Wanda HOSKINS; and David Paul Smith, Appellants, v. R. Cletus MARICLE, Clay Circuit Court, Judge, Appellee. and Commonwealth of Kentucky (Real Party in Interest) Appellee.
No. 2002-SC-0579-MR.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Aug. 26, 2004.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 16, 2004.
Marcus S. Carey, Erlanger, Counsel for Appellant David Paul Smith.
R. Cletus Maricle, Manchester, pro se, Counsel for Appellee R. Cletus Maricle, Clay Circuit Court Judge.
Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General, Karen M. Timmel, Assistant Attorney General, Brian T. Judy, Assistant Attorney General, Frankfort, Counsel for Real Party in Interest Appellee Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Opinion of the Court by Justice COOPER.
Appellants, Wanda Hoskins and David Paul Smith, petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ prohibiting Appellee, R. Cletus Maricle, judge of the Clay Circuit Court, from ordering a retrial of their indictments for murder and abuse of a corpse and directing him to approve the plea agreements that they negotiated with a special prosecutor. The Court of Appeals denied the writ and they appeal to this Court as a matter of right.
The indictment charged each Appellant with two counts of murder, a capital offense,
The Clay County Commonwealth‘s attorney thereafter disqualified himself from prosecuting the second trial, and a special prosecutor was appointed. Following plea negotiations, an agreement was reached to dismiss the abuse of a corpse charges, to dismiss one count of murder against each Appellant, and to amend the remaining counts of murder to charge each Appellant with one count of manslaughter in the second degree, a Class C felony.
On August 6, 2001, Judge Maricle heard evidence on the motions, including testimony from the victims’ families and friends. The Court of Appeals denied a motion to include the videotape of that hearing in the record of this original action, deeming it unnecessary to its decision. However, we assume that the victims’ families and friends objected to the plea agreement and that Judge Maricle was persuaded to some extent by their testimony. Appellants and the Commonwealth agree that Judge Maricle commented extensively following the hearing, referred to his intimate knowledge of the case gleaned from presiding over the first trial, and rejected the agreement as too lenient. His succinct written order of April 4, 2002, simply denied Appellants’ motions to enter guilty pleas to second-degree manslaughter, effectively overruling the Commonwealth‘s motion to amend the indictment.
In their petition for a writ of prohibition, Appellants claimed, inter alia, that Judge Maricle acted outside his jurisdiction in overruling the prosecutor‘s motion to amend the indictment because the prosecution of felony cases is vested exclusively in the executive department of government, i.e., the Commonwealth‘s attorney.
I. WRIT OF PROHIBITION.
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except it shall have the power to issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the complete determination of any cause, or as may be required to exercise control of the Court of Justice.
Similarly,
[A] writ of prohibition should be granted only upon a showing that: 1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or 2) the lower court is about to act incorrectly, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury would result.
Id. at 199 (emphasis added) (internal quotes omitted).
Because Appellants claim that Judge Maricle is acting either outside his jurisdiction or erroneously within his jurisdiction, both tests apply. Thus, the issues are (1) whether the right to appeal1 precludes the issuance of a writ of prohibition when a trial court is proceeding outside its jurisdiction; (2) whether the right to appeal is an “adequate remedy;” and (3) whether “great injustice and irreparable harm” will result if the petition is denied.
Our case law, at least over the past twenty-three years, has been facially inconsistent with respect to the first issue. Compare, e.g., Peterson v. Shake, Ky., 120 S.W.3d 707, 710 (2003) (though observing that “Appellant has no other adequate remedy at his disposal“), Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. v. Maricle, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 130, 133 (1999), Petrey v. Cain, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1999), Coms v. Transp. Cabinet, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 574, 578 (1991), and Wood v. Graham, Ky., 633 S.W.2d 404, 406 (1982), none of which imposed or recited the “inadequate remedy” requirement, with Lewis LP Gas, Inc. v. Lambert, Ky., 113 S.W.3d 171, 175 (2003), Ky. Labor Cabinet v. Graham, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 247, 255-56 (2001), Commonwealth v. Ryan, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 113, 115 (1999), Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., Ky., 926 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1996), Fischer v. State Bd. of Elections, Ky., 847 S.W.2d 718, 720 (1993), Shumaker v. Paxton, Ky., 613 S.W.2d 130, 131 (1981), and Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 770 S.W.2d 239, 241 (1989), all of which either imposed or recited the “inadequate remedy” requirement. An understanding of how this divergence of authority occurred requires historical context.
From 1799 until 1891, the constitutional jurisdiction of the “old” court of appeals2 was limited to “appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the State, under such restrictions and regulations, not repugnant to this Constitution, as may, from time to time be prescribed by law.” Ky. Const. of 1799, art. IV, § 2; Ky. Const. of 1850, art. IV, § 2. Under this regime, a circuit court, as the court of general jurisdiction, could issue a common law writ prohibiting an inferior court from acting outside its jurisdiction, Arnold v. Shields, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 18, 23 (1837); Reese v. Lawless, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 394, 394-95 (1816), but the common law did not authorize a circuit court to prohibit an inferior court from acting erroneously
When Section 110 of the 1891 Constitution was adopted, it added language giving the court of appeals “power to issue such writs as may be necessary to give it a general control of inferior jurisdictions.” Ky. Const. of 1891 § 110. At the 1890 Constitutional Convention, Delegate Thomas H. Hines of Franklin County, a former chief justice of the court of appeals, offered an amendment that would have deleted the new language. 3 Debates of Constitutional Convention of 1890 3127. Delegate C.J. Bronston of Lexington explained:
I presume that the Delegate from Franklin means, by that amendment, that the Court already has that power as an inherent power in the Court. I am inclined to agree with the Delegate from Franklin on that legal proposition; but it was believed, on the part of the General Committee, after a discussion of that matter, that it would be better to express that in the Constitution, so as to relieve it from any possible doubt in the mind of anybody within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Our predecessor court initially declined to interpret Section 110 of the 1891 Constitution as conferring authority to prohibit a trial court from proceeding erroneously within its jurisdiction, even where there existed no right to appeal from the erroneous action.3 Standard Oil Co. v. Linn, Ky., 17 Ky.L.Rptr, 832, 32 S.W. 932, 933 (1895). That reluctance was short-lived. In Weaver v. Toney, 107 Ky. 419, 54 S.W. 732 (1899), the court held that a writ was appropriate to prohibit a circuit judge from acting outside his jurisdiction, id., 54 S.W. at 738, but also signaled its intent to consider petitions for writs in other circumstances:
[W]here the inferior tribunal is proceeding out of its jurisdiction, the power of the court may be invoked to stay the exercise of such jurisdiction; and it would also seem, in certain classes of cases, that even where the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction this court may likewise interfere, if the remedy by appeal is not entirely adequate, or if the court, in the exercise of its discretionary powers shall deem it necessary to so interfere.
