Hospes v. Northwestern Manuf'g & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174

Hospes v. Northwestern Manuf'g & Car Co.

48 Minn. 174 | Minn. | 1892

Mitchell, J.

This appeal is from an order overruling a demurrer to the so-called “supplemental complaint” of the Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company. The Northwestern Manufacturing- & Car Company was a manufacturing corporation organized in May, 1882. Upon the complaint of a judgment creditor, (Hospes & Co.,) after return of execution unsatisfied, judgment was rendered in May, 1884, sequestrating all its property, things in action, and effects, and appointing a receiver of the same. This receivership still continues, the affairs of the corporation being not yet fully administered; but it appears that it is hopelessly insolvent, and that all the assets that have come into the hands of the receiver will not be sufficient to pay any considerable part of the debts. The Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company, a corporation organized in November, 1884, as creditor, became a party to the sequestration proceeding, and proved its claims against the insolvent corporation. In October, 1889, in behalf of itself and all other creditors who have exhibited their claims, it filed this complaint against certain stockholders (these appellants) *190of the car company, in pursuance of an order of court allowing it to do so, and requiring those thus impleaded to appear and answer the complaint. The object is to recover from these stockholders the amount of certain stock held by them, but alleged never to have been paid for. What was said in Meagher’s Case, ante, p. 158, 50 N. W. Rep. 1114, (just decided,) is equally applicable here as to the right to enforce such a liability in the sequestration proceeding upon the petition or complaint of creditors who have become parties to it. There is nothing in this practice inconsistent with what was decided in Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Langdon, 44 Minn. 37, (46 N. W. Rep. 310.) The complaint is not the commencement of an independent action by creditors in their own behalf, antagonistic to the rights of the receiver, but is filed in the sequestration proceeding itself, and in aid of it.

The principal question in the case is whether the complaint states facts showing that the thresher company, as creditor, is entitled to the relief prayed for; or, in other words, states a cause of action. Briefly stated, the allegations of the complaint are that on May 10, 1882, Seymour, Sabin & Co. owned property of the value of several million dollars, and a business then supposed to be profitable. That, in order to continue and enlarge this business, the parties interested in Seymour, Sabin & Co., with others, organized the car company, to which was sold the greater part of the assets of Seymour, Sabin & Co. at a valuation of $2,267,000, in payment of which there were issued to Seymour, Sabin & Co. shares of the preferred stock of the car company of the par value of $2,267,000, it being then and there agreed, by both parties that this stock was in full payment of the property thus purchased. It is further alleged that the stockholders of Seymour, Sabin & Co., and the other persons who had agreed to become stockholders in the car company, were then desirous of issuing to themselves, and obtaining for their own benefit, a large amount of common stock of the car company, “without paying therefor, and without incurring any liability thereon or to pay therefor;” and for that purpose, and “in order to evade and set at naught the laws of this state,” they caused Seymour, Sabin & Co. to subscribe for and agree to take common stock of the car company of the par value *191of $1,500,000. That Seymour, Sabin & Co. thereupon subscribed for that amount of the common stock, but never paid therefor any consideration whatever, either in money or property. That thereafter these persons caused this stock to be issued to D. M. Sabin as trustee, to be by him distributed among them. That it was so distributed without receipt by him or the car company, from any one, of any consideration whatever, but was given by the. car company and received by these parties entirely “gratuitously.” The car company was, at this time, free from debt, but afterwards became indebted to various persons for about $3,000,000. The thresher company, incorporated after the insolvency and receivership of the car company, for the purpose of securing possession of its assets, property, and business, and therewith engaging in and continuing the same kind of manufacturing, prior to October 27, 1887, purchased and became the owner of unsecured claims against the car company, “bona fide, and for a valuable consideration,” to the aggregate amount of $1,703,000. As creditor, standing on the purchase of these debts, which were contracted after the issue of this “bonus” stock, the thresher company files this complaint to recover the par value of the stock as never having been paid for. . The complaint does not allege what the consideration of these debts was, nor to whom originally owing, nor what the intervener paid for them, nor whether any of the original creditors trusted the car company on the faith of the bonus stock having been paid for. Neither does it allege that either the thresher company or its assignors were ignorant of the bonus issue of stock, nor that they or any of them were deceived or damaged in fact by such issue, nor that the bonus .stock was of any value. Neither is there any traversable allegation of any actual fraud or intent to deceive or injure creditors. A desire to get something without paying for it, and actually getting it, is not fraudulent or unlawful if the donor consents, and.no one else is injured by it; and the general allegation that it was done “in order to evade and set at naught the laws of the state” of itself amounts to nothing but a mere conclusion of law. As a creditors’ bill, in the ordinary sense, the complaint is manifestly insufficient. The thresher company, however, plants itself upon the so-called “trust-fund” doctrine, that *192the capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the payment of its debts; its contention being that such a “bonus” issue of stock creates, in case of the subsequent insolvency of the corporation, a liability on part of the stockholder in favor of creditors to pay for it, notwithstanding his contract with the corporation to the contrary.

