403 F.3d 228 | 4th Cir. | 2005
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in the judgment:
In this appeal by Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”), we are called upon to decide whether a claim by Zurich for unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums is entitled to priority status under § 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Zurich maintains that its claim is so entitled, asserting that such premiums constitute, under the applicable statutory provision, “contributions to an employee
I.
Under West Virginia law, employers in the state are required to “subscribe to and pay premium taxes into the [state’s] workers’ compensation fund for the protection of their employees.” W. Va.Code § 23-2-1(a). In the alternative, an employer may self-insure by, among other requirements, demonstrating its financial ability to cover any workers’ compensation claims that may arise. Id. at § 28-2-9. Howard, an over-the-road freight carrier operating in West Virginia, fulfilled its obligations under West Virginia law to become “self-insured” and purchased workers’ compensation insurance coverage from Zurich (the “Policy”).
On January 30, 2002, Howard filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of West Virginia, seeking court protection in the reorganization of its business operations. On May 9, 2002, Zurich filed an unliquidated and unsecured creditor’s claim in that proceeding, seeking priority status from the bankruptcy court for its claim for the unpaid premiums owed on the Policy.
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan—
(A) arising from services rendered within 180 days before the date of the filing of the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor’s business, whichever occurs first....
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4).
By an opinion filed on July 15, 2008, the bankruptcy court denied the Zurich Claim priority status, concluding that unpaid workers’ compensation premiums are not “bargained-for, wage-substitute-type benefits,” relying on materials it identified in the legislative history of the Statute. In re: Howard Delivery Serv., Inc., BK No. 02-30289, at *5 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va.) (the “Bankruptcy Opinion”) (observing also that three courts of appeals had so ruled while only one had determined otherwise). Zurich appealed the Bankruptcy Opinion to the district court, which affirmed, on December 22, 2003, on similar grounds. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Home Ins. Co. (In re: Howard Delivery Serv., Inc.), No. 3:03CV61, at *11 (N.D.W.VA.) (the “District Opinion”). Zurich has now appealed to this Court, contending that the Zurich Claim is entitled to priority status because the unpaid insurance premiums embodied therein constitute “contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered” under the Statute. We possess jurisdiction to consider Zurich’s appeal because, in these circumstances, the District Opinion and the corresponding Judgment in a Civil Case, filed on December 22, 2003, constitute a final decision of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
II.
Zurich’s appeal concerns the meaning and application of the Statute, which constitutes a question of law that we review de novo. See Loudoun Leasing Dev. Co. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 128 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir.1997). In construing the meaning of a statutory provision, we are obliged to utilize the well-settled two-step process explained in a long series of decisions, including Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Brown, 376 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir.2004). First, we must ascertain whether the language of the statutory provision is plain or ambiguous. If the provision is drawn in plain and unambiguous terms, we simply apply the statute’s plain meaning. Alternatively, if the language of the statutory provision is am
III.
In assessing whether the Zurich Claim is entitled to priority status under the Statute, I first briefly review the split of authority in the federal courts as to whether claims for unpaid insurance premiums are so entitled. As explained below, I am of the view that the pertinent statutory terms — “contributions,” “employee benefit plan,” and “services rendered” — are plain and unambiguous. I am therefore obliged to apply the Statute to the Zurich Claim and, in so doing, conclude that it is entitled to priority status thereunder.
A.
The issue presented by Zurich has been previously considered by several other courts, and they disagree on whether a debtor’s unpaid premiums for workers’ compensation insurance constitute “contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered,” and on whether a bankruptcy claim for such premiums is thereby entitled to fourth-level priority status under the Statute. Compare Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp. v. Birmingham-Nashville Express, Inc. (In re: Birmingham-Nashville Express, Inc.), 224 F.3d 511 (6th Cir.2000) (denying priority status), State Ins. Fund v. S. Star Foods, Inc. (In re: S. Star Foods, Inc.), 144 F.3d 712 (10th Cir.1998) (same), and Employers Ins. of Wausau, Inc. v. HLM Corp. (In re: HLM Corp.), 62 F.3d 224 (8th Cir.1995) (same), with Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries, Inc., 10 F.3d 605 (9th Cir.1993) (affording priority status). This disagreement among the courts rests upon opposing constructions of the Statute: the Ninth Circuit (and various district and bankruptcy courts) deeming the Statute to be unambiguous and affording priority to such claims; while the Sixth, Tenth, and Eighth Circuits (as well as several district and bankruptcy courts) have concluded that the Statute’s legislative history precludes priority status being accorded to such claims. These divergent views deserve some further examination.
