[¶ 1] Sаndra Hoverson appeals from an amended divorce judgment denying her motion to modify spousal support and parenting time, granting Carl Hoverson’s motion to modify parenting time and to appoint a parenting coordinator, and granting Carl Hoverson’s request for attorney fees. We affirm the amended judgment.
I
[¶ 2] In 2012, Carl and Sandra Hover-son were divorced in a judgment awarding Sandra Hoverson about $2.8 million and Carl Hoverson about $11.6 million in marital рroperty and awarding her spousal support of $3,000 per month for two years, child support of $3,002 per month and attorney fees. The judgment granted Sandra Hoverson primary residential responsibility of the parties’ minor child, subject to Carl Hoverson’s right to parenting time as outlined in a schedule in the judgment. We affirmed the judgment in
Hoverson v. Hoverson,
[¶ 3] Carl Hoverson thereafter moved to enforce the divorce judgment’s schedule for parenting time, or alternatively, for appointment of a parenting coordinator to establish a parenting time schedule consistent with the judgment. He also sought attorney fees for his motion. Sandra Hov-erson moved to limit Carl Hoverson’s parenting time, to modify spousal support by increasing the amount and duration of support and for attorney fees for her motion. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court modified the order for parenting time and appointed a parenting coordinator, denied Sandra Hoverson’s motion for modification of spousal support and granted Carl Hoverson’s request for attorney fees.
II
[¶ 4] Sandra Hoverson argues the district court clearly erred in denying her motion to inсrease the amount and the duration of spousal support. She claims the court clearly erred in concluding Carl Hoverson’s income was irrelevant to his spousal support obligation and in finding she failed to show a substantial change in circumstances to modify his spousal support obligation. Carl Hoverson responds the court did not err in analyzing his income in the context of the court’s initial award of spousal support. He also аrgues the court did not clearly err in finding she failed to show a material change in circumstances to modify his support obligation.
[¶ 5] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1, a district court retains jurisdiction to modify spousal support awarded in an original divorce judgment. A party seeking modification must show a material change in financial circumstances warranting modification.
Gibb v. Sepe,
[¶ 6] A district court’s determination on a material change in circumstances warranting modification of spousal support is a finding of fact and will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
Rothberg v. Rothberg,
[¶ 7] In Hoverson, we affirmed the district court’s initial spousal support award and rejected Sandra Hoverson’s argument for permanent spousal support, explaining:
“In conjunction with the district court’s analysis of the Rujf-Fischer guidelines, the court found that the parties’ marriage was short-term, that Sandra Hoverson had an established careеr in radiologic technologies before the marriage, that she spent significant time in Florida during the marriage and did not significantly contribute to the marital household or assist Carl Hoverson in building his career, that Carl Hoverson did not commit non-economic fault and his economic fault in transferring marital property to his sons from a prior marriage was addressed in the property distribution, that the parties’ substantial disparity in income was, addressed by thе property distribution, that Sandra Hoverson could be equitably rehabilitated, and that she had the ability to work outside the home.
“Spousal support and property division are intertwined. Kostelecky v. Kostelecky,2006 ND 120 , ¶ 14,714 N.W.2d 845 . Sandra Hoverson was awarded about $2.8 million in the court’s property distribution. Although Carl Hoverson received about $11.6 million in the property distribution and has a grfeater earning capacity than Sandra Hoverson, the court found she has a demonstrated earning ability outside the home and has maintained her license аnd continuing education credits. Sandra Hoverson’s arguments generally ignore the court’s findings that the parties’ marriage was a short-term marriage and she could be rehabilitated. Although the duration of spousal support awarded in this case could be problematic under other circumstances, in this case, Sandra Hover-son testified she was not interested in returning to work as a radiologic technician, but has not cited specific evidence about the extent of any necessary or potential retraining.
“On this record, we conclude the district court’s findings are sufficient to understand the rationale for the court’s decision. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction the court made a mistake in awarding Sandra Hoverson spousal support of $3,000 per month for two years. We conclude the court’sspousal support award is not clearly erroneous.”
[¶ 8] In denying Sandra Hoverson’s motion to modify spousal support, the district court considered her request in the context of the court’s earlier rejection of permanent spousal support and award of rehabilitative spousal support, which the court said was premised on providing her an opportunity to acquire an education and work skills to become self-supporting. In that context, the court explained Carl Hov-erson’s income at the time of the divorce was not a limiting factоr in the initial award of spousal support and any claimed increase in his income was not a material change in circumstances. The court also explained Sandra Hoverson failed to provide sufficient evidence to consider how any claimed increases in distributions to Hoverson Farms impacted Carl Hover-son’s income. In finding no material change in circumstances, the court found Sandra Hoverson failed to makе a good faith effort to obtain employment and the parties contemplated at the time of the divorce that she may not return to work.