Id. at 734 (emphasis added). Weaver was the genesis of the “inadequate remedy by appeal” requirement and indicated that it would apply only when it was claimed that the inferior tribunal was acting erroneously within its jurisdiction. Weaver went on to explain that “necessary” meant that “an excessive and unauthorized application of judicial force, although in a case otherwise properly cognizable by the court or judge in question, may be prevented by prohibition.” Id. at 736 (internal quotation omitted). The “necessary” circumstance articulated in Weaver evolved into the “great injustice and irreparable injury” requirement of our present rule. Ohio River
In no instance has a writ of prohibition been allowed against a court proceeding out of its jurisdiction or erroneously within its jurisdiction when any other adequate remedy for the threatened wrong existed, which was adequate. If the right of appeal exists and it is an adequate remedy, the complaining party must be relegated to his remedy through appeal.
Id. However, Gordon continued that “the writ is granted as a matter of sound discretion,” id., and it was cited for that proposition in Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d at 800. After Gordon, and until Shumaker v. Paxton was decided in 1981, no Kentucky case suggested that the “inadequate remedy by appeal” requirement applied when the lower court was proceeding outside its jurisdiction.
In Duffin v. Field, 208 Ky. 543, 271 S.W. 596 (1925), the court formulated a bright line rule with respect to writs of prohibition:
[W]e will prohibit inferior courts in all cases where (1) they are threatening to proceed, or are proceeding in a matter of which they have no jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; and (2) where they, although possessing jurisdiction, are exercising or about to exercise it erroneously and great injustice and irreparable injury would result to the applicant if they should do so, and there exists no other adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise.
Id., 271 S.W. at 596. Under this rule, the court would always issue a writ to prohibit an inferior court from proceeding outside its jurisdiction unless there was a remedy available through application to an intermediate court, e.g., a petition to a circuit court for a writ against an inferior court. Thus, Duffin eliminated any discretion to deny the petition in such a circumstance even if there was an adequate remedy by appeal. Compare the “in all cases” language in Duffin with the “only upon” language in Southeastern United Medigroup, 952 S.W.2d at 199. Per Duffin, the “no adequate remedy by appeal” and the “great injustice and irreparable injury” requirements applied only when the lower court was proceeding erroneously within its jurisdiction. Id., 271 S.W. at 596.
Evans v. Humphrey, 281 Ky. 254, 135 S.W.2d 915 (1940), restated the Duffin rule except for the “in all cases” language, which it deleted. Id., 135 S.W.2d at 917. We assume the deletion was intended to restore the element of discretion in cases where the lower court was proceeding outside its jurisdiction (a factual scenario not present in Evans).
The two most significant opinions on this subject are Chamblee v. Rose, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 775 (1952), and Bender v. Eaton, supra, both authored by Commissioner Clay. In Chamblee, the petitioner sought a writ to prohibit a trial court from proceeding in a child custody case over which the state of Alabama had jurisdiction. Commissioner Clay wrote for the court:
Respondent takes the position that this Court is not authorized to issue a writ of prohibition where the right to appeal exists. The authorities cited do not sustain such a position, and
Section 110 of the Constitution imposes no such limitation. This Court has a broad discretion in the issuance of such writs, and each case must be adjudged on its particular merits. Our opinions have consistently distinguished between those cases: (1) where the inferior court lacks jurisdiction; and (2) where the court, having jurisdiction is proceeding erroneously. It is in the latter class of cases that we have emphasized the need for a showing of great injustice and irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise....
It has been held that the remedy by way of appeal is not the controlling consideration where the inferior court is without jurisdiction....
If the Whitley Circuit Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed in this case, it would be a most inept ruling to deny the writ, require a trial on the merits, and then on an appeal be forced to reverse the case on the very question which is now before us. We therefore conclude that if the Whitley Circuit Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, petitioner should be entitled to his writ of prohibition.
Id. at 776-77 (citations omitted). The first two quoted paragraphs from Chamblee indicate that the existence of a remedy by appeal is a relevant, but not the controlling, factor in determining whether to issue a writ prohibiting a trial court from acting outside its jurisdiction. The last quoted paragraph concludes that the right of appeal was an inadequate remedy under the circumstances of that case.
Bender v. Eaton, supra, held, with respect to the court‘s authority to grant or deny any petition for a writ, that “[t]he exercise of this authority has no limits except our judicial discretion, and each case must stand on its own merits.” Id., 343 S.W.2d at 800. The petitioner in Bender claimed that the trial court was acting erroneously within its jurisdiction by permitting discovery of privileged materials. Bender held that when that allegation is made, a showing of inadequate remedy by appeal becomes a prerequisite to consideration of the alleged error (as opposed to a mere factor to be considered). Id. at 801.
Thus, under Chamblee and Bender, whether to issue a writ was always discretionary, even when the trial court was acting outside its jurisdiction. However, in that circumstance, the existence of an adequate remedy by appeal was not controlling, but only a factor for the court to consider in exercising its discretion. But if the petition alleged only that the trial court was acting erroneously within its jurisdiction, a writ would issue only if it was shown that there was no adequate remedy by appeal and great injustice and irreparable harm would otherwise occur. As will be further explained in Part III(1) of this opinion, infra, Bender also held that great and irreparable harm to the petitioner is not an absolute prerequisite. Id. at 801.