1.
The first line of decisions addressing bankruptcy claims for unpaid insurance premiums, including the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Plaid Pantries, has found the Statute to be unambiguous, and thus reasoned that legislative history need not be considered. Relying on the Statute’s plain meaning, those courts have concluded that the Statute accords priority status to such claims as “contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered” under the Statute. See Plaid Pantries, 10 F.3d at 607 (according priority status to claim for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums); Saco, 711 F.2d at 449 (according priority status to claim for unpaid employee group life, health, and disability insurance premiums); Ivey v. Great W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 308 B.R. 752 (M.D.N.C.2004), appeal docketed, No. 04-1576 (4th Cir.2004) (according priority status to claim for unpaid health insurance premiums); Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Joint Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re: CirrusCorp), 196 B.R. 76
In this series of decisions, the courts that have assessed the priority status of claims premised on unpaid workers’ compensation premiums have found such claims to be indistinguishable from claims of priority status involving other types of employer-provided insurance benefits, e.g., health, disability, or life insurance. See Plaid Pantries, 10 F.3d at 607; Integrated Health Servs., 291 B.R. at 613. Indeed, the Statute fails to distinguish between an “employee benefit plan” that an employer is statutorily required to provide to its employees, ie., workers’ compensation, and a benefit plan that an employer voluntarily decides to provide. The courts adopting the plain meaning view of the Statute have thus concluded that bankruptcy claims for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums, like those for unpaid health, disability, and life insurance premiums, are entitled to priority status under the Statute.
2.
On the other hand, three of our sister circuits, as well as several of the lower courts, have turned to and relied on aspects of the Statute’s legislative history in concluding that claims for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums are somehow different from claims for premiums to voluntarily provided benefit plans, and that claims for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums are not entitled to priority status as “contributions to an employee benefit plan” under the Statute. See Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 517 (holding unpaid workers’ compensation premiums are not entitled to priority status); S. Star Foods, 144 F.3d at 715-17 (same); HLM Corp., 62 F.3d at 225 (same); In re: Allentown Moving & Storage, 214 B.R. 761 (E.D.Pa.1997) (same); Edward W. Minte Co. v. Franey & Parr (In re: Edward W. Minte Co.), 286 B.R. 1, 8-13 (Bankr.D.D.C.2002) (same); In re: Perk Dev. Corp. Brambury Assocs., 246 B.R. 753 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.2000) (same); In re: Arrow Carrier Corp., 154 B.R. 642 (Bankr.D.N.J.1993) (same); see also In re: AER-Aerotron, Inc., 182 B.R. 725 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1995) (denying priority status to claim for unpaid life insurance premiums).
Congress enacted the Statute in 1978 in an effort to abrogate two Supreme Court decisions which had construed the terms “wages” and “commissions” of the priority provision of the predecessor statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus. v. United States, 391 U.S.
The line of decisions relying on the Statute’s legislative history have generally concluded that a workers’ compensation plan does not constitute a wage substitute and is not an “employee benefit plan” under the Statute, because workers’ compensation is statutorily mandated.
B.
In order to ascertain which of these competing views to adopt, I must, pursuant to the applicable principles of statutory construction, first decide whether the Statute has a plain and unambiguous meaning. Newport News Shipbldg., 376 F.3d at 248; see Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 580 U.S. 1, 7, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) (admonishing that “when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms”) (citations omitted). In enacting the Statute, Congress failed to define the terms “contributions,” “employee benefit plan,” or “services rendered,” as they are used therein, nor has the Supreme Court construed those terms. Where, as here, a statutory provision fails to expressly define the terms to be assessed, we are obliged to construe them in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994).
In these circumstances, in order to ascertain whether the Statute is plain or ambiguous, I will assess separately the ordinary and natural meanings of the pertinent statutory terms, i.e., “contributions,” “employee benefit plan,” and “ser
1.