[¶ 9] The district court provided an explanation about Carl Hoverson’s income and the claimed increased distributions from Hoverson Farms, stating his income was not a limiting factor to the court’s initial decision about rehabilitative spousal support. In the context of assessing the district court’s earlier decision awarding rehabilitative spousal support for two years, the court’s statements indicate it did not determine an obligor’s income was never relevant to a motion to modify a spousal support obligation; rather, the court’s statements indicate Carl Hoverson’s income in this case was not determinative in the court’s initial decision to award rehabilitative spousal support and his income had a similar stature for Sandra Hover-son’s motion to modify rehabilitative spousal support. In the context of this case and the court’s explanation, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction the court made a mistake in assessing Carl Hoverson’s income.
[¶ 10] The district court found Sandra Hoverson failed to make a good faith effort to obtain employment, stating that outside of her general and conclusory statements about her job search, she рrovided no evidence of her job search efforts, or that she made efforts to pursue further education or training. Evidence supports the district court’s findings and statements about Sandra Hoverson’s efforts to obtain employment or to pursue further education and training. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction the court made a mistake in finding Sandra Hoverson failed to establish a material change in circumstances to modify spousal support. Therefore, the court did not clearly err in denying her motion to modify spousal support.
Ill
[¶ 11] Sandra Hoverson argues the district court clearly erred in denying her motion to modify parenting time. She argues the court clearly erred in precluding her from having any input with a parenting coordinator regarding parenting time decisions and in expanding the authority of the parenting coordinator to modify the existing divorce decree in. violation of N.D.R.Ct. 8.11(c)(3). Carl Hover-son responds the court’s order precluding Sandra Hoverson from having input with the parenting coordinator pertained to the mechanical application of the court’s prior order for parenting time and was justified based on her conduct regarding his exercise of parenting time. He also argues the court did not expand the authority of the parenting coordinator and did not cleаrly err in modifying parenting time.
[¶ 13] In Prchal, we discussed factors impacting a material change in circumstances and the best interests of the child in the context of a motion to modify parenting time:
“To modify parenting time, ‘a material change of circumstances occurs when important new facts arise that were unknown at the time of the initial [parenting time] order.’ Dufner,2010 ND 31 , ¶ 7,778 N.W.2d 586 (citing Helfenstein [v. Schutt ],2007 ND 106 , ¶ 18,735 N.W.2d 410 ). See also Young v. Young,2008 ND 55 , ¶¶ 14-15,746 N.W.2d 153 (mother’s scheduling problems, together with the child’s recent behavior, constituted sufficient material change in circumstances) (citing Ibach v. Zacher,2006 ND 244 , ¶ 10,724 N.W.2d 165 (mother’s out-of-town move and father’s illness a sufficient material change); Simburger v. Simburger,2005 ND 139 , ¶ 18,701 N.W.2d 880 (mother’s agreement for unsupervised visitation with father followed by mother’s unwillingness to allow unsupervised visitation constituted a material change); Reinecke v. Griffeth,533 N.W.2d 695 , 698-99 (N.D.1995) (son’s attention deficit disorder diagnosis coupled with the visitation’s interference with son’s school work is an implied material change)).
“Our decisions also provide the standard to determine whether a mоdification is in a child’s ‘best interests’ based on the factual circumstances of each case. See Dufner,2010 ND 31 , ¶¶ 9-10,778 N.W.2d 586 (affirming visitation modification where court found children were frustrated with incessant bickering between parents and stating ‘[c]ontinually exposing a child to adult conflict is not in that child’s best interests’); Reinecke,533 N.W.2d at 698-99 (holding modification was in the children’s best interests where original visitation order interfered with their weeknight routine, contributing to behavior problems at home, pоor performance at school and causing conflict between the parents).”
[¶ 14] We initially consider Sandra Hoverson’s arguments about her lack of input with the parenting coordinator and the claimed improper expansion of the parenting coordinator’s authority to modify the divorce decree.
[¶ 15] Section 14-09.2-01, N.D.C.C., describes authority and duties of a parenting coordinator and provides:
“A parenting coordinator is a neutral individual authorized to use any dispute resolution process to resolve parenting time disputes. The purpose of a parenting coordinator is to resolve parenting time disputes by interpreting, clarifying, and addressing circumstances not specifically addressed by an existing court order. A parenting coordinator:
“1. May assess for the parties whether there has been a violation of an existing court order and, if so, recommend further court proceedings.
“2. May be appointed to resolve a onetime parenting time dispute or toprovide ongoing parenting time dispute resolution services. Parenting time dispute also means a visitation dispute under existing orders.
