58 Ga. App. 188 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1938
On July 6, 1937, Mrs. E. C. Hosford brought this action against Mrs. C. C. Hosford, mother of her divorced husband, for alienation of her husband’s affections. The plaintiff alleges in her petition, that she and the defendant’s son were married in 1905, and lived happily together in Atlanta until 1931, at which time, because of financial difficulties, they moved to Eastman, Georgia. There were two children born to the plaintiff and her husband, Mildred, 21-year-old daughter now living, and another daughter who has been dead for some time. Upon arrival in Eastman the defendant insisted that the plaintiff and her family come and live with her. This was done, and they continued living with the defendant for some time, later moving to a house owned by the plaintiff’s husband. The plaintiff’s husband was the only child of the defendant, and the defendant has always been a possessive and jealous mother, and attempted to prevent the marriage of her son to the plaintiff by offering him bribes if he would not marry the plaintiff. The plaintiff and her husband lived the normal, happy, and contented married life, but after they moved to
The first question for the determination of this court is, when did the cause of action for the alienation of the affections of the plaintiff’s husband arise or accrue? The plaintiff contends that the loss of consortium was not complete until October, 1936, the date when the plaintiff moved from her husband’s home, and that the cause of action did not accrue until that date. The gist of the action is loss of consortium, which includes the right of the wife to the conjugal affection, fellowship, company, co-operation, and aid in every conjugal way. Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed.), 408. '“It is not a prerequisite to the right of the plaintiff to maintain this suit in her own name that she should have been abandoned by her husband in the litoral sense, nor that she should have actually separated herself from him by or without a decree of divorce. If she had suffered the wrong complained of, her right to redress is absolute; it can not be made to depend upon any of these conditions.” Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. (18 Atl. 1027, 6 L. R. A. 829, 18 Am. St. R. 258). 1. “Conceding, therefore, for the sake of argument, that the action at bar is one solely for alienation of affections, as appellant’s counsel contends, we are to decide whether the fact that the plaintiff’s husband did not actually and in the literal sense of the term abandon her will operate to defeat her right of recovery. We are clear that it will not.” Rott v. Goehring, 33 N. D. 413 (157 N. W. 294, L. R. A. 1916E, 1089, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 643). “Loss of service is not the basis of the right of action, for pecuniary loss is not a necessary element; but the right to recover is based upon loss of consortium.” Pugsley v. Smyth, 98
Now the question for the determination of this court is whether an action for alienation of affection is an injury to property or to the person. The period of limitation on property rights is four years (Code, § 3-1002); on personal rights, two years (Code, § 3-1004). If the present action is the former, it is not barred; if it is the latter, it is barred. There are numerous foreign authorities to sustain each view. However, this State follows the latter and holds that an áction for alienation of affection is an injury to the person. “It may not be amiss to state in this connection that chapter 105-12 of the Code of 1933, which deals with actions similar to the one at bar [action for alienation of affection], is headed, ‘Indirect Injuries to Person,' and that this nomenclature follows the Codes of 1895 and 1910. The actions referred to in the Code of 1933 are: § 105-1202, abducting or harboring wife; § 105-1203, adultery or criminal conversation; § 105-1204, seduction of daughter; § 105-1205, furnishing liquor to minor son of another; § 105-1206, gaming with minor son of another. Our view is that the present action is for an injury to the person; that the loss of consortium is the gist of the action; and that, unless the statute is tolled, the action is barred by the statute of limitations.” Edwards v. Monroe, 54 Ga. App. 791, 798 (189 S. E. 419). The case of Sessions v. Parker, 174 Ga. 296 (162 S. E. 790), does not decide that such an action is a property right, as argued by the plaintiff, nor does it decide that the action is personal. It is authority for the proposition that a married woman living separate from her husband can maintain an action for damages against a third person for alienation of her husband’s affections and for loss of consortium. In the opinion Judge Atkinson quoted at great length from Weber v. Weber, 113 Ark. 471 (169 S. W. 318, L. R. A. 1915A, 67, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 743), stating that it completely covered the Sessions case on that proposition. The Weber decision, citing authorities to sustain each view, also discussed the question whether or not such an action is a personal or property action. However, on that point the Arkansas court ruled that “whether
In Arnold v. Rogers, 43 Ga. App. 390 (159 S. E. 136), this court in effect said only that the statute of limitations in that case applied whether the action was a personal or a property right. However, in Edwards v. Monroe, supra, this court expressly held that it was a personal right. In the Edwards case this court cited Sessions v. Parker merely for the purpose of stating a proposition of -law which it adopted, to wit, that such an action is for an injury to the person. “The basis of the action is loss of consortium, or the right of the husband to the conjugal society of his wife. It is not necessary that there should be proof of any pecuniary loss in order to sustain the action. . . Loss of service is not essential, but is merely matter of aggravation, and need not be alleged or proved. . . ‘To. entice away or corrupt the mind and affection of one’s consort is a civil wrong for which the offender is liable to the injured husband or wife. The gist of the action is not the loss of assistance, but the loss of consortium of the wife or husband, under which term are usually included the person’s affection, society, or aid.’ Bigelow on Torts, 153. 'We see no reason why such an action can not be supported where by statute the wife is allowed to sue for personal wrongs suffered by her.’ Cooley on Torts 228.” Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584 (23 N. E. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553). The cause of action being an action for injury to the person, and having arisen more than two years before the action was brought, it is barred by the statute of limitations. The court did not err in sustaining the demurrer.
Judgment affirmed.