In our 1981 opinion, Shumaker v. Paxton, supra, we held for the first time since 1915 that a writ could not be issued to prohibit a lower court from proceeding outside its jurisdiction absent a showing that there was no adequate remedy by appeal. Id., 613 S.W.2d at 131. Shumaker gave no explanation for this departure from Chamblee, and cited only Evans v. Humphrey as authority for the proposition. Id. As previously noted, Evans did not apply the “inadequate remedy by ap-
We conclude that the analyses in Chamblee and Bender were sound and now depart from those cases holding that the existence of an adequate remedy by appeal precludes the issuance of a writ to prohibit a trial court from acting outside its jurisdiction. We also reinstate the condition deleted by Shumaker that there must be no remedy through an application to an intermediate court. A more precise statement of the rule to which we now return is as follows:
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted.
In Hargis v. Parker, Ky., 85 S.W. 704 (1905), a case decided only fourteen years after the adoption of Section 110 of the 1891 Constitution, our predecessor court wrote:
If it be true that the Fayette court is proceeding without jurisdiction, it is not substantial justice that it should be allowed to take the bodies of the complainants, confine them in jail without bail, as it might do at its discretion, subject the parties to enormous expense in defending the case, even if it went no further than a trial of the question of jurisdiction, and say to them, “Your remedy is solely by appeal if you have been wronged.” We think [Section 110] of the Constitution, though it be deemed only declaratory of the common law on the subject, confers the power and jurisdiction on this court to intervene by the writ of prohibition to stay the inferior courts of the state from proceeding out of their jurisdiction. It may issue whether or not there is an appeal.
Id. at 706. Hargis was cited by Chamblee, supra, as authority for the proposition that the existence of a remedy by way of appeal does not control when the inferior court is
We have consistently issued writs to prohibit criminal proceedings when the lower court was acting outside of its jurisdiction. See Peterson v. Shake, 120 S.W.3d at 710 (circuit court without jurisdiction to try misdemeanor offense as a felony); Spivey v. Jackson, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 158 (1980) (circuit court without jurisdiction to try incarcerated defendant more than 180 days after motion for final disposition was properly filed under
If [Judge Maricle] lacks jurisdiction to [reject these plea agreements], it would be a most inept ruling to deny the writ, require a trial on the merits, and then on an appeal be forced to reverse the case on the very question which is now before us.
Chamblee, 249 S.W.2d at 777. We turn now to the claim that Judge Maricle acted outside of his jurisdiction.
II. JURISDICTION—SEPARATION OF POWERS.
Appellants assert that Judge Maricle acted outside his jurisdiction when he rejected the plea agreement because he thereby exercised powers belonging exclusively to the executive department of government. Our Constitution specifically articulates the doctrine of separation of powers.
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.
No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
Perhaps no state forming a part of the national government of the United States has a Constitution whose language more emphatically separates and perpetuates what might be termed the American tripod form of government than does our Constitution
Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S.W. 455, 457 (1922). See also Diemer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 786 S.W.2d 861, 864 (1990) (“Kentucky is a strict adherent to the separation of powers doctrine.“).
The power to define crimes and assign their penalties belongs to the legislative department.
Essentially, Appellants claim that since it lies within the prerogative of the executive department by and through the Commonwealth‘s attorney to determine what crime to charge and whether to prosecute it, an indictment “belongs” to the prosecutor who may prosecute, amend, or dismiss it at his or her discretion without interposure from the presiding judge. While that is or has been the law in some common law jurisdictions, e.g., In re Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1868); Baglioni v. Chief of Police, 421 Mass. 229, 656 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1995); State v. Tufts, 56 N.H. 137 (1875), it is not the law of Kentucky.
Our predecessor court once stated, “An indictment can only be found and presented by a grand jury, and therefore no amendment of an indictment can be allowed.” Commonwealth v. Vanmeter, 8 Ky. Op. 754, 755 (1876).6 However, the law of the Commonwealth since at least 1854 has permitted a Commonwealth‘s attorney to dismiss an indictment but only “with the permission of the court.” M.C. Johnson, Joshua Harlan & J.W. Stevenson, Code of Practice in Criminal Cases § 241 (eff. July 1, 1854) (emphasis added); see also John D. Carroll, Carroll‘s Code of Practice in Criminal Cases (“Criminal Code“) § 243 (1st ed. 1888). Similarly,7
Before the court shall permit any Commonwealth‘s or county attorney to dismiss any indictment or enter a nolle prosequi in any case, such attorney shall file a statement, in writing, setting forth the reasons for such dismissal or such failure to prosecute....
(Emphasis added.) That requirement was also contained in KS 1127(4) (1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 182, § 1). Construing these provisions, our predecessor court held in Commonwealth v. Davis, 169 Ky. 650, 184 S.W. 1121 (1916):
[T]he commonwealth attorney cannot dismiss an indictment without permission of the court, and will be permitted to do so only upon reasons deemed sufficient by the court. This necessarily vests in the circuit judge the right and duty to exercise a discretion in sustaining or overruling such a motion.
Id., 184 S.W. at 1122 (citations omitted).8 See also Kidd v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 498, 74 S.W.2d 944, 947 (1934) (court has discretion to grant or deny Commonwealth‘s attorney‘s request to dismiss indictment).