“3. Shall attempt to resolve a parenting time dispute by facilitating negotiations between the parties to promote settlement and, if it becomes apparent that the disрute cannot be resolved by an agreement of the parties, shall make a decision resolving the dispute.”
[¶ 16] Section 14-09.2-04, N.D.C.C., deals with decisions of a parenting coordinator and provides: ,
“Within five days of notice of the appointment, or within five days of notice of a subsequent parenting time dispute between the same parties, the parenting coordinator shall meet with the parties together or separately and shall make a diligent effort to facilitate an agreement to resolve the dispute. The parenting coordinator may confer with the parties through a telephone conference or other means. A parenting coordinator may make a decision without conferring with a party if the parenting coordinator makes a good-faith effort to confer with the party. If the parties do not reach an agreement, the parenting coordinator shall make a decision resolving the dispute as soon as possible but not later than five days after receiving all of the information necessary to make a decision and after the final meeting or conference with the parties. The parenting coordinator shall put the agreement or decision in writing and provide a copy to the parties. An agreement of the parties or a decisiоn of the parenting coordinator is binding on the parties until further order of the court.”
[¶ 17] Rule 8.11(c), ND.R.Ct., describes the roles and responsibilities of a parenting coordinator and provides, in part:
“A parenting coordinator shall:
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“(3) Facilitate the resolution of disputes regarding the implementation of the parenting plan, the schedule, or parenting time issues provided such resolution does not involve a substantive change to the court’s order.”
[¶ 18] In Dieterle v. Dieterle, we considered the interрlay of statutes and rules regarding the authority of a parenting coordinator and said:
“Allowing neutral individuals to resolve disputes between the parties, so long as access by the parties to the district court is allowed for ultimate resolution of the dispute, is not an improper delegation of judicial power. See generally Wait [v. Wolt ],2010 ND 26 , ¶ 40,778 N.W.2d 786 . For example, in Yates v. Yates,963 A.2d 535 , 540-41 (Pa.Sup.Ct.2008), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the appointment of a parenting coordinator to resolve аncillary custody disputes was not an improper delegation of judicial authority. The court noted that ‘if the parties are dissatisfied with the parenting coordinator’s decision, they can appeal it to the trial court’ for de novo review. Id. at 541. Similarly, under North Dakota law a parenting coordinator has no authority to make substantive changes to a court’s order, and if a party disagrees with the devised parenting plan and brings thаt disagreement to the court’s attention, it becomes the duty of the court to ‘issue a parenting plan considering the best interests of the child.’ N.D.C.C. § 14-09-30.”
[¶ 19] The district court’s decision described Sandra Hoverson’s interference with Carl Hoverson’s parenting time in
[¶ 20] We further conclude the district court’s decision did not improperly expand the authority of the parenting coordinator. The court’s language about decision making states “[i]n the event of a dispute regarding a major decision, the Parenting Coordinator shall make the decision.” As we explained in
Dieterle,
[¶ 21] Sandra Hoverson argues the district court clearly erred in denying her motion to modify parenting time. She argues Carl Hoverson’s work schedule required him to use a daycare provider when she was available to care for the child and she should have been allowed to take care of the child when he was working or on business trips.
[¶ 22] The district court modified the parties’ pаrenting time after making findings about the parties’ conflict and lack of agreement in implementing Carl Hover-son’s parenting time. We recognize conflict may be a change in circumstances warranting modification of parenting time.
Dufner,
IV
[¶ 23] Sandra Hoverson argues the district court abused its discretion in ordering
[¶ 24] The amended judgment reflects Sandra Hoverson has satisfied the court’s award of attorney fees to Carl Hoverson. Satisfaction of a judgment extinguishes the claim and the judgment no longer exists.
See Mr. G’s Turtle Mountain Lodge, Inc. v. Roland Twp.,
“ ‘[A] party who voluntarily pays a judgment against him waives the right to appeal from the judgment.’.... ‘[Wjhether a judgment has been voluntarily paid depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, and the party seeking dismissal of the appeal bears the burden of showing the judgment was paid voluntarily.’ ‘A showing that the judgment has been paid, however, creates a presumption that the payment was voluntary.’ ”
[¶ 25] The district court ordered Sandra Hoverson to pay Carl Hoverson’s attorney fees for responding to her motions, and she subsequently paid those fees, which were denoted as satisfied in the amended judgment. This record does not reflect any attempt by Sandra Hover-son to post a bond pending appeal, and she does not dispute the statement in the amended judgment that the attorney fees have been paid.
See Lyon,
V
[¶ 26] We affirm the amended judgment.