135 Mich. 614 | Mich. | 1904
Lead Opinion
(after stating the facts). The sole question presented is, Has the relator the right, under the franchise, to connect the two lines at the place designated P
While its so-called main line was that running from Houghton to Red Jacket, the other two lines were as much a part of its road as the so-called main line. It was apparently as much to the benefit of the village of Laurium and the traveling public to have an unbroken connection with Lake Linden and vicinity as to have it with Houghton and Hancock. That the parties contracted in reference to these lines is apparent from the language of section 3, by which, for the accommodation of its own inhabitants and all travelers to and from Laurium, the franchise required the company to run cars from any terminus of the line or lines of its road without the limits of said village at regular intervals to said village, and without change or transfer, and without any discrimination between said village of Laurium and any other city or village. No such language would have been used if but one line had been contemplated, running between Houghton and Red
Let us reverse the proposition: If the relator, having constructed its road to Calumet street at the point designated, had refused, upon the request of the authorities of the village of Laurium, to connect this line with the other line at that point, would not its refusal have been in violation of its contract ? A contract, to be binding, must be mutual, and what the relator contracted to do, the respondent, by the same instrument, contracted to give it the right to do. By the ordinance (section 3) the relator contracted to run all its cars without change to the village of Laurium. “To” means within, not up to. It was not a compliance with the terms of the contract for the relator to construct its road up to the boundary line of the village.
The only other question is, Is that right lost or forfeited by the failure to construct the Lake Linden line within the time fixed for the construction of the road through the village of Laurium ? If this contention prevail, it follows that the company has lost all right to construct a double track because two tracks were not constructed within the time. The ordinance, under the authorities, gave the right to construct a second track whenever the necessities and business of the company required. City of Burlington v. Burlington St.-Ry. Co., 49 Iowa, 144 (31 Am. Rep. 145); Ransom v. Citizens’ St.-Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 375 (16 S. W. 416). See, also, Detroit Citizens’ St.-Ry. Co. v. Board of Public Works of Detroit, 126 Mich. 554 (85 N. W. 1072).
The occupation of about five feet of the street in the manner and at the place designated creates no additional burden upon the street. The connection is clearly for the accommodation of the inhabitants of Laurium, and as well all travelers over the road, and is in accordance with the terms of the franchise. The right to make the connection has not been forfeited by the failure to construct the Lake Linden line before July 1, 1901. Besides, the road was constructed along the designated streets in the village of Laurium within the time provided. The right to connect with other lines was not limited as to time.
Judgment reversed, and judgment entered in this court for the relator.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). Relator proposes to lay
“ That permission and authority be and hereby is granted to and vested in the Houghton County Street-Railway Company * * * to hereafter construct, maintain, and operate a double-track electric railway, with all necessary tracks, side tracks, and switches, poles and wires, upon and along the following streets of said village, viz.: Commencing on Calumet street, at the extreme southwesterly corner of the limits of the village of Laurium; thence running easterly, on and through Calumet street, to Lake Linden avenue; thence [and here follows an enumeration of streets, not material to the case].”
I think it clear that the right to construct the proposed track is not granted in this section. It surely is not a track “upon and along” Calumet street. Neither is it a side track or switch necessary to the operation of said track.
Is the right to construct the proposed track granted by section 3 of said franchise ? Said section, so far as material to the question under consideration, reads:
“And said company, for itself, its successors and assigns, in accepting this ordinance, agrees that the cars from any terminus of the line or lines of its railway without the limits of said village of Laurium shall run at regular intervals to said village of Laurium, without change or transfer.”
This provision, and, indeed, all the provisions of this section, impose obligations upon the grantee of the franchise. It is not the section in which we would naturally expect to find a grant to the relator. Nevertheless, I think it should be presumed that relator was granted everything necessary to enable it to perform the obligations imposed upon it by respondent. It is insisted that under this rule there passed to relator a grant to construct in the streets of respondent village a track to connect its Lake Linden branch with its line on Calumet street. To this
It is true that the relator’s proposed track in the respondent village is very short, and perhaps it may not seriously damage the street; but, in my judgment, it is a clear invasion of respondent’s rights, and should not be permitted. If relator can build this track to permit a connection at this point, I am unable to see any reason why it should not select the point of connection to suit its convenience, and build whatever tracks are necessary to effect a juncture there. Indeed, it is stated in relator’s brief:
*624 “We might well argue from these eases [cases which I think are clearly distinguishable from the one under consideration] that this very section of the ordinance gives the relator the right to run its Lake Linden branch to some convenient point within the village of Laurium, even using some of the streets of the village if necessary to reach such point; • but we do not, of course, take that position.”
An argument leading to such a conclusion is, in my judgment, unsound. Even if we construe the franchise liberally to the grantee, — and it should be construed strictly against it (see Detroit Citizens St.-Ry. Co. v. City of Detroit, 110 Mich., at page 394 [68 N. W. 304, 35 L. R. A. 859, 64 Am. St. Rep. 350]), — no such grant could, in my judgment, be implied.
I cannot agree to the proposition that “the record shows that the point of union [of thh two lines] is a proper, convenient, and necessary one,” and that “the Lake Linden line was contemplated as finally constructed.” By its petition relator claimed the right, under the ordinance in question, to.connect said Lake Linden line with its line on Calumet street by building a side track or switch. Respondent denied this right, averring that “the construction of a branch railway from Lake Linden, entering said village of Laurium, and connecting with said relator’s main line in said village, was in no way contemplated or authorized by any ordinance enacted by respondent.” Respondent’s denial is as broad as relator’s claim. In my judgment, there is nothing in relator’s petition to suggest that the point of connection was a necessary one, or that the Lake Linden line was contemplated as finally constructed. As relator did not plant its case on this ground, the failure of respondent to deny it is of no significance.
This question is asked:
“If relator, having constructed its road to Calumet street at the point designated, had refused, upon the request of the authorities of the village of Laurium, to con-*625 meet this line with the other line at that point, would not its refusal have been in violation of its contract?”
I answer “Yes,” and I also say that, if respondent insists upon this connection, it must permit relator to make it. I also say that, if relator’s Lake Linden branch had been constructed to some point at respondent village so remote from its line in that village that it could only reach the same by laying a mile of track in a street not designated in its franchise, respondent could have insisted upon the connection being made, and would have been obliged to permit the laying of the track necessary to effect it. I apprehend that this would be true even if relator had expressly promised to make connection without laying additional track in respondent’s street. The right of relator to lay the track in these supposed cases arises, not from its original contract, but from relator’s undertaking a particular method of performing that contract, and respondent’s insistence upon the execution of that method. In the case at bar, respondent objects to the execution of that method of performance, and the question before us is whether it ever granted relator the right to perform its contract by that method. In my judgment, we cannot say from the record before us that it did.
I think that relator is not entitled to the mandamus, and that the decision of the court below should be ' affirmed.