This “trust-fund” doctrine, commonly called the “American doctrine,” has given rise to much confusion of ideas as to its real meaning, and much conflict of decision in its application. To such an extent has this been the case that many h ave questioned the accuracy of the phrase, as well as doubted the necessity or expediency of inventing any such doctrine. While a convenient phrase to express a certain general idea, it is not sufficiently precise or accurate to constitute a safe foundation upon which to build a system of legal rules. The doctrine was invented by Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308, which called for no such invention, the fact in that case being that a bank divided up two thirds of its capital among its stockholders without providing funds sufficient to pay its outstanding bill holders. Upon old and familiar principles this was a fraud on creditors. Evidently all that the eminent jurist meant by the doctrine was that corporate property must be first appropriated to the payment of the debts of the company before there can be any distribution of it among stockholders, — a proposition that is sound upon the plainest principles of common honesty. In Fogg v. Blair, 133 U. S. 534, 541, (10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338,) it is said that this is all the doctrine means. The expression used in Wood v. Dummer has, however, been taken up as a new discovery, which furnished a solution •of every question on the subject. The phrase that “the capital of a corporation constitutes a trust fund for the benefit of creditors” is misleading. Corporate property is-not held in trust, in any proper sense of the term. A trust implies two1 estates or interests, — one equitable and one legal; one person, as trustee, holding the legal title, while another, as the cestui que trust, has the beneficial interest. Absolute control and power of disposition are inconsistent with the idea of a trust. The capital of a corporation is its property. It has the whole beneficial interest in it, as well as the legal title. It may use the income and profits of it, and sell and dispose of it, the *193same as a natural person. It is a trustee for its creditors in the same sense and to the same extent as a natural person, but no further. This is well illustrated and clearly announced in the case of Graham v. La Crosse & M. R. Co., 102 U. S. 148. That was a creditors’ suit to reach a piece of real estate on the ground that it had been conveyed by the corporation fraudulently for a wholly inadequate consideration. The trust-fund doctrine' was invoked by a subsequent creditor, and it was claimed that, as the trust had been violated, the deed should be set aside. If the premise was correct that the corpotion held it in trust for creditors, the conclusion was inevitable; but the court denied the premise, saying that a corporation is in law as distinct a being as an individual is, and is entitled to hold property (if not contrary to its charter) as absolutely as an individual can hold it. Its estate is the same, its interest is the same, its possession is the same; and that there is no reason why the disposal by a corporation of any of its property should be questioned by subsequent creditors any more than a like disposal by an individual; that the same principles of law apply to each. That the phrase that “the capital of a corporation is a trust fund for the payment of its creditors” is misleading, if not inaccurate, is illustrated by the character of the actions that are frequently mistakenly instituted on the strength of it. For example, in the case of Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587, (5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1081,) two roads had been consolidated, the new company acquiring the property of the old ones. A creditor of one of the old companies, on the strength of the “trust-fund” doctrine, claimed a lien on its property in the hands of the new corporation. If this property was impressed with a trust in favor of creditors in the hands of the old company, it would logically follow that it would continue so in the hands of the new one. But the court denied the relief, and, in giving its construction of the “trust-fund” doctrine, said: “The property of a corporation is doubtless a trust fund for the payment of its debts in the sense that when the corporation is lawfully dissolved, and all its business wound up, or when it is insolvent, all its creditors are entitled in equity to have their debts paid out of the corporate property before any distribution thereof among the stockholders. It is also true, in the case of a corporation, as in *194that of a natural person, that any conveyance of the property of the debtor without authority of law and in fraud of existing creditors is void.” This is probably what is meant when it is said in some cases, as in Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96, 110, (11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468,) that the capital of a corporation is a trust fund sub modo. If so, no one will dispute it. But it means very little, for the same thing could be truthfully said of the property of an individual or a partnership. And obviously it would make no difference whether the disposition of the corporate property is to a stranger or to a stockholder, except that, of course, the latter could not be an innocent purchaser.

