1. The appellant, Beverage Sales, contends that the evidence shows that the relation which existed between Leaf, its еmployee, and Watts was a bailment. On the other hand the plaintiff, appellee here, argues that Watts was a servant of Leaf since Leaf tipped Watts, had the right to retake his car at any time and could have discharged Watts *674 “from the assignment of taking care of the car any time he pleased.”
The question for determination is whether Leaf and Watts occupied the stаtus of master and servant because as a general rule an owner of an automobile is not liable for the negligence of the operator merely because he consented to its operation by such person. The relationship of master and servant must exist between the owner and the operator of the car in order to render the owner liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the negligent conduct of the operator.
Graham v. Cleveland,
In determining whether the relationship of parties under a contract for performance of labor is that of employer and servant or that of employer and independent contractor, the chief test lies in whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner and method of executing the work as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the contract.
Hall v. Cassell,
Hence the trial judge erred in denying Beverage Sales’ motion for summary judgment.
2. The defendant, Hotel Storage, urges that Watts acted outside the scope of his employment and that at most hе was its general servant loaned to Manger who was consequently liable for his acts.
It is true as a basic proposition that when one lends his servant to another for a particular employment, the servant will be dealt with as a servant of the man to whom hе is lent although he remains the general servant of the person who lent him.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark,
This point is further elucidated in Blashfield’s Treatise on Automobile Law and Practice, Yol. 6, § 253.113 at p. 302. “Notwithstanding in doing an аlleged negligent act one ordinarily cannot be the servant of both a general master and a temporary master, it may be found that there was a dual agency and that the employee in question was the servant of both the general and the special employer because the purpose and business of each was being furthered and each had some control over the activity which occasioned the injury. . . It is not necessary that full control of the servant be retained by the general emрloyer in order to impose liability on him, and, where an employee is furthering the business of his general employer by services rendеred to another, there is no inference of *676 a surrender of control by the general employer by the mere fact of its division.”
The Georgia courts have recognized the principle that one may be the servant of joint masters and subject to the demands of both or either.
Hotel Equipment Co. v. Liddell,
On motion for summary judgment the burden is on the movant even as to matters which would be upon the opposite party on the trial.
Sanfrantello v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Moreover, under the evidеnce Watts was authorized to accept vehicles but according to an affidavit by an officer of Hotel Storage, he was not authorized to accept vehicles for any purpose except storage for a guest who had registered and had a room assigned to him. “Where the employee is acting within the class of service he has authority to perform, the mаster is bound even though the servant is forbidden to perform the particular act. . . Thus even though the employee may have violated his instructions or exceeded in some respects the boundaries of his authorized acts, the master is still bound where the disobedience is not such as to take him out of the scope of his employment.”
Southern Airways v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
The trial judge did not err in denying Hotel Storage’s motion for summary judgment.
*677 Judgment reversed in Case 44472; affirmed in Case 44459.