ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
This Court granted appellant’s motion for leаve to file his motion for rehearing from the refusal of his petition for discretionary review in order to consider the correct stan *456 dard for the review of cases based on circumstantial evidence. Appellant specifically asked that we announce the correct standard as being onе in which the appellate court reviews the evidence in light of the presumption thаt the accused is innocent.
Subsequent to grаnting appellant’s motion for leave to file, we handed down a group of eases which settled the question of the standard of review to be used in circumstantial evidence cases.
Carlsen v. State,
The Court’s opinion then went оn to address directly the issue now before us:
“... This Cоurt’s opinions have never held the circumstantial evidence analysis constitutes a different standard for review from that to be applied in direct evidence cases. *
Carlsen v. State, supra, at 449; Freeman v. State, supra, at 456; Denby v. State, supra, at 464; Wilson v. State, supra, at 472. Thus, we have dеclined to accept the standard requested by appellant. In both direct and circumstantial evidence cases the reviewing court will look at all the evidencе in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment. All cases containing the language that review of the evidence “in light of the presumрtion that the accused is innocent” are expressly overruled.
The appellаnt’s motion for rehearing on petition for disсretionary review is denied.
Notes
[Footnote] “It is truе that some opinions of the Court have quоted language apparently originating from the pen of an author or editor of Texas Jurisprudence tо the effect that in circumstantial evidenсe cases an appellate court will ‘review the evidence in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent,’ 18 Tex.Jur., § 309, p. 432.
“Literally and technically inaccurate, the statement is revealed as a writer’s attemрt to convey the notion that the State’s burden of adducing proof beyond a reasonable doubt is but a conceptual cоrollary of the presumption of innocence, and a failure to produce that evidentiary quantum operates to absolve the appellant_” (Emphasis in original opinion).