There is also much confusion in regard to what the “trust-fund” doctrine applies. Some cases seem to hold that unpaid subscribed .capital is a trust fund, while other assets are not, — that is, so long as the subscription is unpaid, it is held in trust by the corporation, but, when once paid in, it ceases to be a trust fund; while other cases hold that, paid or unpaid, it is all a trust fund. The first seems to be the rule laid down in Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, in which the “trust-fund” doctrine was first squarely announced by that court with all the vigor and force characteristic of the great jurist who wrote the opinion. In that case a stockholder in an insurance company had given his note, as the court found the fact to be, for 85 per cent, of his subscription to the stock of the company. After the company had become bankrupt, and the stockholder knew the fact, he bought up a claim against the company for one third its face, and in a suit by the assignee in bankruptcy on his note set up this claim as an offset. That this would have been a fraud on the bankrupt act, and at least a moral fraud on policy holders, is quite apparent without invoking the “trust-fund” doctrine; and, if the note for unpaid stock was a trust fund, there could have been no offset, whether the company was solvent or insolvent. In the opinion it is said that, if the subscription had been paid by the note or otherwise, the note ceased thereby to be a trust fund to which creditors can look, and becomes ordinary assets, with which directors may deal as they choose. But in Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, it is stated: “The capital paid in and promised to be paid in is a fund which the trustees cannot squander or give away.” While in Sanger v. Upton, Id. 56, it is said: *195“When debts aré incurred a contract arises with the creditors that it [thé capital] shall not be withdrawn or applied otherwise than upon their demands until such demands are satisfied.” And in the same connection it is distinctly stated that there is no difference between assets paid in and subscriptions; that “unpaid stock is as much a part of this pledge and as much a part of the assets of the company as the cash which has been paid in upon it. Creditors have the same right to look to it as to anything else, and the same right to insist upon its payment as upon the payment of any other debt due to the company. As regards creditors, there is'no distinction between such a demand and any other asset which may form a part of the property and effects of the corporation.” This language is quoted and approved in County of Morgan v. Allen, 103 U. S. 498, 508. It would seem clear that this is the correct statement of the law. The capital (not the mere share certificates) means all the assets, however invested. If a subscriber gives his note for bis stock, that note is no more and no less a trust fund than the money would have been if he had paid cash down. Capital cannot change from a trust to not a trust by a mere change of form. It is either all a trust or all not a trust, and the “trust-fund” rule, whatever that be, must apply to all alike, and in the same way. If the assets of a corporation are given back to stockholders, the result is the same as if the shares had been issued wholly or partly as a bonus. The latter is merely a short cut to the same result. So with dividends paid out of the capital, voluntary conveyances, stock paid in overvalued property; all are forms of one and the same thing, all reaching the same result, (a disposition of corporate assets,) which may or may not be a fraud on creditors, depending on circumstances. This much being once settled, the solution of the question when a subsequent creditor can insist on payment of stock.issued as paid up, but not in fact paid for, or not paid for at par, becomes, as we shall presently see, comparatively simple.