First of all, an accepted and ordinary meaning of the term “contributions” is that they include sums “paid by an employer to [a] group-insurance fund ... for employees.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 496 (reprint 1993) (1981). Importantly, a contribution need not be a payment that is voluntarily made. Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 516 (observing that “employer’s statutorily mandated payment to an employee benefit plan ... is no less of a ‘contribution’ to such a fund simply because it is mandated by statute”). Applying this meaning of the term “contributions” to these circumstances, Howard’s unpaid premiums on the Policy constitute sums to be paid by an employer to a group insurance fund for workers’ compensation insurance, and constitute “contributions” within the meaning of the Statute.
2.
Second, the insurance coverage provided by the Policy for Howard’s workers’ compensation liabilities constitutes an “employee benefit plan” as that term is used in the Statute. As explained below, I reach this conclusion because a workers’ compensation plan constitutes an “employee benefit plan” under the Statute, and because the insurance coverage purchased by an employer to cover such a plan is also an “employee benefit plan.”
a.
A workers’ compensation insurance program constitutes a detailed contractual arrangement enabling an employer to pro
I acknowledge, and respectfully so, that three of the four courts of appeals to face this question have disagreed, taking the view that workers’ compensation insurance coverage does not constitute an “employee benefit plan.” We are unable to decide such an issue by a poll of the courts, however, and I view the contrary reasoning of those courts as unpersuasive. See McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (“Judicial interpretation is not an exercise in poll-taking.”) The courts adopting the contrary view have relied on aspects of the Statute’s legislative history to interpret the term “employee benefit plan,” and they have consistently done so without first deciding that the statutory term is ambiguous. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the plain meaning of the term “employee benefit plan” militated against affording priority based upon the legislative history of the Statute. HLM Corp., 62 F.3d at 225 (observing that since Bankruptcy Code did not define term, “the legislative history is instructive and illuminating” without addressing term’s plain meaning). The Tenth Circuit simply concluded that a split in the circuits was sufficient evidence that the statutory provision was ambiguous. S. Star Foods, 144 F.3d at 715 (“The split in the circuits is, in itself, evidence of the ambiguity of the phrase ‘contributions to an employee benefit plan’... .”).
The language of the Statute is plain and unambiguous — it does not require that compensation received by an employee be a “wage substitute,” nor does it exclude an employee benefit plan that is statutorily mandated.
b.
Turning next to the question of whether this particular Policy constitutes an “employee benefit plan,” within the meaning of the Statute, I conclude that it does. The Policy constitutes such a “plan,” in that it is a “detailed and systematic formulation of a large-scale ... program of action.” Webster’s Third 1729. The district court concluded otherwise, finding that the Policy failed to benefit Howard’s employees, and that it benefitted Howard only, because “the insurance is designed to shield Howard from the liability of providing workers’ compensation benefits.” District Opinion at *10.
Notwithstanding the benefits accruing to Howard under the Policy, the insurance coverage provided thereunder plainly inured to the benefit of Howard’s employees. Zurich was obliged to pay Howard’s workers’ compensation claims and be partially reimbursed by Howard pursuant to the Policy’s provisions. As a result, the Policy directly benefitted the Howard employees who received compensation. See Ivey v. Great W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. (In re: Ivey), 308 B.R. 752, 757 (M.D.N.C.2004) (“the plain language of the statute ... include[s] priority for an insurance company which has expended its own funds to make the plan work”). That the Policy may also have benefitted Howard is not controlling, because it unquestionably provided an “employee benefit” under the plain and unambiguous meaning of that term.
Nearly all the courts addressing the issue have ruled that claims for unpaid health, disability, and life insurance premiums are entitled to priority status under the Statute, and that those types of insurance constitute a benefit to employees.
3.
Finally, Howard asserts that the meaning of the term “services rendered,” as found in the Statute, is limited to those services rendered by its employees and does not include services rendered by an insurer such as Zurich. See Edward W. Minte Co. v. Franey & Parr (In re: Edward W. Minte Co.), 286 B.R. 1, 8-13 (Bankr.D.D.C.2002).
I reject Howard’s contention on this point because it seeks to inappropriately limit the breadth of the relevant term. I am again content to follow Justice Breyer’s guidance in Saco that insurers may be entitled to priority under the Statute. 711 F.2d at 449. Regardless of whether the term “services rendered” refers to the provision of insurance or is limited to employees’ services, the Zurich Claim satisfies this aspect of the Statute. It is only because workers were employed by Howard (and providing services to it) prior to the bankruptcy filing that Howard’s obligation to provide insurance and pay the necessary premiums arises. The Zurich Claim thus arises from “services rendered” by Howard’s employees, ie., their services occasioned Howard’s obligation to purchase workers’ compensation insurance, and by Zurich as well, ie., providing insurance.
