate appeal from any preadjudicatory emergency temporary custody order, see Kurtz & Giannelli, Ohio Juvenile Law (2 Ed.1989) 112, Section T 7.07; cf. In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1170-1171, the absence of such remedy does not per se mean that an appeal following a determination of the permanent custody complaint is not an adequate remedy. Cf., e.g., Wenzel v. Enright (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 63, 66, 623 N.E.2d 69, 72 (appeal following conviction and sentence an adequate remedy to address error in pretrial overruling of dismissal motion based on double jeopardy), and State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 119 (appeal following conviction and
There may be certain extreme circumstances in which habeas corpus would lie where either one or a series of improperly entered emergency temporary custody orders is used solely to deprive natural parents of their paramount constitutional right to the care, custody, and management of their children, see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606, and In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171, without any findings as to parental suitability and the best interests of the children, but such extreme circumstances are not present in the case at bar.1 The court of appeals thus properly denied appellant‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and appellant‘s first proposition of law is overruled.
Appellant‘s second proposition of law asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying his
Although some Ohio appellate courts have adopted the view that trial courts can consider the merits of
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the court of appeals are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer, J., concurring in judgment. While I agree with the result reached by the majority, the opinion goes too far by unnecessarily discussing other scenarios where habeas corpus relief is not warranted. This extraneous analysis may affect future cases that are unimagined by the court today.