Concomitantly, subject to rare exceptions usually related to a defendant‘s claim of a denial of the right to a speedy trial,9 a trial judge has no authority, absent consent of the Commonwealth‘s attorney, to dismiss, amend, or file away before trial a prosecution based on a good indictment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, Ky., 980 S.W.2d 278, 281 (1998) (dismissal); Commonwealth v. Hicks, Ky., 869 S.W.2d 35, 37 (1994) (dismissal); Allen v. Walter, Ky., 534 S.W.2d 453, 455 (1976) (amendment); Commonwealth v. Huddleston, 283 Ky. 465, 141 S.W.2d 867 (1940) (dismissal); Slater v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 620, 40 S.W.2d 389, 391 (1931) (dismissal);
In Cundiff, supra, our predecessor court explained the relationship between prosecutor and judge as follows:
First ... where an indictment, for any cause, is to be dismissed or filed away, it can only be done upon motion of the commonwealth‘s attorney, or the county attorney who may be acting for him; and, second, that it cannot be done by even the commonwealth‘s or county attorney, except the reasons therefore be reduced to writing, and the court, upon having considered the reasons upon which the discontinuance of the prosecution is sought, gives his consent that it may be done. A prosecution by indictment is a litigation in which the state is plaintiff or complainant, and is represented by the commonwealth‘s attorney. The judge does not represent the state any more than he does the defendant in the prosecution. His right to control the prosecution goes only to the extent of determining whether or not the indictment is good on demurrer. If he holds it to be a good indictment, he is without power to direct its dismissal.
Id., 147 S.W. at 768 (emphasis added). See also Slater, 40 S.W.2d at 391 (“The dismissal must be by the concurrent action of both the prosecuting attorney and the judge.“).
In 1962, the General Assembly repealed the Criminal Code, 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 234, § 61(2), and replaced it with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Act adopting the new rules states, inter alia, as follows:
PREAMBLE
The Criminal Code Committee, established by the General Assembly for the purpose of improving criminal procedure in the courts of the Commonwealth, having reported its recommendations to the Legislative Research Commission, the Commission having approved the recommendations and formulated plans for their execution, and the Court of Appeals being in accord with these plans, the General Assembly establishes this revised procedure in criminal cases....
It is therefore declared to be the policy of the General Assembly that prescription of rules governing details of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Judicial Department after the effective date of this Act [emphasis added];
[S]ubject to the rule-making authority of the Court of Appeals[,]
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
Section 0. The rules in this section are prescribed in accordance with the principle, finding and declaration contained in the preamble to this Act, and with modifications thereof shall be known as the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, and may be cited by the abbreviation, ‘RCr’ or by the full title.
1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 234, Preamble, § 0.
Whereas, the revision of criminal procedure effected by this Act is comprehensive ... this Act shall become effective on January 1, 1963. The Rules of Criminal Procedure shall govern further proceedings and prosecutions pending on that date....
The Act set forth the new Rules in the same order and enumeration as they exist today. Thus, contrary to the suggestion in the dissenting opinion, post at 33, the Rules of Criminal Procedure were enacted by the General Assembly, subject to the power of the Judicial Department to amend or repeal them.10 The Act did not contain an expiration date or a self-repealer, and the General Assembly has never repealed any portion of it. Consistent with former Criminal Code § 243, the new Criminal Rule (RCr) 9.64, as enacted in 1962, read:
The attorney for the Commonwealth with the permission of the court, may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint prior to the submission of the case.
The attorney for the Commonwealth, with the permission of the court, may dismiss the indictment, information, complaint or uniform citation prior to the swearing of the jury or, in a non-jury case, prior to the swearing of the first witness.
As enacted in 1962,
The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.
1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 234, § 0,
The plea agreements rejected in the underlying action include both dismissals and amendments of the indictment, both of which require judicial approval. As with former Criminal Code § 243,
In the landmark case of United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2168, 48 L.Ed.2d 795 (1976), the district court denied a joint motion by the government and the defendant to dismiss the indictment. The Attorney General argued on appeal that the “by leave of court” provision violated the constitutional requirement of separation of powers. Like Section 81 of the Kentucky Constitution,
We think the rule should and can be construed to preserve the essential judicial function of protecting the public interest in the evenhanded administration of criminal justice without encroaching on the primary duty of the Executive to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. The resulting balance of power is precisely what the Framers intended.... [T]he phrase “by leave of court” in
Rule 48(a) was intended to modify and condition the absolute power of the Executive, consistently with the Framer‘s [sic] concept of Separation of Powers, by erecting a check on the abuse of Executive prerogatives.... The rule was not promulgated to shift absolute power from the Executive to the Judicial Branch. Rather, it was intended as a power to check power.
Id. at 512-13. Thus, the “by leave of court” requirement of
Another reason why
“Indictment” is a technical word, peculiar to Anglo Saxon jurisprudence and implies the finding of a grand jury, as does also the word “presentment.” “Information” is a written accusation of a crime, preferred by a public prosecuting officer without the intervention of a grand jury.
Rice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 288 S.W.2d 635, 637 (1956) (citation omitted).
We have stated in a different context that “[a] grand jury is a part of the court, and under judicial control, so there can be no doubt that a session of the grand jury is a proceeding in a circuit court.” Bowling v. Sinnette, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 743, 745 (1984); Greenwell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 859, 861 (1958). See also Nelson v. Shake, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 914, 916 (2002). The grand jury is summoned and impaneled by the circuit court,
Nor does the Commonwealth‘s attorney control the grand jury. The Commonwealth‘s attorney is the person with “primary responsibility [for] present[ing] evidence” to the grand jury concerning alleged criminal violations.
Nothing in our Constitution, statutes, or rules classifies the grand jury as an arm of the Commonwealth‘s attorney. The grand jury is “an investigative body acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.” United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The hallmark of the grand jury is its independence from outside influence.” Democratic Party of Ky. v. Graham, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 423, 426 (1998). “[I]t serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.” Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962).
Because the grand jury is an agency of neither the court nor the prosecutor, but an independent agency of constitutional origin, it follows, ipso facto, that
III. CLAIMS OF ERROR.
1. Preliminary determinations.
In addition to reiterating the rule that a writ prohibiting a trial court from acting erroneously within its jurisdiction will issue only when there is “no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise” and the petitioner will suffer “great and irreparable injury”15 if the petition is not granted, Bender v. Eaton, supra, further explained that those requirements are but “a practical and convenient formula for determining, prior to deciding the issue of alleged error, if petitioner may avail himself of this remedy.” Id., 343 S.W.2d at 801. In other words, only after determining that the prerequisites exist will the court decide whether an error occurred for which a writ should issue.
