House v. Davis

130 Ark. 387 | Ark. | 1917

WOOD, J.,

(afjer stating the facts). Under the undisputed evidence the contract of insurance was complete when the company accepted appellee’s application, issued the policy and mailed the same to appellee. When this was done nothing remained for the insurance company to do.

In DuPriest v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 97 Ark. 229, we said: “It is very well settled that where nothing remains to be done by the insurer, the mailing of the policy, duly executed, to the insured constitutes a delivery.”

The authorities generally hold that “Where an application is made for a policy of insurance which is accepted and the insured notified thereof, the contract is consummated without actual delivery of the policy in the absence of a provision in the application requiring delivery. ’ ’ 14 R. C. L., § 75, page 897. And on page 898, §.76, of the same volume, it is said: “It is the intention of the parties, and not the manual possession of the policy, which determines whether there has been a delivery thereof. ’ ’

In volume 19 Cyc., page 603, it is said: “Where a policy has been duly executed in compliance with an application on the part of the insured, so that the minds of the parties have fully met as to the terms and conditions of the contract, a manual delivery of the policy to the insured is not essential to render it binding on the company.”

Here the undisputed evidence shows that a manual delivery of the policy was not contemplated. All that the company had to do was to send the policy by mail, which it did. There was no provision in the application or the receipt showing that the parties contemplated that the contract was not to be complete until the appellee had received the same, but all that the company had to do was to issue the policy and send it through the mail.

The instructions, therefore, numbered 1 and 2, given at the instance of the appellee, under the undisputed evidence, raised abstract issues before the jury which were prejudicial to the appellant.

Appellee himself testified that the company wrote him that his application had been accepted and that it would send the policy. And he further testified that he wanted the insurance and would have paid for it if he had received the policy, but that it was never received. The testimony of the receiver shows that appellee had executed a power of attorney and proxy to officers of the company to act for him in stockholders’ meetings, which these officers had exercised in his behalf.

These facts are sufficient to constitute a meeting of the minds so as to render the contract of insurance complete, and if appellee had suffered a loss during the life of the policy there is no doubt but what, under the circumstances, he would have been entitled to recover against the company. Moreover, under the undisputed evidence, the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law as given by the court in instruction No. 5. The appellee accepted from the appellant a receipt in which it was stated that the policy was to be sent by mail, and if the appellee did not receive the policy in fifteen days he was to write the company and give the name of the solicitor and date of the receipt, and the company was to return the cash premium note if the contract was not issued.

The court properly instructed the jury, under this evidence, that if the defendant did not notify plaintiff that he had not received his policy, and did not request the issuance of a new policy or the return of the premium note within a reasonable time that he was estopped from denying the issuance of the policy, and that their verdict should be for the plaintiff. The verdict of the jury was therefore contrary to the law as given by the court, and the court erred in refusing to set aside a judgment based upon such verdict and in overruling the appellant’s motion for a new trial.

For the errors indicated the judgment is reversed, and judgment will he entered here in favor of the appellant.