Whether • the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is unreasonable or unlawful, as claimed by appellant, depends upon a proper understanding of Section 2, Article XII of the Ohio Constitution and Sections 669-13 and 5353 оf the General Code of Ohio.
This court is firmly committed to the following propositions:
A. The land and improvements thereon of an institution may be exempted from taxation only if they are being used exclusively for a charitablе purpose.
Ursulina Academy of Cleveland
v.
Board of Tax Appeals,
B. A right to exemption from taxation must appear with reasonable certainty in the language of the Constitution or valid statute and must not depend upon a doubtful construction of such language.
In re Estate of Taylor,
C. A statute exempting property from taxation is to be read in the light of the Constitution of Ohio and this court will not assume that the Genеral Assembly intended to exceed any constitutional limitation.
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority,
v.
Thatcher, Aud., supra; State, ex rel. Struble, v. Davis et al., Tаx Commission,
Section 669-13, General Code, provides:
“Every corporation subject to the provisions of this act is hereby declared to be a-- chаritable and be *183 nevolent institution, and its funds and property shall be exempt from taxation.”
Bearing in mind the rule of strict construction of statutes authorizing exemption from taxation and the duty of the court to sustain legislation where рossible, the court must limit the word “property” in the foregoing statute to personal property and as not inсluding “land and improvements thereon.” Section 2 Article XII of the Constitution of Ohio.
We are not called upon in this case to pass upon thе question of whether under the statute personal property may be exempted or classified. In the cаse of
Seward, Dir. of Pub. Service,
v.
State, ex rel. Kratt,
As stated by Judge Matthias in the case of State, ex rel. Struble, v. Davis et al., Tax Commission, supra, 559:
“This court has uniformly adopted and applied the rule of strict construction to the exemption provisions of Section 2, Article XII. As stated in 2 Cooley on Taxation (4. Ed.), 1382, Section 661: # * and generally, where the Constitution enumerаtes the property which is or may be exempted, it is held that the Legislature has no power to exempt оther property than that enumerated. The lack of power to exempt may result from the express wording of the constitutional provision or be implied on the theory that the enumeration is intended to be exclusive. ’ ’ ’
We are of the opinon that Section 669-13, General Code, does not authorize the exemption of lаnd and improvements thereon from taxation.
Therefore, appellant’s reliance must be limited to Seсtion 5353, General Code. This section provides for *184 the exemption of “property belonging to institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes.” (Italics ours.)
In the case of
Wehrle Foundation v. Evatt, Tax Commr.,
In the case of
Cleveland Hospital Service Assn.
v.
Ebright, Treas.,
“A corporation organized under the provisions of Sections 669 to 669-13, inclusive, General Code, for the purpose of establishing, maintaining and operating a nonprofit hospital service plаn whereby hospital care may be provided by a nonprofit hospital or a group of such hospitals, is еngaged in a business substantially amounting to insurance.”
We are unable to find any evidence in the record of the instant case which would justify a holding that appellant is an institution whose property is used exclusively for charitablе purposes. Appellant’s activities are limited exclusively to the securing of pay patients and not charity patients for the various hospitals. Indeed, the many persons covered by such insurance, as well as thе organizations employing such insured, would doubtless resent the imputation that they or any of them are objects of charity. The very purpose of the insurance is to guard against the insured becoming an object of charity. Each participating hospital is to receive six dollars ($6) for each day, or part thereof, of hospital service rendered to subscribers holding contracts for semi-private room service and at the ratе *185 of four dollars and fifty cents ($4.50) for each day, or part thereof, of hospital service rendered to subscribers holding contracts for service in a ward. More expensive hospital service may be obtained аt regular hospital rates for such service with credit to subscriber for the semi-private ward allowance.
In сoncluding its finding, the Board of Tax Appeals, in its journal entry, recites:
“The board finds that the applicant is engagеd in the insurance business for the advantage and convenience, if not profit, of the participating hospitals and the subscribers to said contracts. It is not engaged in dispensing charity to anyone or furnishing any service or сarrying on any of the purposes for which the applicant was organized for those who are in need thereof without payment. Its property and funds are not used exclusively, or even in part, for charitable purрoses.
“It is therefore the order of the Board of Tax Appeals that this application be, and the sаme hereby is, denied. ’ ’
Upop hearing and consideration of the record and evidence in the instant cаse this court is of the opinion that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals appealed from is reasonable and lawful and, therefore, such decision should be and hereby is affirmed.
Decision affirmed.