The claim in this case is more akin to the latter class of cases than to the former; for Appellants essentially claim immunity from further prosecution. If Judge Maricle erred in rejecting a plea agreement that would have permitted Appellants to plead guilty to a lesser included offense, subjecting them to a trial for the greater offense, though technically not double jeopardy, would have the same effect. Cf. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326-27, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 1760, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970) (conviction of lesser included offense operates as acquittal of offense of higher degree so that, if the conviction is reversed for a new trial, the defendant cannot be retried for the higher offense); Klee v. Lair, Ky., 621 S.W.2d 892, 893 (1981) (same). Applying the logic of Hargis v. Parker, supra, that it is not enough under this circumstance to say to Appellants, “Your remedy is solely by appeal if you have been wronged,” 85 S.W. at 706, we conclude that the right of appeal is inadequate in this circumstance.
We turn now to the requirement of “great injustice and irreparable injury.” In Litteral v. Woods, 223 Ky. 582, 4 S.W.2d 395 (1928), our predecessor court defined great injustice and irreparable injury as “incalculable damage to the applicant ... either to the liberty of his person, or to his property rights, or other far-reaching and conjectural consequences.” Id., 4 S.W.2d at 396-97 (emphasis added). Litteral cited as an example Natural Gas Products Co. v. Thurman, 205 Ky. 100, 265 S.W. 475 (1924), where the failure to issue the writ would have required the closing of a newly constructed and fully operational manufacturing plant. Distinguishing Thurman, Litteral held that no “great and irreparable injury” would result from the petitioner‘s temporary loss of a judgment to which he believed himself entitled in the event of a correct ruling. Id., 4 S.W.2d at 398; see also Farmers Nat‘l Bank of Danville v. Speckman, 312 Ky. 106, 226 S.W.2d 315, 317 (1949) (delay and expense of appeal is not irreparable injury); Osborn v. Wolfford, 239 Ky. 470, 39 S.W.2d 672, 673 (1931) (“[G]reat and irreparable injury’ [is] not such an injury as is usually suffered and sustained by a losing litigant upon a trial of his case in a court having
Litteral, Farmers National Bank, and Osborn were civil cases, and Litteral specifically identified damage to a person‘s liberty as “great injustice and irreparable injury.” Id., 4 S.W.2d at 397. Nevertheless, if Appellants were convicted of murder and sentenced to death, and then obtained a reversal on appeal, their liberty interests would likely be no more affected than if they were permitted to plead guilty to a Class C felony and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. However, Bender v. Eaton, supra, also held that a finding of “great injustice and irreparable injury” is not an absolute prerequisite to considering the merits of a claim of error.
Thus we find that in certain special cases this Court will entertain a petition for prohibition in the absence of a showing of specific great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, provided a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration. It may be observed that in such a situation the court is recognizing that if it fails to act the administration of justice generally will suffer the great and irreparable injury.
Id. at 801; see also Roman Catholic Diocese of Lexington v. Noble, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 724, 729 (2002). We conclude that if Judge Maricle erred in rejecting Appellants’ plea agreements, which would unnecessarily subject Appellants to another trial for double murder with possible sentences of death and a lengthy appeal, such would constitute a miscarriage of justice and would disrupt the orderly administration of justice. Thus, we proceed to the merits of the claims of error.
2. Rejection of plea agreement.
“Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.” Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.Cir.1967). Thus, “[a] judge in our system does not have the authority to tell prosecutors which crimes to prosecute or when to prosecute them.” United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir.1992). “Courts do not know which charges are best initiated at which time, which allocation of prosecutorial resources is most efficient, or the relative strengths of various cases and charges.” United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.1983) (citations and internal quotes omitted).
Thus, we start with the presumption that the party charged with the prosecution of a case is in the best position to evaluate the probability of its success.
The Executive remains the absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and presumptively the best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated. The exercise of its discretion with respect to the termination of pending prosecutions should not be judicially disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest public interest.
United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d at 513 (emphasis added). See also Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29, 98 S.Ct. 81, 85, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977) (“[T]he District Court was empowered to withhold leave if the Government‘s decision to terminate this prosecution clearly disserved the public interest.“) (citing Cowan). “Unless the court finds that the prosecutor is clearly
motivated by considerations other than his assessment of the public interest, it must grant the motion to dismiss.” United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 630 (5th Cir.1981). Factors that indicate a motivation other than an assessment of the public interest include the acceptance of a bribe, the desire to attend a social event rather than trial, or personal dislike of the victim of the crime. Id. (quoting In re Washington, 544 F.2d 203, 212-13 (5th Cir.1976) (Hill, J., dissenting)). These examples do not exclude other factors contrary to the manifest public interest. Id. n. 19. No one in this case suggests that the special prosecutor was motivated by anything other than “his assessment of the public interest.” However, his motions to dismiss certain counts of the indictment in this case were not independent of the other aspects of the plea agreements. Each agreement required the dismissal of some charges and the amendment of another in exchange for a guilty plea to the amended charge. Since the motions to dismiss were integral to the plea agreements, the issue becomes whether Judge Maricle abused his discretion in rejecting the plea agreements.
There is, of course, no constitutional right to plea bargain. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977); Commonwealth v. Reyes, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 62, 64 (1989). While a defendant may have the right to hold the prosecution to its bargain in certain circumstances,16 this right does
Federal courts generally recognize three types of plea bargains. A “sentence bargain” is an agreement in which the prosecutor agrees to recommend or not to oppose a particular sentence in exchange for a guilty plea to the original charge. Miller, 722 F.2d at 563. Since sentencing is a function of the judiciary, a judge‘s discretion to accept or reject a sentence bargain is unfettered. United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1437 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 835 (5th Cir.1981), superseded by regulation on other grounds as stated in United States v. Diaz, 138 F.3d 1359, 1364 (11th Cir. 1998). A “charge bargain,” is an agreement by the prosecutor to reduce the original charge in exchange for the defendant‘s agreement to plead guilty to the reduced charge, United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1033 (2d Cir.1991), and/or to dismiss some charges in exchange for pleas of guilty to others. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985). A “hybrid bargain” is a charge bargain accompanied by an agreement by the prosecutor to recommend or not oppose a particular sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty to the reduced charges. Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437. Charge bargains affect the court‘s sentencing authority only incidentally, in the same manner as a prosecutor‘s decision whether to initiate charges restrains the court‘s sentencing powers. Id. at 1438; see also Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1464. Hybrid bargains implicate not only the prosecutorial authority of the Executive but also the adjudicatory and sentencing authority of the Judiciary and the discretion of a trial court to accept or reject a guilty plea. Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438.