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Zurich Claim is entitled to priority under the Statute. I therefore concur in the judgment to reverse the decision of the district court and remand for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.
concurring:
While I appreciate Judge King’s well-crafted opinion and concur in its result, I base my opinion on a different rationale. Our paths diverge on the issue of whether the phrase “employee benefit plan” in § 507(a)(4) is ambiguous. Judge King
The “first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (holding that the term “employee” in Title VII is ambiguous in its context). In determining whether a statute is plain or ambiguous, a court must consider the specific language employed, the specific context of that language, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. A statute is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Brown, 376 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir.2004). “If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends there.” Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir.1996). If, however, a statute is ambiguous, resort to legislative history is appropriate. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 186, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 1595, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004).
In deciding that § 507(a)(4) is unambiguous, Judge King picks and chooses from accepted dictionary definitions of the words “benefit” and “plan” and concludes that an “employee benefit plan” is any “cash payment provided for under an ... insurance plan” or “financial help in time of sickness, old age, or unemployment” to an employee that is paid according to “a detailed and systematic formulation of a large-scale campaign or program of action.” Although this definition might be one reasonable interpretation of these words, it is not the only reasonable interpretation. For instance, in common usage the phrase “employee benefit plan” can refer to a package of “fringe benefits,” which may or may not include workers’ compensation benefits. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(b) (2005) (stating that, for purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, an “employee benefit plan” is a plan that “provides employees with what are frequently referred to as ‘fringe benefits’ ”); Employee Fringe Benefits: Tax Policy Issues, Management Matters, Sept. 1, 1992 (listing the four most common “fringe benefits” as pensions, health insurance, life insurance, and flexible benefit programs). Moreover, the context of the statute suggests that Congress could have intended the phrase “employee benefit plan” to be a term of art having a specific meaning different from the sum of what these three words mean individually. Accordingly, because the term “employee benefit plan” is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is appropriate to consider the legislative history of § 507(a)(4) to determine what Congress intended by using this particular language. See BedRoc, 124 S.Ct. at 1595.
As originally introduced in 1975, the new priority for “employee benefit plans” included “allowed claims for contributions to pension, insurance, or similar employee benefit plans_” H.R. 31, 94th Congress (1975) (emphasis added). In hearings before the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives, one important witness — a union official representing more than a dozen affiliated
The priority was enacted into law two years later as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)). Congress enacted the exact wording proposed in the House Judiciary Committee hearing two years earlier, so that the priority applies to “allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4).
In this particular instance, the best evidence as to what Congress intended by incorporating the term “employee benefit plan” comes not from attempting to ascertain the overriding purposes and aims of the legislation.
ERISA § 3(3) defines the term “employee benefit plan” to mean “an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan.... ” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (emphasis added). An “employee welfare benefit plan” is:
any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an employer ... to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or*241 otherwise, ... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). Based on these definitions, the workers’ compensation insurance plan at issue in this case qualifies as an “employee benefit plan.” The plan at issue was established by Howard Delivery Service through the purchase of insurance and was maintained for the purpose of providing benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability or death of the employees.
Because Congress enacted an ambiguous statute, we must ascertain from the statute’s legislative history which types of plans Congress meant to include in this new bankruptcy priority. In my view, the best evidence reveals that Congress intended the term “employee benefit plan” in § 507(a)(4) to share the same meaning as “employee benefit plan” under ERISA. A workers’ compensation insurance plan is an “employee benefit plan” under ERISA, and it necessarily follows that a workers’ compensation plan qualifies as an “employee benefit plan” under § 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, I concur with Judge King that the Zurich Claim is entitled to priority and that the judgment of the district court should be reversed.
. Although not relevant to this appeal, Howard also purchased employer's liability and automobile liability policies from Zurich.
. The Policy provided coverage to Howard on a "claims incurred” basis; that is, claims incurred while the Policy was in effect were covered, regardless of when such claims might be made. The Policy was a high-deductible insurance plan, requiring Howard to reimburse Zurich for all losses up to $250,000.
. Zurich filed another claim in Howard's bankruptcy proceeding on May 9, 2002 — an unliquidated, unsecured, and nonpriority claim — which is not relevant to this appeal.
