Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages from the City of Decorah for injuries resulting from a fall on a public sidewalk on March 5, 1966. She alleged defendant was negligent in allowing ice, snow, and slush to аccumulate for an unreasonable period of time on a public sidewalk contrary to 389.12 of the Iowa Code. The jury, after deliberating twenty-three minutes, returned a verdict for the plaintiff in thе full amount asked, $10,000. Defendant filed a motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and, in the alternative, a Motion for a New Trial. The trial court overruled defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding but granted a new trial. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s ruling on the motion for new trial and defendant cross-appealed from the ruling on the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
We shall discuss only defendant’s сross-appeal as our determination of this issue disposes of the entire case.
I. There does not seem to be any serious dispute between the parties as to the applicable law. The city has a duty .under section 389.12 of the code to exercise reasonable care to keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. Allen v. City of Ft. Dodge,
However, if the municiрality has permitted snow or ice to remain on a sidewalk until it has become so ridged, rough and uneven that it is dangerous for a pedestrian to walk on exercising ordinary care, liability may be imрosed; provided the municipality has actual or constructive notice of the condition of the walk and has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy such condition. Anderson v. City оf Sioux City,
The length of time sufficient to constitute constructive notice of the condition and a reasonable opportunity to remedy it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and is generally a question for the jury. Parks v. City of Des Moines, supra; Tillotson v. City of Davenport, supra. Wе therefore examine the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff to determine if it was sufficient to create a jury issue on the questions of constructive notice of and reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect.
*537 Plaintiff left her home at 11:45 a. m. on Saturday, March 5, 1966, and was hurrying to the bank to pay her rent before it closed at 12:00 noon. She drove to an areа known as the city parking lot. This area is directly east of a building housing the Kephart Music Center. State Street extends through this parking area joining North Alley on the north and Water Street on the south. A public sidewalk adjoins the east side of the Kephart Music Center and the west side of State Street which, at the time of the accident, had metered diagonal parking spaces abutting the sidewalk. Plaintiff parked her car in the 5th parking place from the south end of the parking area facing the sidewalk on which the accident occurred. She got out on the driver’s side of her car and proceeded along the sidewalk, which was covered with about an inch of slush to some ice where she fell and was injured. Plaintiff stated the cause of her fall was the rough and uneven ice.
It was agreed by all concerned that the City of Decorah had no actual notice of the condition of the sidewalk at the time of the fall. The city had received no comрlaints about snow removal on March 4 or 5. It had no prior difficulty with dangerous snow or ice accumulations in this area. There was no evidence that any portion of the three inch snow on Fеbruary 21 remained. Plaintiff does not so argue. There was an unusually warm period between February 19, 1966 and March 4, 1966.
Snow began falling during the late afternoon of March 4, 1966 and .31 of an inch precipitation was recorded by the weather bureau for that date. On March 5, a trace of snow was recorded. The owner and manager of the music center adjoining the walk where plaintiff fell, had shoveled the walk in front of his store on the morning of March 5, 1966 but did not shovel the sidewalk in question along the east side of his store because the city had always done it and he assumed it was their responsibility. The city records show that the only work done on Saturday, March 5, 1966 was two hours sanding intersections at stop signs. The sidewalk and parking lot were slushy immediately before plaintiff fell and the snow was melting at thе time of the accident. It had been snowing off and on all morning of March 5, 1966 and it was still snowing when Mr. Kephart took Mrs. Hovden to the hospital immediately after her fall.
There seems to be an almost unlimited number of cases against municipalities for injuries sustained in falls on icy sidewalks.
The closest case on the facts is Batie v. City of Humboldt,
“Under the factual situation shown, in order that constructive notice to the city could be imputed, it wаs necessary to prove that the alleged defective street condition existed for such length of time that the city, in the exercise of reasonable care, would have discovered and would have had reasonable opportunity to remedy it. Spiker v. City of Ottumwa,
Plaintiff claims this case is stronger than Batie because the city assumed thе obligation of an adjoining property owner to keep the sidewalk clean. Such contention is not helpful to plaintiff. The city has the primary responsibility for all sidewalks. The duty placed on the city by section 389.12 is greater than the common law duty imposed on the adjoining property owner. There is no common law duty on the owner to remove a natural ac•cumulation of snow from a walk. Franzen v. Dimock Gould & Co.,
Evidence the city was sanding intersections the morning of plaintiffs fall is no proof the sidewalk in question was in a dangerous condition because of ice and snоw made rough and uneven through artificial means. Nor does it prove actual knowledge on the part of the city. In fact, the court instructed the jury defendant had no actual knowledge of thе alleged condition and plaintiff necessarily relied on constructive notice. No objection was taken and this instruction is now the law of the case.
Had there been proof the iсy condition existed from the time the snow began to fall, the municipality would not have had a reasonable time within which to remedy the defect. The snow continued until after the accident.
Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Savings Bank,
“The authorities are in substantial accord in support of the rule that а business establishment, landlord, carrier, or other inviter, in the absence of unusual circumstances, is permitted to await the end of the storm and a reasonable time thereafter to remove ice and snow from an outdoor entrance walk, platform, or steps. The general controlling principle is that changing conditions due to the pending storm render it inexpedient and impracticable to take earlier effective action, and that ordinary care does not require it.”
We think this is a reasonable rule which is applicable here.
We therefore hold the trial court erred in not sustaining defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict as the evidence was insufficient to raise a jury question as to defendants’ negligence (1) because there was nо showing how long the dangerous condition of rough, uneven ice had existed, and (2) because under the evidence here the city would not have had a reasonable opportunity to remеdy the condition even if it had existed from the prior evening.
*539 We reverse the decision of the trial court on the cross appeal. It is therefore unnecessary to consider plaintiff’s appeal.
Affirmed on plaintiff’s appeal. Reversed on defendant’s cross-appeal.