Federal courts must reject plea agreements that undermine the federal sentencing guidelines. The following comments from the Senate Judiciary Committee report regarding proposed
The concern is that the prosecutor will use the plea bargaining process to circumvent the guidelines recommendation .... The bill contains a provision designed to avoid this possibility. Under proposed
28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2)(D) , the Sentencing Commission is directed to issue policy statements for consideration by Federal judges in deciding whether to accept a plea agreement. This guidance will assure that judges can examine plea agreements to make certain that prosecutors have not used plea bargain-ing to undermine the sentencing guidelines.
S.Rep. No. 225-98, at 63 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3246. See also United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir.2000) (discussing and quoting same). Accordingly, Section 6B1.2(a) of the
In the case of a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of any charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges, the court may accept the agreement if the court determines, for reasons stated on the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.
We said in Commonwealth v. Corey, supra, that plea agreements are “subject to the approval of the court,” id., 826 S.W.2d at 320, and federal law is in accord. United States v. Sandles, 80 F.3d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir.1996) (“We review the court‘s decision to accept or reject a plea agreement for abuse of discretion.“);
Thus, although a court may not adopt a categorical policy to reject all charge (or hybrid) bargains, Miller, 722 F.2d at 564-65, its discretion to accept or reject such an agreement is limited only by the requirement that it independently review each bargain placed before it, and set forth in the record both the prosecutor‘s reasons for forming the bargain and the court‘s justification for rejecting it. Id. at 566 (citing United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 623 (D.C.Cir.1973)). “[R]equiring district courts to articulate a sound reason for rejecting a plea is the surest way to foster the sound exercise of judicial discretion.” United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir.1990). We agree.
To summarize federal law on this subject, an “independent” motion by a prosecutor to dismiss or amend an indictment must be sustained unless clearly contrary to manifest public interest. Cowan, 524 F.2d at 513. A “sentence bargain,” which does not involve dismissal or amendment of any charges but does involve a recommendation or agreement not to oppose a particular sentence, can be approved or rejected in the discretion of the trial court. Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437. A “charge bargain,” which dismisses or amends one or more charges in exchange for a guilty plea to the reduced charges, or a “hybrid bargain,” which is a charge bargain with an additional agreement with respect to sentencing, can be approved or rejected in the discretion of the trial court, Miller, 722 F.2d at 566, but the trial court must articulate the prosecutor‘s reasons for forming the bargain and the court‘s reasons for rejecting it.17 Id.; Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 623. While these rules are not binding on the states, Hurtado v. California, supra note 6, we conclude that they establish sound and reasonable guidelines. Thus, we adopt these principles for Kentucky.
Because the sentence recommendation was the maximum sentence for the reduced charge, the plea bargain in the underlying case was a charge bargain rather than a hybrid bargain. The prosecutor‘s reasons for forming the bargain were stated in the written plea agreement. The parties agree that Judge Maricle stated on the record that his reason for rejecting the agreement was because it was “too lenient.” Thus, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Miller and Ammidown, supra. The issue becomes whether Judge Maricle abused his discretion in rejecting the agreement as “too lenient.”
While we have no precedent on this issue, federal courts have recognized, both before and after the adoption of the sentencing guidelines, that excessive le-
The proposition that a facially proper plea agreement must be approved unless disapproval is required by a concern for the rights of the defendant is a far too restrictive view of the court‘s proper concerns. The plea bargaining process is an essential component of the administration of justice, and if the court has reasonable grounds for believing that acceptance of the plea would be contrary to the sound administration of justice, it may reject the plea. United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir.1986) (internal quotation and citation omitted). See also United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir.2002) (“The court‘s belief that the defendant would receive too light a sentence is a sound reason for rejecting a plea agreement.“); Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 696 (“Among the reasons that may justify the exercise of discretion to reject a plea agreement is a concern that the resulting sentence would be too lenient.“); United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 376 (6th Cir.1993) (“[A] district court [may] reject a plea agreement either because the proposed agreement is too lenient or because it is too harsh.“); Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462 (“While ‘[t]he procedures of Rule 11 are largely for the protection of criminal defendants ... Rule 11 also contemplates the rejection of a negotiated plea when the district court believes that bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.’ “) (quoting Miller, 722 F.2d at 563). We agree that excessive leniency undermines the sound administration of justice and is a proper factor for a trial judge to consider when evaluating a plea agreement.
Here, because Appellants were each charged with two counts of intentional murder, the death penalty was an authorized punishment.
3. Testimony of victims’ families and friends.
When evaluating a plea agreement pursuant to
A victim has the right to submit a “victim impact statement” pursuant to
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to deny Appellants’ petition for a writ of prohibition, although on other grounds than those stated in its opinion.
All concur as to Part I.
LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur as to Part II.
KELLER, J., dissents by separate opinion as to Part II, with STUMBO, J., joining that opinion.
LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur as to Part III.
KELLER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion as to Part III, with STUMBO, J., joining that opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., concurs in result only as to Part III without separate opinion.