. The amount of the Zurich Claim is premised on an actuarial analysis of Zurich's exposure to liability for claims incurred while the Policy was in effect. The Zurich Claim was admittedly slightly overstated, because it included a small amount owed under the automobile liability policy and covered a time period slightly in excess of 180 days.
. Creditors holding valid claims of fourth-level priority may recover from the general assets of a bankrupt’s estate following, first,
. Subsection (d) of § 158 provides jurisdiction in the courts of appeals "from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees [by a district court] entered under subsection (a)." It is generally acknowledged that the “finality" requirement of § 158(d) is to be interpreted in light of the special circumstances of bankruptcy proceedings. See Comm. of Daikon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.1987). And, as explained by Justice Breyer (then serving on the First Circuit) in a seminal decision on § 158(d) jurisdictional issues, In re: Saco Local Development Corp., a district court’s ruling in a priority dispute is typically an appealable ruling. 711 F.2d 441, 445 (1st Cir.1983) ("[A] ‘final judgment, order, or decree' ... includes an order that conclusively determines a separable dispute over a creditor’s claim or priority.”) (emphasis added).
The district court's ruling that the Zurich Claim was not entitled to priority effectively concluded the dispute between Zurich and Howard because the Zurich Claim was then rendered valueless. If the Zurich Claim is not now accorded priority status, Zurich becomes another general unsecured creditor of Howard, and it is agreed that Zurich would then receive nothing from Howard’s bankrupt estate. Furthermore, if it loses this appeal, Zurich has agreed to withdraw the Zurich Claim.
. None of the decisions taking this view has held that an "employee benefit plan” under the Statute must have resulted from collective bargaining. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit specifically rejected such an assertion, agreeing with the First Circuit’s decision in Saco, stating: "we do not hold that to qualify for priority under § 507(a)(4) the wage substitute must actually be the product of collective bargaining.” Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 517 (relying on Saco, 711 F.2d at 449).
. In concluding that the unpaid insurance premiums owed to Zurich are contributions, I necessarily reject the view that a contribution does not include the unilateral purchase of such a product or service, because a contribution, as defined by Random House, means inter alia, giving "along with others." Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 515 (quoting Random House Dictionary of the English Language 308 (1981) (emphasis added)). Because the bankrupt employer in the Birmingham-Nashville proceeding was, like Howard, the sole purchaser of an insurance policy, its unpaid premiums were deemed not to constitute contributions. Id. I see this as an overly narrow interpretation of the term "contributions,” precluding the existence of a sole contributor and denying priority status to claims for unpaid life, health, and disability insurance premiums. Claims for such unpaid insurance premiums have been accorded priority status by the First Circuit in Saco, and by multiple district and bankruptcy courts. See Saco, 711 F.2d at 441; see also supra Part III.A.1.
. Certain bankruptcy courts have found the ERISA definition of "employee benefit plan” to be useful in construing the meaning of the Statute, because, under ERISA, workers’ compensation is identified as an "employee benefit plan.” See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(3), 1003(b); see, e.g., Allegheny Int’l, Inc. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. (In re: Allegheny Int’l, Inc.), 138 B.R. 171, 173-74 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992), aff'd, 145 B.R. 820 (W.D.Pa.1992). However, "[mjost federal courts ... have rejected this reasoning.” Birmingham-Nashville, 224 F.3d at 517. Importantly, the Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of construing terms found in the Bankruptcy Code, it is inappropriate to incorporate characterizations of a term in another statute absent some congressional indication that this was intended. United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 225, 116 S.Ct. 2106, 135 L.Ed.2d 506 (1996). I therefore decline to rely upon the ERISA definition.
. I see this point as unpersuasive. As Justice Thomas has aptly observed, "[a] mere disagreement among litigants over the meaning of a statute does not itself prove ambiguity; it usually means that one of the litigants is simply wrong.” Bank of A. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 461, 119 S.Ct. 1411, 143 L.Ed.2d 607 (1991) (Thomas, J., concurring).
. See also In re: Integrated Health Servs., Inc., 291 B.R. 611 (Bankr.D.Del.2003) (making comprehensive analysis of statute and pertinent legislative history, and according priority status to claim for unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums).
. In resolving this issue I am impressed with the reasoning of the recent decision of the Middle District of North Carolina on the question of whether a claim for unpaid insurance premiums is entitled to priority status. Ivey, 308 B.R. at 755-57. That court makes a comprehensive analysis of this issue, concluding that such a claim is entitled to priority
. Under the Minte decision, on which Howard relies for this contention, only employees or administrators of employee benefit plans who represent employee interests may recover under the Statute. 286 B.R. at 10.
