MEMORANDUM
This case asks how, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a mortgagee must account for a mortgagor who has discharged his personal debt under the Note in bankruptcy, yet who continues making payments on the Mortgage in an effort to stave off foreclosure of the mortgaged property. Speaking in broad strokes, plaintiffs — six married couples and three individuals — took out mortgages serviced by the various financial institution defendants in the usual form of a Note and Mortgage. They then went through the bankruptcy process, under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. The parties agree that the bankruptcy discharges meant that plaintiffs no longer had in personam liability for the borrowed amounts set forth in the Notes, but defendants retained the in rem right to foreclose on the Mortgage of the properties if plaintiffs failed to keep up their monthly payments.
Plaintiffs continued to make their monthly mortgage payments on schedule, though they found that any post-bankruptcy payments were not reflected on their credit reports — rather, these reports indicated only that plaintiffs owed no money (“zero balances”) on these accounts, because defendants consider such payments to be voluntary once personal liability on the Note has been removed.
Two putative classes of plaintiffs assert that this practice constitutes either a willful or negligent violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The first, larger class consists of those borrowers who declared bankruptcy (the “debtor” plaintiffs). The second, smaller class, consists of certain of the borrowers’ spouses, who were co-debtors on the Mortgages but who did not themselves declare bankruptcy (the “co-debtor” plaintiffs). All plaintiffs claim that defendants have painted an inaccurate or incomplete picture of their credit history, which they allege has made it more expensive or
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because this case involves fifteen plaintiffs and essentially six defendants, a full recounting of all the facts would be overly complicated. I will instead focus on one representative dispute . and then discuss relevant differences between the others as necessary.
Vilma Collier, a resident of Vineland, New Jersey, took out a mortgage serviced by Green Tree Servicing LLC.
Our records indicate that you filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy .... The bankruptcy was discharged without reaffirmation of the loan. When you filed bankruptcy and did not reaffirm the loan, you discharged your obligation to the loan. Without a reaffirmation of debt, we are prohibited from reporting a loan balance and payment history. Your credit report will continue to indicate this loan as a bankruptcy account. When the loan has been paid in full we will file a[ ] ... form stating the loan was paid as agreed and is closed.6
Here, “reaffirmation” means the procedure of re-establishing personal liability on a Note after such liability has been discharged in bankruptcy — a móve that courts disfavor, according to plaintiffs.
The other debtor plaintiffs’ accounts differ in small but important ways from Collier’s. When plaintiffs Karl Peter Horsch and Kimberly Ann Horsch disputed the zero balance on their credit report, their mortgage servicer — defendant Wells Fargo — agreed to remove any mention of the account from future credit reports. Likewise, defendant Nationstar Mortgage agreed to delete the allegedly incorrect zero balance from the credit report of plaintiffs Brad Saltzman and Rebecca Saltzman, as did defendants Bank of America and CitiMortgage when a dispute was raised by plaintiffs Thomas Kennedy and Sarah Kennedy. By contrast, when plaintiff Rhiannon Lindmar disputed her zero balance with Wells Fargo, the record was deleted from the records of one credit reporting agency (Transunion), but not another (Equifax). It is unclear from the pleadings what if anything resulted when Paula Milbourne filed her dispute with JPMorgan Chase Bank.
The fact pattern is further complicated by the second putative class of plaintiffs, represented by co-debtors Eileen Jackson and Paul Duffin.
On May 8, 2014, the full, current set of plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this case, again claiming violations of § 1681s-2(b), the bankruptcy discharge injunctions, the “automatic stay” provisions of the bankruptcy code, and several common law causes of action. Defendants moved to dismiss, and on September 2, 2014, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which brings a claim under § 1681s — 2(b) alone. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), plaintiffs opposed, and defendants replied. On January 7, 2015, I ordered supplemental briefing from, the parties on how the Third Circuit’s decision in Seamans v. Temple University,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
III. DISCUSSION
All plaintiffs have filed suit under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), a provision of FCRA that regulates how the furnishers of credit information must respond when they are given notice of a dispute over
(1) After receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the person shall—
(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information;
(B) review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agency pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title;
(C) report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency;
(D) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis; and
(E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1), for purposes of reporting to a consumer reporting agency only, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation promptly—
(i) modify that item of information;
(ii) delete that item of information; oje
(iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information.
