93 Wis. 393 | Wis. | 1896
The principal question here presented is, Was the contract entered into between plaintiff and defendant void as against public policy? And that turns on whether it embraces, by its terms or by necessary implication, an agreement to do air illegal act or to resort to secret and improper tampering with official action, either legislative or otherwise, to effect the purposes of the agreement, or that such was its tendenoy. If, by its terms or by necessary implication, the agreement stipulated for corrupt action or personal solicitation in the nature of lobbying, or tended directly to such results, then it is void; and if such facts appear satisfactorily the court should not hesitate to put the seal of condemnation upon it. The rules governing this subject are as old, at least, as the common law, have been long and firmly established in our jurisprudence, and must be rigidly enforced by courts of justice, else purity and integ
As applied to contracts like the one before us, the dangers and mischiefs that may arise from allowing parties to make merchandise of mere personal solicitation and influence are what the law seeks to guard against, by closing the doors of the courts securely against all efforts to enforce, or to secure the fruits of, agreements that involve such elements as a subject of sale, either expressly or by necessary inference.
Does the agreement under consideration come within the condemnation of the salutary rule referred to ? That is the question. Unless it does, clearly, the contract should be upheld. As very truly said by Sir G-eobgke Jessel, M. E., in Printing & N. R. Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462: “ It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and of competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by the courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider — that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.” This means no more, we take it, than that it should be made to appear clearly — that is, beyond reasonable controversy — that the contract is void, as contrary to law or sound morals, else it should be sustained.
In the light of the foregoing, the contract in question
It is sometimes lost sight of that the presumptions in human affairs are in favor of innocence rather than of guilt, and that such rule applies in testing such a contract as the one we have here by the principles of sound morals. McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kan. 692. In Salinas v. Stillman, 14 C. C. A. 50, 66 Fed. Rep. 677, the agreement between the parties provided that a portion of the moneys eventually
To the same effect is Chippewa Valley & S. R. Co. v. C., St. P., M. & O. R. Co. 75 Wis. 224, where this court, quoting with approval from Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, and Oscanyan v. Arms Co. 103 U. S. 261, to the effect that agreements to influence the action of the legislative or other branches of the government by personal solicitation or in
In Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, the agreement was for the influence of a lobbying agent to bring about the passage of a law for the payment of a private claim, without reference to it merits, by means of personal influence and solicitation. The court held the contract void, and there ■ clearly pointed out the distinction between agreements for services that may, and such as may not, properly be entered into to obtain legislative or executive action, and, in effect, said that the preparation of petitions, taking of testimony, •collecting of facts, preparing of arguments, and submitting
A contract somewhat similar to the one under consideration, in Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, was held void as-against public policy; but the court appears to have rested the decision, not so much on the contract, as on what was. done under it and done before it was entered into. The evidence showed that plaintiff attended sessions of Congress, appeared before its committees, and employed counsel to urge the passage of a bill forfeiting lands to the government, and to open them to settlement in such a way as to-secure priority of settlers, thereto. So far as we can gather from the reported case, all acts done in regard to obtaining-legislation were prior to the making of the agreement.
There was really nothing in the language or purposes of the contract, viewed in the light of attending circum: stances and what was actually done, showing that improper influence was contemplated, or that there was any tendency to that end. There was no personal soliciting of members of Congress or the officers of the Interior Depart
So far as appears from the evidence in this case, plaintiff had acquired all his information in respect to the legal status
The other questions raised have been considered, but we do not deem them of sufficient importance to more than mention them, so that it may be seen that they have not been overlooked. There is no reversible error that we perceive in •the record.
By the Court.— Judgment affirmed.