. Because the language of the Statute is plain and unambiguous, I decline Howard's invitation to examine its legislative history. Conducting such an analysis "would require a radical abandonment of our long-standing precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 1595, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004).
. I note, however, that my approach is also consistent with the Congressional purpose and aim of the legislation. Language in the House Committee Report explaining the purpose of the new priority provision suggests that workers' compensation plans are entitled to priority. That Report states that the new priority will cover contributions and payments to plans including "health insurance programs, life insurance plans, pension funds, and all other forms of employee compensation that is not in the form of wages." H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 6148 (1977). Under this very broad language, workers’ compensation would qualify as "employee compensation that is not in the form of wages.”
. Relying on United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 116 S.Ct. 2106, 135 L.Ed.2d 506 (1996), Judge King rejects the ERISA definition because it is "inappropriate to incorporate characterizations of a term in another statute absent some congressional indication that this was intended.” This contention ignores the indication of Congress's intent in the legislative history. The plain facts that (1) Congress was urged to make § 507(a)(4) consistent with ERISA and (2) Congress subsequently amended the provision to employ the very same term that is used in ERISA provides "some congressional indication” that "employee benefit plan” should have the same meaning in both statutes. Simply, Congress used a special term it had used in the recent past with knowledge of what that term meant.
. ERISA § 4(b)(3) further confirms that the term "employee benefit plan” includes workers' compensation plans. This code section provides: (b) The provisions of this subchap-ter shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if— (3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation laws 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (emphasis added). In other words, all workers’ compensation plans are "employee benefit plans” under ERISA's definition, but ERISA does not govern all "employee benefit plans,” including some workers’ compensation plans. See PPG Indus. Pension Plan v. Crews, 902 F.2d 1148, 1151 (4th Cir.1990) (deciding that ERISA applies to company's employee benefit plan providing workers’ compensation benefits because it was not maintained solely for the purpose of complying with West Virginia's workers' compensation laws).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
The sole question in this appeal is whether the claim of Zurich American Insurance Company filed against the estate of Howard Delivery Service, Inc., the debt- or in bankruptcy, for unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums is given priority by § 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Because such premiums are plainly not — as the statute requires they must be — “contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered,” 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4), I would affirm the judgment of the district court denying priority for Zurich’s claim.
In holding that claims for unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums enjoy the same priority as claims for unpaid employee fringe benefits, the judgment of the majority widens a split among the circuits, joining the Ninth Circuit as the only circuit that has so held. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Plaid Pantries, Inc., 10 F.3d 605 (9th Cir.1993). The other three circuits that have considered this issue have held that claims for unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums do not fall within the statutory language of § 507(a)(4) and therefore do not enjoy the priority afforded by that section. See Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp. v. Birmingham-Nashville Express, Inc. (In re: Birmingham-Nashville Express, Inc.), 224 F.3d 511 (6th Cir.2000); State Ins. Fund v. Southern Star Foods, Inc. (In re: Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 144 F.3d 712 (10th Cir.1998); Employers Ins. of Wausau, Inc. v. HLM Corp. (In re: HLM Corp.), 62 F.3d 224 (8th Cir.1995). Because I believe that the decisions of these
I
When construing a statutory provision, we begin with an analysis of the statute’s language. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685, 105 S.Ct. 2297, 85 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985). If the language is unambiguous and “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,” we apply the statute as written. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843.
Moreover, in construing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, we keep in mind its overriding objective of providing to creditors equal distribution of a debtor’s limited resources. See Isaac v. Temex Energy, Inc. (In re Amarex, Inc.), 853 F.2d 1526, 1530 (10th Cir.1988). Because of this broad equitable purpose, statutory priorities must be narrowly construed. See Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 224 F.3d at 517; New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. W. Va. Workers’ Comp. Fund, 886 F.2d 714, 719 (4th Cir.1989); Isaac, 853 F.2d at 1530. Stating this principle as a rule of statutory construction, the claims of a class of creditors may receive preferential or priority treatment from bankruptcy courts only when authorized by Congress in clear and unequivocal terms. See United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 31, 33, 79 S.Ct. 554, 3 L.Ed.2d 601 (1959). It follows that if a particular type of unsecured claim is not clearly and unequivocally listed in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a), which enumerates the Bankruptcy Code’s priorities, then Congress had no intention of giving the claim priority, see Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952); Employee Transfer Corp. v. Grigsby (In re White Motor Corp.), 831 F.2d 106, 110 (6th Cir.1987), and we would not be free to create a new priority, see Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917).