Opinion by Justice KELLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully with Part I of the majority opinion that returns to the Chamblee1-Bender2 standard for granting a writ of prohibition. I also concur with Part III(1). But, because I believe that
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS
“It is well settled law in the state of Kentucky that one branch of Kentucky‘s tripartite government may not encroach upon the inherent powers granted to any other branch.”3 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, “[o]ur Constitution, Sections 27 and 28, is clear and explicit on this delineation.”4 “[T]he framers of Kentucky‘s constitution ... were undoubtedly familiar with the potential damage to the interests of the citizenry if the powers of government were usurped by one or more branches of that government.”5 Thus, “it has been our view, in interpreting Sections 27 and 28, that the separation of powers doctrine is fundamental to Kentucky‘s tripartite system of government and must be ‘strictly construed.’ ”6 “[T]he judiciary should be particularly vigilant to restrain its own exercise of power, because of its unique position as the final and unchecked arbiter of constitutional disputes[,]”7 and the powers of the Legislature should not “stand or fall according as they appealed to the approval of the judiciary; else one branch of government, and that the most representative of the people, would be destroyed, or at least completely subverted to the judges.”8
This Court has authority under Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution to adopt procedural rules.9 Just as it would be a violation of separation of powers for the Legislature to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice,10 a similar constitutional violation of separation of powers occurs when this Court exercises power properly belonging to another branch.11 Since the enactment of substantive law is the exclusive prerogative of the Legislature under our Constitu-
“Procedural law” consists of “[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.”15 A rule is procedural if it “really regulates procedure, — the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law ....”16 “Substantive law” is “[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties.”17 Accordingly, as I see it, the dispositive issue is whether
II. NOLLE PROSEQUI
A “nolle prosequi” is “an entry made on the record, by which the prosecutor or plaintiff declares that he will proceed no further.”18 It “may be entered as to an entire charging document, or one or more counts, or even a part of a count.”19 “A nolle prosequi may be entered to a degree of an offense.”20 Although the entry of a nolle prosequi results in the dismissal of a pending criminal charge, it does not operate as an acquittal of the defendant, and therefore, it may not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution.21
Under the English common law, the Attorney General had the almost unfettered
The Attorney General‘s authority to nolle prosequi a criminal prosecution entered England‘s common law in the sixteenth century,27 and therefore, it became part of Kentucky‘s common law:
The present constitution provides, and previous constitutions in substance provided, that “all laws which on the first day of June, 1792, were in force in the state of Virginia, and which are of a general nature, and not local to that state, and not repugnant to this constitution, nor to the laws which have been enacted by the General Assembly of the commonwealth, shall be in force in this state until they shall be altered or repealed by the General Assembly.”
The Revised Statutes repealed certain statutes of Virginia and of England, as do the General Statutes, but neither repeals the common law of England.
But only such principles and rules as constituted a part of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I are or ever were in force in this state. This is clearly implied in the act of 1776. To declare that the common law and statutes enacted prior to that time should be in force, was equivalent to declaring that no rule of the common law not then recognized and in force in England should be recognized and enforced here.
James I ascended the throne of England in 1603, March 24, and the fourth year of his reign commenced March 24, 1607, and when it is sought to enforce in this state any rule of English common law as such, independently of its soundness in principle, it ought to appear that it was established and recognized as the law of England prior to the latter date.28
Section 233 of our Constitution preserves as a part of our system of laws all of those which were in force in the state of Virginia on the 1st day of June, 1792, which are of a general nature and not local to that state, nor repugnant to our Constitution or laws enacted in pursuance thereto, “until they shall be altered or repealed by the General Assembly.” The common law of Virginia at that time (June 1, 1792) consisted of the common law of England and of acts of Parliament in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I which were not peculiarly local to that kingdom, and, of course, such laws became the common law of this Commonwealth (Kentucky). So that we are convinced that the writ [of coram nobis] herein applied for became a part of our remedial law upon Kentucky‘s admission into the Union, and, unless since repealed, it is yet available.30
Like the writ of coram nobis, the almost unfettered right of the prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi became part of the law of Kentucky upon its admission into the Union.31 And, as a result, prosecutors in Kentucky,32 like prosecutors in other states,33 originally exercised the same un-
fettered common-law power as England‘s Attorney General to nolle prosequi a criminal case.In 1854, however, the Kentucky Legislature enacted the Code of Practice in Civil and Criminal Cases (“1854 Code“), and although not abolishing the Commonwealth‘s Attorney‘s right to enter a nolle prosequi, the 1854 Code restricted the Commonwealth‘s Attorney‘s power by providing that an indictment may only be dismissed by “[t]he attorney of the commonwealth, with the permission of the court ....”34 Later, in 1873, the Legislature also enacted a statute (“1873 Statute“) that imposed an additional restriction upon the Commonwealth‘s Attorney‘s right to dismiss criminal prosecutions:
That hereafter, before the court shall permit any Commonwealth‘s Attorney to dismiss any indictment or enter a nolle prosequi in any case, such attorney shall file a statement, in writing, setting forth the reasons for such dismissal or failure to prosecute, which statement shall be signed by said Commonwealth‘s Attorney, and an order shall be made on the record-book of said court, and it shall remain with the papers of such prosecution as a part of the record.35
Thus, with the Legislature‘s adoption of Section 241 of the 1854 Code and its subsequent enactment of the 1873 Statute, the Commonwealth‘s Attorney could only dismiss an indictment with permission of the court, and would only be permitted to do so upon reasons, stated in writing, signed by the Commonwealth‘s Attorney, and deemed sufficient by the court.36
In 1876, the Legislature enacted the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases (“Criminal Code“) and incorporated in Section 243 thereof the 1854 Code Section 241‘s requirement that the Commonwealth‘s Attorney secure the “permission of the court” before dismissing an indictment.37 But, the Criminal Code was repealed “in its entirety” in 196238 with the
The majority opinion makes the untenable argument that the rules prescribed by the Legislature in 1962 were enacted as statutory law by the Legislature and have not been repealed. This is simply not correct. As Judge Palmore stated for a unanimous Court in Lunsford v. Commonwealth,40 where our predecessor court addressed — like the majority opinion now does — the issue of whether one of the prescribed Criminal Rules could be validated as a legislative enactment:
Since Chapter 234, Acts of 1962, prescribed a complete set of Rules, including