Another proposition which we think must be sound is that creditors cannot recover on the ground of contract when the corporation could not. Their right to recover in such cases must rest on the ground that the acts of the stockholders with reference to the corporate capital constitutes a fraud on their rights. We have here a case where *196the contract between the corporation and the takers of the shares was specific that the shares should not be paid for. . Therefore, unlike many of the eases cited, there is no ground for implying a promise to pay for them. The parties have explicitly agreed that there shall be no such implication, by agreeing that the stock shall not be paid for. In such a case the creditors undoubtedly may have rights superior to the corporation, but these rights cannot rest on the implication that the shareholder agreed to do something directly contrary to his real agreement, but must be based on tort or fraud, actual or presumed. In England, since the act of 1867, there is an implied contract created by statute that “every share in any company shall be deemed and be taken to have been issued and to be held subject to the payment of the whole amount thereof in cash.” This statutory contract makes every contrary contract void. Such a statute would be entirely just to all, for every one would be advised of its provisions, and could conduct himself accordingly. And in view of the fact that “watered” and “bonus” stock is one of the greatest abuses connected with the management of modern corporations, such a law might, on grounds of public policy, be very desirable. But this is a matter for the legislature, and not for the courts. We have no such statute; .and, even if the law of 1873, under which the car company was organized, impliedly forbids the issue of stock not paid for, the result might be that such issue would be void as ultra vires, and might be canceled, but such a prohibition would not of itself be sufficient to create an implied contract, contrary to the actual one, that the holder should pay for his stock.

It is well settled that an equity in favor of a creditor does not arise absolutely and in every case to have the holder of “bonus” stock pay for it contrary to his actual contract with the corporation. Thus no such equity exists in favor of one whose debt was contracted prior to the issue, since he could not have trusted the company upon the faith of such stock. First Nat. Bank v. Gustin, etc., Mining Co., 42 Minn. 327, (44 N. W. Rep. 198;) Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co., 119 U. S. 343, (7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231;) Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, 435, (11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530.) It does not exist in favor of a subsequent creditor who has dealt with the. corporation with full knowl*197edge of the arrangement by which the “bonus” stock was issued, for a man cannot be defrauded by that which he knows when he acts. First Nat. Bank v. Gustin, etc., Mining Co., supra. It has also been held not to exist where stock has been issued and turned out at its full market value to pay corporate debts. Clark v. Bever, supra. The same has been held to be the case where an active qorporation, whose original capital has been impaired, for the purpose of recuperating itself issues new stock, and sells it on the market for the best price obtainable, but for less than par, (Handley v. Stutz, supra;) although it is difficult to perceive, in the absence of a statute authorizing such a thing, (of which every one dealing with the corporations is bound to take notice,) any difference between the original stock of a new corporation and additional stock issued by a “going concern.” It is difficult, if not impossible, to explain or reconcile these cases upon the “trust-fund” doctrine, or, in the light of them, to predicate the liability of the stockholder upon that doctrine. But by putting it upon the ground of fraud, and applying the old and familiar rules of law on that subject to the peculiar nature of a corporation and the relation which its stockholders bear to it and to the public, we have at once rational and logical ground on which to stand. The capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit. It is a substitute for the individual liability of those who own its stock. People deal with it and give it credit on the faith of it. They have a right to assume that it has paid-in capital to the amount which it represents itself as having; and if they give it credit on the faith of that representation, and if the representation is false, it is a fraud upon them; and, in case the corporation becomes insolvent, the law, upon the plainest principles of common justice, says to the delinquent stockholder, “Make that representation good by paying for your stock.” It certainly cannot require the invention of any new doctrine in order to enforce so familiar a rule of equity. It is the misrepresentation of fact in stating the amount of capital to be greater than it really is that is the true basis of the liability of the stockholder in such cases; and it follows that it is only those creditors who have relied, or who can fairly be presumed to have relied, upon the professed amount of capital, in whose favor the law will recognize and enforce an equity against the holders of “bonus” stock. *198This furnishes a rational and uniform rule, to which familiar principles are easily applied, and which frees the subject from many of the difficulties and apparent inconsistencies into which the “trust-fund” doctrine has involved it; and we think that, even when the trust-fund doctrine has been invoked, the decision in almost every well-considered case is readily referable to such a rule.'