15 U.S.C. § 1681s — 2(b). If a furnisher fails to comply with these requirements, then § 1681n and § 1681o “authorize!] consumers to bring suit for damages caused by a furnisher’s ... breach” when that breach is willful or negligent, respectively. Seamans v. Temple Univ.,
CitiMortgage and JPMorgan assert at the outset that certain plaintiffs failed to plead that they ever notified a CRA about their disputed information, undermining any claim they may have under FCRA. Specifically, CitiMortgage argues that no such allegation was made regarding Paul Duffin, and JPMorgan argues the same for Wanda Adams (a non-party). It is true that the complaint specifically alleges that the Duffins notified the CRAs only about their dispute with Wells Fargo, and that only Troy (not Wanda) Adams notified the CRAs about his dispute with JPMorgan. See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) 18 ¶ 56, 20 ¶ 61. But the amended complaint also sets out that “Plaintiffs, after having received and reviewed their respective credit reports, each and all ... requested that the respective [CRA] investigate and seek an investigation by the furnisher of the information, and correct the credit reports of the respective plaintiffs.” FAC 18 ¶ 55 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs further plead that “[e]ach of the CRA’s, upon receipt of the notice of dispute from Plaintiffs, provided each respective Defendant with the notice of the dispute involving the failure to report current monthly mortgage payments.” FAC 22 ¶ 70 (emphasis added).
A. Defendants’ Duty to Investigate
Upon receiving notice from a CRA that a consumer has disputed an entry on his credit report, the furnisher responsible must “conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information.” § 1681s-2(b)(l)(A). In 2011, the Third Circuit held that not just any investigation will meet this requirement — rather, an investigation must be “reasonable” to satisfy FCRA. SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp.,
According to defendants, this admission ends the case. See, e.g., Wells Fargo’s Reply Br. 4 (“This concession, standing alone, mandates dismissal.”). In essence, defendants argue that § 1681s-2(b) imposes a duty to investigate reasonably and that plaintiffs undermine their case by admitting defendants’ investigations were reasonable. But the duty to investigate is only part of what § 1681s-2(b) requires. Section 1681s-2(b)(l)(E), by contrast, provides that “if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any reinvestigation,” then the furnisher shall “promptly— (i) modify that item of information; (ii) delete that item of information; or (iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information.” That requirement is what the court in Taggart referred to as the furnishers’ duty to “rectify the disputed charge.” Taggart,
The debtor plaintiffs claim that their credit reports were inaccurate or incomplete because they did not reflect any payments made to their mortgage servicers after the Notes were discharged in bankruptcy.
1. The accuracy of reporting zero balances
Defendants cite several cases for the proposition that it is accurate to report a zero balance after the Note has been discharged in bankruptcy. The most on point is Schueller v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
[Schueller] says the credit report should not have reflected that his account was closed and had a zero balance due, and should have included the fact that he made payments after [bankruptcy]. Wells Fargo responds that it would have been inaccurate and misleading to report that Mr. Schueller’s loan balance remained outstanding; thus, it reported that the account was closed and had a zero balance due.... Mr. Schueller has cited no authority requiring Wells Fargo to report his post-bankruptcy mortgage payments. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Schueller has not carried his burden of showing that the information Wells Fargo furnished was inaccurate or incomplete, nor has he shown that the information about his home loan debt and bankruptcy was materially misleading.
Id. at 737 (citations omitted). In other words, the court agreed that Schueller’s making payments on the mortgage to prevent foreclosure did not mean that he truly owed anything on the discharged account. Reporting a “zero balance” was, therefore, accurate and complete. I agree with this reasoning. Here, defendants assert that plaintiffs — lacking personal liability — are in the same position. That is why defendants describe any payments made by plaintiffs as voluntary, and it is why they argue that it is accurate to report zero balances on the discharged mortgages.
Plaintiffs do not offer a convincing response. They contend only that “the balance on the Note was $0, but the amount due on the mortgage instrument, although in rem, was the respective mortgage bal-
2. Factual inaccuracy versus legal inaccuracy
Defendants further assert that even if their reporting were not accurate, § 1681s-2(b) penalizes only inaccuracies of fact, not legal interpretation, relying largely on Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc.,
Since Chiang was decided, however, the Third Circuit has put forward its own interpretation of FCRA’s standards for accuracy and completeness. In Seamans, plaintiff disputed the reporting of a student loan he had taken out many years earlier while attending Temple University. After receiving notice, Temple conducted an investigation and complied with part of plaintiffs request, but Temple would not make certain other changes and refused to note on the credit report that the entry at issue was under dispute. Seamans,
The meaning of “completeness” and “accuracy” in the specific context of a fur-nisher’s duties under FCRA is also a matter of first impression in this Court. It is not seriously debated, however, that factually incorrect information is “inaccurate” for purposes of FCRA. And we agree with the three Courts of Appeals to have considered the question that even if the information is technically correct, it may nonetheless be inaccurate if, through omission, it “create[s] a materially misleading impression.” Whether technically accurate information was “ ‘misleading in such a way and to such an extent that [it] can be expected to have an adverse effect’ ” is generally a question to be submitted to the jury.