RCr 3.06 , subject to revision by this court either before or after the effective date of the Act, we have considered whetherRCr 3.06 can reasonably be validated as a legislative enactment, but have decided that it can not. Section 0 of the Act declared that the Rules were prescribed in accordance with the principle, finding and declaration contained in the preamble. The preamble expressed the primary purpose of keeping to the legislature those things that lie within the legislative power and leaving to the court those things that are within the judicial power, and an auxiliary purpose of prescribing “a better expression of current legislative policy for those matters in which both legislative and judicial discretion are involved.” By specifically making the Rules prescribed in the Act subject to the rule-making authority of the Court of Appeals the General Assembly can have had no intention of doing more than expressing a policy of approval toward the Rules as prescribed in the Act itself. It is elementary, of course, that the General Assembly could not give the judiciary power to amend or repeal that which only the General Assembly could enact in the first instance. From this fundamental premise we deduce that the General Assembly did not in fact intend to “enact” any of the Rules prescribed in the Act. See, for example, Section 60(2) of the Act, in which it is provided that in the event of a legislative amendment of any section of the Criminal Code which has been incorporated into the Rules, “it shall not be effective as a statute, but shall be construed as a concurrent resolution directed to the Court of Appeals.”41
Thus, contrary to the majority opinion, no legislative authority now exists for requiring the trial court‘s approval of a prosecutor‘s decision to amend or dismiss an indictment. Such authority was repealed in 1962.42
The Criminal Rules prescribed by the Legislature, however, were “supersed[ed],” also in 1962, by our predecessor Court‘s adoption of its Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (also “Criminal Rules“).43
The 1873 Statute was recompiled several times,47 finally as
The majority opinion, however, interprets
In holding that
The majority opinion cites the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rinaldi v. United States59 in support of Cowan‘s holding — and thus supportive of the majority opinion‘s position — that a trial court has discretion to reject the prosecution‘s motion to dismiss a criminal charge if the dismissal is “clearly contrary to manifest public interest.”60 I do not agree that Rinaldi supports Cowan‘s holding. In the context of the language quoted from Rinaldi in the majority opinion, the Supreme Court only cited Cowan to show that it was the authority for the standard applied by the Court of Appeals in Rinaldi, but did not indicate its approval of the Cowan standard: “Under the standard applied by the Court of Appeals, the District Court was empowered to withhold leave if the Government‘s decision to terminate this prosecution clearly disserved the public interest. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (C.A.5 1975).”61 In fact, the Rinaldi Court indicated later in the opinion that
The words “leave of court” were inserted in Rule 48(a) without explanation. While they obviously vest some discretion in the court, the circumstances in which that discretion may properly be exercised have not been delineated by this Court. The principal object of the “leave of court” requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment, e. g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant‘s objection. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171(CA5), cert. denied, sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700 (1965); Woodring v. United States, 311 F.2d 417, 424(CA8), cert. denied sub nom. Felice v. United States, 373 U.S. 915, 83 S.Ct. 1301, 10 L.Ed.2d 415 (1963). But the Rule has also been held to permit the court to deny a Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the
Thus, the majority opinion‘s reliance upon Rinaldi is misplaced.
Under its exclusive power to enact substantive law, only the Legislature may properly take away, restrict, or assign common-law powers to executive constitutional officers without violating the Constitution.63 This is particularly true as to Commonwealth‘s Attorneys because under our Constitution the Legislature has the power to abolish the office.64 Further-
more, only the Legislature has the authority to modify or repeal the English common law that has been adopted by our Constitutions.65 Consequently, the Legislature, and only it, has the power to enact substantive law that restricts, takes away, or transfers the common-law authority of the Commonwealth‘s Attorney.The majority opinion cites prior case law, former
As construed by the majority opinion,
III. AMENDMENT OF INDICTMENT
I believe that the majority‘s interpretation of
The grand jury represents the Commonwealth in making an investigation into a criminal charge and fulfills its duty with the completion of its investigation and the return of an indictment or of a report of no indictment to the court.70 Once, an indictment is returned, the grand jury has no
Although at common law, an indictment could not be amended,73 this was changed by a 1942 amendment to
Notes
One Atkins having been committed for trial for seditious language, an associate of Atkins named Lacy appeared at the house of Chief Justice Holt and to see the great judge. The servant pleaded the ill health of his master and refused to admit Lacy who then said in a very solemn tone, “Acquaint your master that I must see him, for I bring him a message from the Lord God.” This impressive message moved the Chief Justice to admit the visitor who thus addressed his host: “I have come to you a prophet from the Lord God, who has sent me to thee, and would have thee grant a nolle prosequi for John Atkins, his servant.” “Thou art a false prophet and lying knave,” answered the Chief Justice, “If the Lord God has sent thee, it would have been to the Attorney General, for he knows that it belongeth not to the Chief Justice to grant a nolle prosequi. But I, as Chief Justice, can grant a warrant to commit thee to bear him company in prison.” The Judge‘s directions were followed and both the prophet and his friend were convicted and punished.2 Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices, 173 .
But, as interpreted by the majority opinion,
Regardless, one cannot convincingly argue that the defendant‘s substantial rights are prejudiced when an indictment is amended to a lesser-included offense, particularly when the defendant consents to such an amendment. Furthermore, “lesser included offenses” are included in the greater indicted offense,77 and just as a defendant may properly be convicted at trial of any lesser-included offense supported by the evidence without an amendment of the indictment,78 a fortiori, with the consent of the Commonwealth‘s Attorney, a defendant may plead guilty to a lesser-included offense without the necessity of an amendment of the indictment.79 Accordingly, an amendment of the indictments was not necessary in order for the Appellants to plead to a lesser-included offense since the Appellants and the Commonwealth‘s Attorney were in agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Commonwealth v. Corey,80 this Court held “that by virtue of
I will briefly summarize my position. Under Kentucky‘s common law, even at a time when an indictment could not be amended, the Commonwealth‘s Attorney had an almost unfettered right to dismiss (nolle prosequi) a criminal prosecution. This power was at one time restricted by legislative enactments that were repealed and replaced with
For these reasons, I believe that the trial court is required to accept the Appellants’ pleas with these two qualifications: (1) under
STUMBO, J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
At any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant that if the defendant persists in that guilty plea the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.The court can defer accepting or rejecting the plea agreement until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.
