Christy Hostacky, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21AP-349
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
December 16, 2021
2021-Ohio-4464
(Ct. of Cl. No. 2021-203JD)
(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Rendered on December 16, 2021
On brief: The Spitz Law Firm, LLC, Trisha Breedlove, and Sean Costello, for appellant.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Timothy M. Miller, and Michelle C. Brizes, for appellee. Argued: Timothy M. Miller.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
DORRIAN, P.J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Christy Hostacky, filed this appeal seeking reversal of the June 16, 2021 decision by the Court of Claims of Ohio granting dismissal in favor of appellee, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, on appellant‘s claims of employment discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On April 14, 2021, appellant filed an action against appellee in the Court of Claims alleging claims, pursuant to
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 3} Appellant appeals and assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
It was error to dismiss an employment discrimination case brought against a State employer under
Chapter 4112 based upon the two-year statute of limitations contained inR.C. 2743.16(A) rather than the then-existing six-year statute of limitations applicable to claims inR.C. 2305.07 .
III. Analysis
{¶ 4} We review a trial court‘s grant of a
{¶ 5} Appellant argues that on the date she filed her complaint, the general statute of limitations in effect for employment discrimination claims was the six-year statute of limitations in
{¶ 6} Appellant does not challenge the Court of Claims finding that more than two years had passed between the date on which her claims accrued and the date on which she filed her complaint in the Court of Claims. Rather, appellant challenges the Court of Claims
{¶ 7} In McFadden, we considered the analysis in Senegal and Harris and rejected the same. We held:
Appellant‘s first assignment of error involves the question of which statute of limitations applies to appellant‘s claims: the two-year statute set forth in
R.C. 2743.16(A) or the six-year statute set forth inR.C. 4112.99 . The parties have pointed to two conflicting decisions issued by this court. In the first, Senegal v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (March 10, 1994), Franklin App. No. 93API08-1161, we held that the six-year statute of limitations applied. In the more recent case, we specifically declined to follow Senegal and held that the two-year statute of limitations applies. McCoy v. Toledo Corr. Inst., Franklin App. No. 04AP-1098, 2005-Ohio-1848.In both cases, resolution turned on an application of
R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) , in which the state waived its immunity from liability. The relevant language in that section states that, “To the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has no applicability.” In Senegal, we concluded that the state was included within the definition of “employer” for purposes of the age discrimination statute, and therefore had consented to be sued prior to the enactment ofChapter 2743 . Thus, the two-year statute of limitations inR.C. 2743.16 did not apply, and we concluded that the six-year limitation period for liability established by statute set forth inR.C. 2305.07 was the proper limitation period.In McCoy, we initially rejected an attempt to distinguish Senegal on the grounds that Senegal involved an age discrimination claim brought under
R.C. 4101.17 (since renumbered asR.C. 4112.14 ) rather than race and genderdiscrimination claims under R.C. 4112.02 . In rejecting this argument, we stated that “our reading of Senegal suggests it is factually similar enough that, were it still good law, it would apply here.” McCoy, supra at ¶ 5. We then pointed out that no other decisions had accepted the six-year statute of limitations and, in fact, a number of decisions had specifically applied the two-year statute of limitations. Id. at ¶ 6, citing Ripley v. Ohio Bur. Of Emp. Serv., Franklin App. No. 04AP-313, 2004-Ohio-5577; Hosseinipour v. State Med. Bd. Of Ohio, Franklin App. No. 03AP-512, 2004-Ohio-1220; Obasuyi v. Wright State Univ., Franklin App. No. 02AP-300, 2002-Ohio-5521; Schaub v. Div. Of State Hwy. Patrol, (Mar. 5, 1996), Franklin App. No. 95APE08-1107.Finally, we noted that
R.C. 4112.99 was amended to allow suits for money damages against the state for discrimination in 1987, well after the adoption ofChapter 2743 in 1975. Since no other statutory provisions or cases evidencing the state‘s consent to be sued for money damages prior to 1975 could be cited, we concluded that the two-year limitations period set forth inR.C. 2743.16 applied. Id. at ¶ 9.
Appellant argues that we erred in McCoy by failing to recognize that from the time of its enactment in 1959,
We believe McCoy more accurately reflects the law applicable to appellant‘s claim. Therefore, we reiterate the holding from McCoy that the two-year statute of limitations in
McFadden at ¶ 5-10.
{¶ 8} In McCoy, McFadden, and Williams, this court revisited its analysis in Senegal and Harris and rejected the same. The precedent set forth in McFadden, overruling Senegal, has been in place since 2007. This court is not persuaded by appellant‘s argument to revisit the issue once again.
{¶ 9} Accordingly, we find the Court of Claims did not err in dismissing appellant‘s claims on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations in
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 10} Having overruled appellant‘s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio.
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and JAMISON, JJ., concur.