Seamans,
As a consequence, the Chiang and Sea-mans standards produce different outcomes. Under the former, only “factual inaccuracy” triggers the duty to rectify in § 1681s-2(b). Chiang,
3. Applying the Seamans standard to debtor plaintiffs’ claims
To determine whether the disputed credit report entries here are materially misleading under Seamans, I look to what so far is the only district court opinion within this circuit to interpret the Sea-mans standard: Hillis v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-02203,
If “as complete as it could [be]” is read as “contains as much information as the space can hold,” then defendants’ reporting here would fail the test, as they no doubt are capable of providing additional
C. Additional Grounds for Dismissing Debtor Plaintiffs’ Claims
Even if it were considered inaccurate or incomplete to report only zero balances on post-bankruptcy mortgages, the debtor plaintiffs’ claims would still fail on other grounds.
1. Two defendants satisfied their duty to rectify
FCRA provides that when furnish-ers find they have provided inaccurate or incomplete information to the CRAs, they are required to report those findings “to all other [CRAs] to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D). Similarly, if the information “is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any reinvestigation,” furnishers have three options under FCRA: “(i) modify that item of information; (ii) delete that item of information; or (iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information.” Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). Here, plaintiffs have alleged that two defendants — Bank of America and Nationstar — did delete the zero balance accounts from all of the relevant plaintiffs’ credit reports after receiving notices of dispute. See FAC 27 ¶ 68(i) (credit report of Thomas and Sarah Kennedy); FAC 28 ¶ 68(j) (credit report of Brad and Rebecca Saltzman).
2. Debtor plaintiffs have not made out a claim for willfulness or negligence
FCRA does not hold furnishers strictly liable for'failing to investigate and rectify disputed credit information. Rather, only willful or negligent violations will expose a
a. Willfulness
In Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr,
Where, as here, the statutory text and relevant court and agency guidance allow for more than one reasonable interpretation, it would defy history and current thinking to treat a defendant who merely adopts one such interpretation as a knowing or reckless violator. Congress could not have intended such a result for those who followed an interpretation that could reasonably have found support in the courts, whatever their subjective intent may have been.
Id. at 70 n. 20,
Here, plaintiffs cite no federal judicial decisions — whether from courts of appeals or district courts — that have found it inaccurate or improper to report a zero balance on post-bankruptcy accounts. Likewise, plaintiffs have pointed to no guidance from the relevant federal regulators that would have warned defendants against reporting zero balances. Defendants, by contrast, have found exactly these kinds of authorities to support the practice of reporting zero balances. They point to guidance from the Federal Trade Commission. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 600 app. § 607(b)(6) (2010) (“A consumer report may include an account that was discharged in bankruptcy (as well as the bankruptcy itself), as long as it reports a zero balance due to reflect the fact that the consumer is no longer liable for the discharged debt.”). They cite a nonprecedential opinion from the Tenth Circuit where, on facts similar to those presented here, the court held that reporting a zero balance did not violate FCRA. See Schueller,
b. Negligence
Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that defendants have violated § 1681s-2(b) neg
• i. Failure to flag
Plaintiffs argue that, after receiving notice from the CRAs, defendants were obliged under FCRA to “at least note the fact that there is a ‘dispute’ ” regarding the zero balance entries. See FAC 38 ¶ 111(b).
What it means for a dispute to be bona fide is an unsettled question, but the Third Circuit has instructed that “the furnisher ... is in the best position to determine” whether or not it is so. Id. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all of the defendants argue in their supplemental briefs on Seamans that plaintiffs’ disputes are neither bona fide nor potentially meritorious. See Doc. Nos. 64-68. For one, defendants reiterate that the administrative and judicial authorities that have weighed in on the issue have all stated that discharged notes should be reported as having a zero bal-anee. Defendants further assert that they cannot comply with plaintiffs’ requests without violating the bankruptcy injunctions that discharged the notes at issue in the first place. See, e.g., In re Helmes,
As defendants note, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) has held the authority since July 2011 to issue new guidance on how furnishers should report on notes that have been discharged in bankruptcy. See Statement of General Policy or Interpretation; Commentary on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 44462-01, 44463 (July 26, 2011). Yet to date, the CFPB has not countermanded the guidance on the subject previously provided by the FTC — guidance which has remained in place for more than two decades. See FTC, 4-0 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act: An FTC Staff Report with Summary of Interpretations 68 (July 2011), available at http://Lusa.gov/lDDgxhp. If and when a modified administrative interpretation of FCRA is released, furnishers may be forced to choose between following newer guidance and following older jurisprudence. But for now — while all of the relevant authorities are in accord and while the Third Circuit holds that furnishers are in the best position to determine which disputes are bona fide — I must conclude that the “failure to flag” claim is not potentially meritorious. Under Seamans, therefore, this claim must be dismissed.
