64 Minn. 226 | Minn. | 1896
This action is based upon Gen. St. 1894, § 6001, which is in these words: "If any officer herein authorized to grant writs of habeas corpus wilfully refuses to grant such writ when legally applied for, he shall forfeit, for every such offence, to the party aggrieved, one thousand dollars.”
The only question raised by the defendant’s motion is whether the complaint states a cause of action. The defendant claims that it does not, because it shows on its face that no legal application was ever made to him for the writ. The substance of the application is set forth in the complaint, and the cause and pretense of the plaintiff’s restraint is therein stated to be a warrant of arrest for the offense of criminal libel, issued by R H. Marden, as court commissioner of the county, and that such warrant was illegal in that Marden, as such court commissioner, had no right to issue the same. Or, in other words, the sole reason or claim stated in the petition why the writ should issue, and why the plaintiff’s restraint was unlawful, was that the warrant was issued by a court commissioner, acting as a committing magistrate, and that such commissioners have no power so to act and issue a warrant to bring parties before them for examination. The plaintiff claims: First, that the allowance of the writ of habeas corpus is purely a ministerial act, and that the judge or officer to whom a petition for the writ is presented has no discretion, but must issue the writ, although the petition, on its face, fails to show probable cause for issuing it; second, that the court commissioner had no power to issue the warrant of arrest.
Except in those states where the statute makes it the absolute and imperative duty of the court or officer to grant the writ in all cases, the rule is too well settled to justify serious argument that an application for a writ of habeas corpus must' show probable cause for the issuing of the writ, and that the court or judge may refuse the writ when the petition shows on its face that there is no sufficient ground, prima facie, for the discharge of the prisoner. The court will not go through the idle ceremony of bringing before it the petitioner, if it is apparent from his application that he must be immediately remanded. Williamson’s Case, supra, 67 Am. Dec. 895, and notes. Our statute relating to the writ of habeas corpus does not change this rule. To prevent frivolous applications for the writ, the petition must be verified by the applicant, or some person in his behalf; and it must show probable cause for issuing the writ, by stating the cause or pretense of the party’s restraint;
2. This brings us to the question whether the petition in question disclosed upon its face probable cause for issuing the writ; that is, did it show, prima facie, that the plaintiff was unlawfully imprisoned?
The only ground stated in the petition why the plaintiff’s imprisonment was illegal was that the court commissioner had no power to issue the warrant of arrest on a charge of criminal libel against the plaintiff. If court commissioners of this state are authorized to apprehend, examine, and commit for trial or bail offenders, the plaintiff’s petition showed on its face that he was not illegally restrained of his liberty, and the writ was properly denied; otherwise it ought to have been issued. Have court commissioners such power, under the constitution and laws of this state? We answer the question in the affirmative.
The constitution and the statute confer upon such officers the judicial power and jurisdiction of a judge of the district court at chambers. Const, art. 6, § 15; G. S. 1894, § 824. The power and jurisdiction of a judge at chambers are precisely those of a judge in vacation. The term “chambers” means the private room or office of a judge, where, for the convenience of parties, he hears such matters and transacts such business as a judge in vacation is authorized to hear, and which do not require a hearing by the judge sitting as a court. The chambers of a judge are not an element of jurisdiction, but of convenience. For the purposes of jurisdiction, the chambers of a judge are wherever he is found within his district, and any business he is authorized to do as a judge-
Judgment affirmed.