A сonviction of assault with intent to rape will not stand unless the evidence plainly discloses that the assault was made with intent to have sexual connectiоn forcibly and against the will of the female involved.
Dorsey
v.
State,
108
Ga.
477 (1) (
Notwithstanding the insidious approach and vile tampering with
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the person of this young girl, we are of the opinion that the еvidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to have carnal knowledge of the child. An indecent assault such аs that shown by the evidence in this case, without question, has a tendency to debauch and to undermine the virtue of young girls. The defendant in the instant case has undoubtеdly committed an offense against the State and should be punished, but in view of the surrounding circumstances at the time of the act and the absence of evidence of an overt act, beyond that of fondling, which would indicate the intentiоn of the defendant to have carnal knowledge, we can not say that thе unlawful imposition of the defendant’s hands, under the circumstances disclosed by thе evidence, would authorize the conviction of the accused of аssault with intent to rape.
Scott
v.
State,
63
Ga. App.
353 (
In the special ground of the motion for new trial, the defendant insists that the failure of the trial court to charge the law of circumstаntial evidence was error. There is no merit in this contention. “When the facts from which the inference of guilt or innocence is to be drawn are all estаblished by direct proof, and only the intent with which the alleged criminal act was committed, or the degree of criminality, must be inferred, the trial judge, in the absence of a timely request, is not required to give in charge to the jury the usual rule apрlicable to circumstantial evidence, to the effect that, if the prоved facts are consistent with innocence, the defendant should be acquitted; this for the reason that every one is presumed to intend the natural and lеgitimate consequences of his acts.”
Reddick
v.
State,
11
Ga. App.
150 (3) (
Judgment reversed.