It is urged, however, that, if fraud be the basis of the stockholders’ liability in such cases, the creditor should affirmatively allege that he believed that the bonus stock had been paid for, and represented so much actual capital, and that he gave credit to the corporation on the faith of it; and it is also argued that, while there may be a presumption to that effect in the case of a. subsequent creditor, this is a mere presumption of fact, and that in pleadings no presumptions of fact are indulged in. This position is very plausible, and at first sight would seem to have much force; but we think it is unsound. Certainly any such rule of pleading or proof would work very inequitably in practice. Inasmuch as the capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit, its financial standing and reputation in the community has its source in, and is founded upon, the amount of its professed and supposed capital, and every one who deals with it does so upon the faith of that standing and reputation, although, as a matter of fact, he may have no personal knowledge of the amount of its professed capital, and in a majority of cases knows nothing about the shares of stock held by any particular stockholder, or, if so, what was paid for them. Hence, in a suit by such creditor against the holders of “bonus” stock, he could not truthfully allege, and could not affirmatively prove, that he believed that the defendants’ stock had been paid for, and that he gave the corporation credit on the faith of it, although, as a matter of fact, he actually gave the credit on the faith of the financial standing of the corporation, which was based upon its apparent and professed amount of capital. The misrepresentation as to the amount of capital would operate as a fraud on such a creditor as fully and effectually as if he had personal knowledge of the existence of the defendants’ stock, and believed it to have been paid for when he gave the credit. For this reason, among others, we think that all that it is necessary to allege or prove in that regard is that the plain*199tiff is a subsequent creditor; and that, if the fact was that he dealt with the corporation with knowledge of the arrangement by which the “bonus” stock was issued, this is a matter of defense. Gogebic Inv. Co. v. Iron Chief Min. Co., 78 Wis. 427, (47 N. W. Rep. 726.) Counsel cites Fogg v. Blair, supra, to the proposition that the complaint should have stated that this stock had some value; but that case is not in point, for the plaintiff there was a prior creditor; and, as his debt could not have been contracted on the faith of stock not then issued, he could only maintain his action, if at all, by alleging that the corporation parted with something of value.

In one respect, however, we think the complaint is clearly insufficient. The thresher company is here asking the interposition of the the court to aid in enforcing an equity in favor of creditors against the stockholders by declaring them liable to pay for this stock contrary to their actual contract with the corporation. While the proceeding is not, strictly speaking, an equitable action, yet the relief asked is equitable in its nature. Under such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the thresher company to show its own equities, and that it was in a position to demand such relief. It was not the original creditor of the car company, but the assignee of the original creditors. By that purchase it, of course, succeeded to whatever strictly legal rights its assignors had; but it is not rights of that kind which it is here seeking to enforce. Under such circumstances, we think it was incumbent upon it to state what it paid for the claims, or at least to show that it paid a substantial, and not a mere nominal, consideration. The only allegation is that it paid “a valuable consideration.” This might have been only one dollar. It appears that it bought the claims after the ear company had become insolvent, and its affairs were in the hands of a receiver; also that the indebtedness of that company amounted to about $3,000,000, and that there were not corporate assets enough to pay any considerable part of it. The mere chance of collecting something out of the stockholders does not ordinarily much enhance the selling price of claims against an insolvent corporation. If any person or company had gone to work and bought up for a mere song this large indebtedness of the car company for the purpose of speculating on the *200liability of the stockholders, no court would grant them the relief here prayed for. It would say to them, “We will not create and enforce an equity for the benefit of any such speculation.” Counsel for respondent suggest that the thresher company is but an organization of the original creditors, who'formed it, and pooled their claims, so as to save something out of the wreck of the car company; but nothing of the kind is alleged. On this ground the demurrer should have been sustained.

In view of further proceedings it may be proper to say that in our opinion there is nothing in the position that the right of recovery against the stockholders was barred by the statute of limitation. The argument in support of the proposition all rests upon the false premise that the cause of action accrued in May, 1882, when the bonus stock was issued. The corporation never had any cause of action against these defendants. As between them and the company, the agreement for the issue of the stock was valid. The creditors are not here seeking to enforce a right of action acquired through or from the corporation, but one that accrued directly to themselves, or for their benefit, and that did not accrue at least until the corporation became insolvent, in May, 1884.

Counsel for the St. Paul Trust Company stated that, if the court should reverse the order appealed from on any of the grounds urged by the other appellants, it would not be necessary for us to consider any of the assignments of error peculiar to his appeal; but, as we reverse upon a ground that may be remedied by amendment, we deem it proper to say that, in our opinion, the claim against the Kittson estate is a “contingent” claim, within the meaning of 1878 G. S. ch. 53.

Order reversed.

Gilfillan, C. J., took no part.

(Opinion published 50 N. W. Rep. 1117.)