II
In this case, we consider whether 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) clearly grants priority to claims for unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums. Before turning to the specific language of § 507(a)(4), it is useful to give context to the enactment of that section, see Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, which in this case provides substantial assistance in understanding the statutory language employed by Congress.
Congress enacted § 507(a)(4) in 1978 specifically to overrule the holdings in two Supreme Court cases: United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 79 S.Ct. 554, 3 L.Ed.2d 601 (1959), and Joint Industry Board v. United States, 391 U.S. 224, 88 S.Ct. 1491, 20 L.Ed.2d 546 (1968). In Embassy Restaurant, the Court construed the predecessor to § 507(a), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (repealed 1978), which established a priority in bankruptcy for claims of “wages ... due to workmen,” and held that a claim for contributions by an employer to a union welfare plan owed under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement did not constitute “wages ... due to workmen.” 359 U.S. at 30-31, 79 S.Ct. 554. Trustees of the welfare plan, which had been formed to maintain life insurance, weekly sick benefits, hospital benefits, and other advantages for union members, id. at 30, 79 S.Ct. 554, argued
Likewise, in Joint Industry Board, the Supreme Court, following its decision and rationale in Embassy Restaurant, held that a claim for an employer’s unpaid contributions to an employees’ annuity plan established by a collective bargaining agreement was not a claim for “wages ... due to workmen” under 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (repealed 1978). See 391 U.S. at 226-28, 88 S.Ct. 1491.
In response to these two decisions, Congress enacted § 507(a)(4) to give priority status to claims for such fringe benefits— the “contributions” to employee benefit plans referred to in Embassy Restaurant and Joint Industry Board. As Congress explained:
Paragraph (4) overrules United States v. Embassy Restaurant, which held that fringe benefits were not entitled to wage priority status. The bill recognizes the realities of labor contract negotiations, under which wage demands are often reduced if adequate fringe benefits are substituted. The priority granted is limited to claims for contributions to employee benefit plans such as pension plans, health or life insurance plans, and others, arising from services rendered.
H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 357 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6313 (internal citation omitted). That purpose is now captured in the text of § 507(a)(4), which reads:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered within 180 days [of the filing of a petition] ....
In this context, we now turn to the specific question of whether a claim for unpaid premiums for workers’ compensation insurance is clearly and unequivocally a claim for “contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered.”
Ill
In defining the priority granted in § 507(a)(4), Congress used the language the Supreme Court used to describe fringe benefits in Embassy Restaurant when it excluded them from “wages ... due to workmen.” See 359 U.S. at 29-30, 79 S.Ct. 554 (framing the issue as “whether contributions to an employer welfare fund which are required by a collective bargaining agreement are entitled to priority”). Although Congress could have used broader terms in defining the priority, it selected the terms (1) “contributions” to an (2) “employee benefit plan,” and related them to (3) “services rendered” by the employee. These three phrases taken together connote the very fringe benefits rejected in Embassy Restaurant and Joint Industry Board. Of course, this is not surprising, because 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) was enacted specifically to overrule these two cases.
The question here is whether a claim for unpaid insurance premiums falls within the class of claims described by Congress as claims for unpaid “contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered.” Stated more succinctly, is workers’ compensation coverage a fringe
First, workers’ compensation liability is an employer’s liability imposed by statute in lieu of tort liability. See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W.Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907, 911 (1978) (noting that West Virginia’s “Workmen’s Compensation Act was designed to remove negligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort system”) (emphasis omitted); Belcher v. J.H. Fletcher & Co., 498 F.Supp. 629, 630-31 (S.D.W.Va.1980) (same). Thus, rather than constituting the payment of a “benefit” to employees, insurance premiums for workers’ compensation are the payments due from an employer in respect to its statutory liability and its employees’ statutory rights. Such payments are not thought to be “contributions,” a term that involves a notion of voluntariness. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 496 (Merriam Webster Inc. ed., 1993) (defining a “contribution” as “a sum or thing voluntarily contributed”). Thus, while payments to a plan for fringe benefits are considered “contributions,” payments made to discharge a statutorily mandated liability are not.
