Mr. аnd Mrs. Horney appeal the grant of summary judgment to Panter in their suit arising from an electrical accident in which Mr. Horney was seriously injured.
Viewed in favor of the Horneys’ opposition to the summary judgment, OCGA § 9-11-56;
Eiberger v. West,
When he came to Georgia, Horney contacted the base housing office and presented letters of recommendation from his previous jobs as resident manager. He was referred to Panter who hired him, giving him an apartment rent free in exchange for his services. Panter had no experience in working with installation or repair of electrical systems. Horney took over the apartments about two months before his accident. Panter hired him partly due to Horney’s assurances that he *475 could handle household mаintenance and construction tasks, including wiring.
At Panter’s home, a single family dwelling separate from the apartments, Horney had charged the air conditioning system and replaced an electrical socket. For jobs at his hоme, Panter paid Horney separately.
Panter was aware that Horney had installed an electrical fan in his own apartment and asked him if he would install one in Panter’s home. Horney agreed to do so for $50.
During the installation process, Horney and Mrs. Panter attempted to ascertain which of the unlabelled electrical circuits controlled the bedroom where the fan was to be installed. Believing he had turned the circuit off, Horney began working. In order to install the fan, he had to run a new line into the ceiling and he was also going to rewire electrical outlets and switches in the room. He received a mild shock while working. After taking unspecified steps to corrеct this problem, he continued working and received a full shock and suffered severe neurological damage. When Panter entered the room in response to Horney’s cry, the fan was on and operating.
Suit was filed agаinst Panter, contending that Panter failed to exercise ordinary care by hiring an unqualified person to perform a dangerous activity and by hiring a non-licensed person to perform electrical contracting work, in violation of OCGA Title 43, Chapter 14. Horney further alleged, in Counts 2 and 3, that an oral agreement was made by Panter to pay him $1,000 a month or to take care of his financial needs in consideration of Horney not filing suit. The last count was for loss of consortium by Mrs. Horney.
Panter filed his motion for summary judgment on March 1, 1991, contending that he breached no legal duty to Horney because the electrical system in the house was not defective and Horney had knowledge that working on an energized system was dangerous. In support of this motion, the affidavit of electrical engineer Landers was submitted. Landers made an inspection of the premises in August 1990 and concluded that the circuit breaker and reсeptacle for the bedroom were adequate and that the electrical system was properly grounded. He found no defects in the wiring at that time. He also noticed the presence on the circuit box of thе county certification of inspection of the wiring after installation and certification that it met county specifications.
1. As to the alleged oral agreements, Horney acknowledged during his deposition that no such аgreements were made and summary judgment for Panter on these counts was appropriate. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).
2. Plaintiffs Horney first contend that Panter committed negligence per se in hiring Horney to do electrical work because he, *476 Horney, was not a licensed electrical contractor. OCGA § 43-14-8 (a) provides that “[n]o person shall engage in the electrical contracting business as an electrical contractor unless such person has а valid license . . . and a certificate of competency, ...” Electrical contracting is defined as “installation, maintenance, alteration, or repair of any electrical equipment, apparatus, control system, or electrical wiring device which is attached to or incorporated into any building or structure in this state. . . .” OCGA § 43-14-2 (6). The only exception to the licensing requirement arguably applicable here is OCGA § 43-14-16 (d), which allows an individuаl to install, alter or repair utility systems or electrical wiring services in a “single-family dwelling owned or occupied by him.” Since, however, the home was not owned or occupied by Horney and the electrical work was not рerformed by Panter, this provision would not excuse the license requirement. See Op. Atty. Gen. 88-29.
Panter argued below that Horney was not among the class of people which the licensing statute was intended to protect.
Lively v. Trust,
“In dеtermining whether the violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se as to a particular person, it is necessary to examine the purposes of the legislation and decide (1) whether the injured person falls within thе class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm it was intended to guard against. [Cits.]” Potts, supra at 547.
OCGA § 43-14-1 states that Chapter 14 of Title 43 “is enacted for the purpose of safeguarding homeownеrs, other property owners, tenants, and the general public against faulty, inadequate, inefficient, or unsafe electrical . . . installations.” Electrical contracting is declared to be a profession or business affеcting the public interest and the chapter is to be liberally construed to fulfill its purpose. .
Horney argues that he, as a member of the “general public,” is within the class sought to be protected. “ ‘Where general words follow а list of particulars, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to the particulars.’ [Cit.]” Lively, supra at 363. Here, the particulars listed are all categories of persons who would be using electrical installations, not the installers thereof.
While Horney was clearly engaging in electrical contracting so that he was required to have the requisite license before working on another’s property, Panter’s hiring of him was not negligence per se under this analysis since Horney was not within the protected class. 1
*477
3. Since Horney was an invitee, Panter owed him the same duty he owed all invitees, that of ordinary care. OCGA § 51-3-1. “The general rule, however, is ‘that a landowner is not liable for injuries to an invitee arising from a patent defect on the premises preexisting the arrival of the invitee and of which the invitee knew or had the means of knowing equal to the landowner. . . . The true ground of liability is the landowner’s superior knowledge of the perilous condition and the danger therefrom to persons coming upon the property. It is when the perilous condition is known to the owner and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted. (Cit.)’ [Cit.]”
Roth v. Wu,
When the movant in summary judgment is the defendant, he must pierce the plaintiff’s pleadings and affirmatively negate one or more essential elements of the complaint.
Corbitt v. Harris,
“In the instant case, there was no breach of the duty to keep the premises safe for invitees because there is no assertion of the existence of any defects or conditions which were in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, and the like, such that they would not be known to appellant and would not be observed by him in the exercise of ordinary care.”
Johnson v. Richardson,
4. In the second enumeration, it is argued that summary judgment was improper due to factual issues as to whether the electrical system in the residenсe posed an “open and obvious risk” sufficient to bar the claim. 2 The dispute in facts was premised upon the Biermann *478 affidavit submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motion.
The affidavit reflected Biermann’s qualifications as an electrical contractor. Biermann clаimed no personal knowledge of the Panter residence or the events surrounding Horney’s injury. He had met with Horney’s attorney “concerning the factual background” of the injury. The remainder of the affidavit was based on suppositiоns and suggestions of possible violations of the National Electrical Code which might be found upon examination of the Panter premises.
“[A] party resisting summary judgment, in addition to coming forward with evidence which is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, must present some credible warrant for its admissibility.”
Wilson v. Nichols,
Therefore, no dispute of fact is created and the grant of summary judgment was not error.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
To the extent that Horney relies on OCGA § 43-14-6 (a) (5) (E) for support, it is misplaced. That sеction allows for the e.g., suspension and revocation of an electrician’s license upon assisting an unlicensed person to practice electrical contracting. Since Panter had *477 no such license, this provision is inapplicable.
The discussion of the “open and obvious,” rule applicable to products liability situations, compare
Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd.,