Thе Housing Authority of the City of Macon (housing authority) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion for summаry judgment, and the grant of Mayor C. Jack Ellis’s motion for summary judgment, on Ellis’s petition seeking a declaration that his аppointment power under OCGA § 8-3-50 (a) (1) is not subject to the city council’s approval. Although the housing authority presents this issue as one of first impression, the plain language of the statute shows clearly that confirmation by the city council is not required. We therefore affirm.
*835 Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
(Citations omitted.)
Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp.,
So viewed, the evidence showed that Ellis attempted to make an appointment to the board of the housing authority in accordance with OCGA § 8-3-50 (a) (1). The housing authority refused to seat the appointee on the ground that Ellis failed to first submit his choice to the Macon City Council for confirmation, as this had historicаlly been the practice of mayors desiring to make appointments. Ellis subsequently filed a petition seeking a declaration that his appointment power is not subject to the city council’s apрroval. Following consideration of both parties’ motions for summary judgment, the superior court agreеd with Ellis, holding that he has the unilateral power of appointment and that had the legislature intended that thе mayor’s appointees be approved by the city council, it could have required such.
OCGA § 8-3-50 (a) (1) provides that
[w]hen thе governing body of a city adopts a resolution as provided in Code Section 8-3-5, it shall promptly notify the mayor of such adoption. Upon receiving such notice, the mayor shall appoint five persons as commissioners of the authority created for such city. In the event the mayor fails or refuses to submit appointments within 30 days after notice from the governing body of approval of a resolution of necessity or termination of existing appointments, the governing body may appoint the commissioners of the authority created for such city.
The housing authority argues that “the mayoral-appointment рower is limited to nominating such commissioners within the statutorily-prescribed time period,” and that the use of the word “submit” in the second sentence of the Code section, “[i]n the event the mayor fails or refuses to submit аppointment within 30 days . . . ,” is evidence that the mayor is required to submit candidates to the city council for approval. The housing authority argues further that prior to 1982, OCGA § 8-3-50 required that the mayor submit appointments to thе State Housing Authority Board (which is no longer in existence) for *836 approval, and that therefore the сurrent statute should also be interpreted to require approval of the mayor’s appointees.
“When a statute is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, thе court has no authority to place a different construction upon it but must construe it according tо its terms.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Ward v. City of Cairo,
This appointment power is unconditional. See id. The statute requires that the mayor “appoint” not “nominate.” And contrary to the housing authority’s argument, the use of “submit” in the second sentence of the Cоde section does not show a legislative intent to require that appointees be apprоved by the city council, but merely explains what occurs when the mayor fails to make appointmеnts within the 30 days. Finally, it is irrelevant that the pre-1982 version of OCGA § 8-3-50 required approval by a then existing State Housing Authority Bоard. “[A] 11 statutes are presumed to be enacted by the General Assembly with full knowledge of the existing conditiоn of the law and with reference to it.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Ga. Public Defender Standards Council v. State of Ga.,
Moreover, this court is charged with the duty of interpreting statutes, not enacting them. Nor is this court empowered to refrain from deciding an issue of statutory interpretation and instead refer, or “kick,” it “back to the legislature for more clarity,” as the housing authority suggests. If the housing authority is to obtain the relief it seeks, it must do so in the Georgia General Assembly. See
Ga. Forestry Comm. v. Taylor,
The trial court therеfore did not err in granting Ellis’s motion for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment action and in denying the housing authority’s motion on the same.
Judgment affirmed.