ii. Failure to correct
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ “failure to correct” claim cannot succeed as
Each and every Plaintiff has sought to achieve a transaction(s) involving credit, whether in the form of home mortgage refinance, modification, automobile purchase, and the like and each and every Plaintiff has either been denied credit or has been charged excessive rates of interest all stemming directly and proximately from the failure and refusal of each and every Defendant to accurately report current mortgage payments. The effect has been financially devastating. ...
FAC 14 ¶ 54 n. 6. Thus, even if Chavez controlled here, plaintiffs’ allegations of suffering actual damages would satisfy its standard.
But Chavez does not even control here— Seamans does. There, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s reporting caused “a drop in credit rating and associated loss of credit opportunities.” Seamans,
The claim, however, must still fail. In Seamans, the Third Circuit held that fur-nishers could be held liable under FCRA for negligently failing to flag credit report entries as disputed, but only where those disputes are “potentially meritorious” or “bona fide.” Id. at 867 & n. 11. The Third Circuit further held that furnishers could be held liable for negligently failing to correct disputed entries — but the court did not specifically include any language restricting- the scope of that duty only to “potentially meritorious” or “bona fide” disputes. See id. at 865-66.
It is axiomatic that “interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
D. Were Co-Debtor Plaintiffs’ Reports Inaccurate or Incomplete Under FCRA?
The Seamans test must reach a different result with respect to co-debtor plaintiffs Eileen Jackson and Paul Duffin.
Like before, the next question is whether plaintiffs have made out a plausible claim that this breach was willful or, in the alternative, negligent. Unlike before, the answer to both is yes. In terms of willfulness, defendants have pointed to no federal agency guidance advising them to report zero balances on the credit reports of co-debtors who have not discharged their liability on the Mortgage or the Note in bankruptcy. Instead, Wells Fargo appears to rely only on various court decisions.
In sum, defendants have not put forward any sound support for their practice of reporting zero balances on the credit reports of non-bankrupt co-debtor spouses— and what authorities they have cited actually undermine their own argument upon closer examination. As to whether this practice constitutes a willful violation of FCRA, I again turn to Seamans:
Liability for willful violations will lie not only in the case of knowing violations of the statute but also if a defendant acts with “reckless disregard” of the statute’s terms. “[A] company subject to FCRA does not act in reckless disregard of it unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.” ...
In determining whether an actor’s conduct was reckless, a court should examine the text of the statute, case law that existed at the time of the alleged violation, and any agency interpretations. “[A] dearth of authoritative guidance” makes it less likely that a party’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, but the absence of such authority does not “immunize” an actor from potential liability where the statute is “far too clear” to support the actors interpretation.
Seamans,
The co-debtors’ negligence claim suffices as well. Again, all plaintiffs alleged that they suffered actual damages as a result of defendants’ credit reporting practices. See FAC 14 ¶ 54 n. 6. And for all the same reasons that the co-debtors have made out a plausible claim of willfulness, I conclude that their dispute is “potentially meritorious” or “bona fide.” See Seamans,
The debtor plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under FCRA for which relief can be granted. These plaintiffs have had two or four opportunities (depending on whether the previous Horsch case counts) to develop this cause of action already, and barring new agency guidance on how post-bankruptcy mortgages should be reported, it would be futile to allow these plaintiffs to amend their claims any further. See Alston v. Parker,
The co-debtor plaintiffs, Eileen Jackson and Paul Duffin, have made out a plausible claim that Wells Fargo and CitiMortgage willfully or negligently violated FCRA. I will therefore deny the motions to dismiss by those two defendants with respect only to those two plaintiffs.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW this 24th day of March, 2015, upon consideration of defendants Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, CitiMort-gage, Green Tree Servicing, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, and Na-tionstar Mortgage’s motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 45-46; 48-50), plaintiffs’ opposition, defendants’ replies, and all supplemental briefing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.All of plaintiffs’ claims against Green Tree Servicing, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, and Na-tionstar Mortgage are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and said defendants are dismissed as parties to this action.