Second, the payment of premiums to an insurance company for the issuance of a workers’ compensation insurance policy is not a contribution “to an employee benefit plan” as that term is used in the statute. Although it would be correct to categorize some employer-funded insurance policies as “employee benefit plans,” that categorization is fitting only when the employer voluntarily provides the insurance policy as a fringe benefit to its employees or when the policy is negotiated between the employer and the employees as part of a collective bargaining agreement. A plan arrived at through those methods is quite different from a policy of insurance issued to discharge the statutorily mandated liability of an employer for workplace injuries.
Third, the payment of premiums by an employer to an insurance company for workers’ compensation insurance coverage is not a surrogate for the payment of wages to employees, as is embraced by the notion of a fringe benefit. See, e.g., Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. at 32-33, 79 S.Ct. 554. Section 507(a)(4) gives priority only to contributions that are considered fringe benefits in the sense that they arise from the employees’ “services rendered.” The claim for an unpaid insurance premium is not a claim for a contribution arising from “services rendered.” While premiums for workers’ compensation insurance might be computed by considering the number of employees covered on any given day, the premium is not linked to the “services rendered” by the employees as is required to qualify for priority status under § 507(a)(4).
In short, the plain language of § 507(a)(4), which gives priority to claims for unpaid “contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered,” does not cover claims for unpaid insurance premiums charged to cover the statutory liability of the employer to its employees. The unpaid insurance premium is not an unpaid contribution; it is not an unpaid contribution to an employee benefit plan; and it does not arise out of an employee’s services rendered in that it is not a wage surrogate.
To read § 507(a)(4) as expansively as do the opinions of Judge King and Judge Shedd not only disregards the explicit language of the statute, but such a reading also violates the underlying ground rules
To make the construction advanced by his concurring opinion appear reasonable, Judge King has cobbled together selected dictionary definitions and portions of definitions. He has taken the statutory words out of context to stretch them beyond their plain meaning. This approach suffers, I respectfully submit, from the same flaw as does the indiscriminate use of statistics. But even when taking this approach — an approach that also violates the mandate to construe bankruptcy priorities narrowly— it is facially irrational to assert that payments for mandatory workers’ compensation liability fall within the plain meaning of the term “contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered.”
Judge Shedd’s opinion, concurring in the judgment, aptly notes that Judge King’s opinion “picks and chooses from accepted dictionary definitions” to arrive at “one reasonable interpretation,” but not “the only reasonable interpretation.” But Judge Shedd’s opinion then proceeds to construe “employee benefit plan” in § 507(a)(4) broadly, employing the definition given for that phrase in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). Applying that definition out of context, Judge Shedd concludes that insurance for workers’ compensation benefits is an “employee benefit plan” that enjoys priority under the Bankruptcy Code.
Judge Shedd’s opinion well notes that ERISA explicitly exempts from its coverage any plan “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation laws.” What Judge Shedd’s opinion fails to address, however, is the analogous limitation made in the Bankruptcy Code. While § 507(a)(4) gives priority to claims made against the estate for “contributions to an employee benefit plan,” that priority is not afforded with respect to every “employee benefit plan.” The priority is extended only with respect to contributions to employee benefit plans “arising from services rendered.” The phrase “arising from services rendered” indicates that not all employee benefit plans are given priority, but only those that function as wage surrogates. This is an especially important phrase in con-text because Congress enacted the priority to overrule the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in Embassy Restaurant and Joint Industry Board.
For the reasons given, I would join the three circuits that have construed § 507(a)(4) not to give priority to claims for unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums, see Travelers Prop. & Gas. Corp., 224 F.3d at 517; State Ins. Fund, 144 F.3d at 717; Employers Ins. of Wausau, 62 F.3d at 226-27, expressing regret that we are now widening the split among the circuits.
Lead Opinion
Reversed and remanded by published per curiam opinion. Judge KING wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, Judge SHEDD wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, and Judge NIEMEYER wrote an opinion dissenting from the judgment.
OPINION
This appeal presents the question of whether the claim made by Zurich American Insurance Company against the estate of the debtor, Howard Delivery Service, Inc., for unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums is to be given priority by reason of § 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court holds that Zurich’s claim is entitled to priority under § 507(a)(4) and therefore reverses the decision of the district court and remands the case for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