2. Plaintiffs’ claims against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage and CitiMort-gage are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE excepting only those brought by Eileen Jackson and Paul Duffin. The motions to dismiss as to those plaintiffs are DENIED.
3. A status conference is scheduled for April 7, 2015 at 10:00 AM in chambers.
Notes
. As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. Home State Bank:
A mortgage is an interest in real property that secures a creditor’s right to repayment. But unless the debtor and creditor have provided otherwise, the creditor ordinarily is not limited to foreclosure on the mortgaged property should the debtor default on his obligation; rather, the creditor may in addition sue to establish the debtor’s in personam liability for any deficiency on the debt and may enforce any judgment against the debtor’s assets generally. See 3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property ¶ 467 (1990). A defaulting debtor can protect himself from personal liability by obtaining a discharge in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 727. However, such a discharge extinguishes only "the personal liability of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1). Codifying the rule of Long v. Bullard,117 U.S. 617 ,6 S.Ct. 917 ,29 L.Ed. 1004 (1886), the Code provides that a creditor’s right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy.
. This account accepts as true all factual allegations made in plaintiffs’ first amended complaint ("FAC”) (Doc. No. 43). See Nami v. Fauver,
. Plaintiffs refer to the institution as Green-tree, but I will defer to defendant’s own usage.
. Attached to this discharge was an "Explanation of Bankruptcy Discharge in a Joint Chapter 7 Case,” which states:
Collection of Discharged Debts Prohibited
The discharge prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt that has been discharged. For example, a creditor is not permitted to contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise, to file or continue a lawsuit, to attach wages or other property, or to take any other action to collect a discharged debt from the debtor. A creditor who violates this order can be required to pay damages and attorney’s fees to the debtor.
However, a creditor may have the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against the debtor’s property after the bankruptcy, if that lien was not avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case. Also, a debtor may voluntarily pay any debt that has been discharged.
Debts That are Discharged
The chapter 7 discharge order eliminates a debtor’s legal obligation to pay a debt that is discharged. Most, but not all, types of debts are discharged if the debt existed on the date the bankruptcy case was filed.
Order Discharging Debtor, In re Collier, No. 11-46052-JHW (Bankr.D.NJ. Mar. 30, 2012); see also Bankruptcy Form 18J, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/ Forms/BankruptcyForms .aspx.
.FAC Ex. G (Doc. No. 43-1) at 50.
. Id. at 38.
. See, e.g., In re Price,
. JPMorgan correctly notes that, according to the pleadings, Wanda Adams was not a debtor or a co-debtor, and therefore she does not fall within either of the putative classes of plaintiffs. JPMorgan's Br. 20-21. Moreover, she was not named as a plaintiff in the caption of the case or referred to in the body of the amended complaint (except for being mentioned in the section on the parties). Id.; FAC 5-6 ¶¶ 24-25.
.See FAC Ex. D (Doc. No. 43-1) at 18 (letter from Wells Fargo to Eileen Jackson denying her a home equity loan because of "[b]ank-ruptcy without re-established credit”); id. at 22 (letter from Experian to Eileen Jackson’s attorney stating that "the disputed account is appearing just as you stated on Mrs. Jackson's personal credit report”).
. See Horsch et al. v. Wells Fargo et al., 2:13-cv-5138-WY (E.D.Pa. Sept. 3, 2013).
. See, e.g., FAC Ex. G (Doc. No. 43-1) at 50 (May 15, 2014 credit report for Collier, in which the Green Tree account lists the "Recent balance” as “$0 / paid as of Mar 2012" and the "Monthly payment” as "Not reported”).
. See, e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What is a Credit Report?, Ask CFPB (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance. gov/askcfpb/309/what-is-a-credit-report.html ("A credit report contains information about your credit — and some bill repayment history — and the status of your credit accounts.”) (emphases added).
. Paragraph 68(j) is mislabeled as a second 68(i) in the amended complaint.
. Several defendants suggest, erroneously, that plaintiffs raise this claim for the first time — and thus too late — -in their opposition to the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Bank of America's Reply Br. 7 ("Plaintiffs did not allege such a claim in the FAC....”).
. JPMorgan correctly argues that "the Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations that JPMC reported anything to the CRAs about Wanda Adams" and that she therefore "fails to allege key elements of section 1681s — 2(b).” JPMorgan's Br. 21. Accordingly, I will grant the motions to dismiss with respect to Wanda Adams as well.
. CitiMortgage does not address the merits of co-debtor Paul Duffin’s claims, making only a procedural argument that Duffin failed to properly notify the CRAs — an argument that I rejected above.