22 Haw. 9 | Haw. | 1914
OPINION OP THE COURT BY
This suit was instituted by Robert Horner against Albert Horner for the dissolution of the partnership of J. M. Horner ■& Sons, and for an accounting. H. Hackfeld & Company, Limited, was also made a party defendant upon the claim that, as former agent of the firm, it had, during the year 1911, received certain moneys aggregating the sum of $32,500 of which it had paid to Albert Horner the sum of $15,410.42 which it was alleged was in excess of his proportionate share as a member of the firm, the balance remaining in the possession of said Hackfeld & Compny. The plaintiff claimed to be entitled to
It appears that on December 5, 1911, the plaintiff agreed to-sell and Davies & Company agreed to buy 1262 shares of the-2400 shares of the capital stock of the Kukaiau Plantation Company, Limited, a corporation operating a sugar plantation and a ranch- on the Island of Hawaii, also the plaintiff’s interest in the Kukaiau mill and landing of which the firm of J. M. Horner & -Sons owned respectively one-half and one-fourth, it -being understood by both parties that the plaintiff’s ownership in said firm’s interests in the mill and landing was in the same proportion as his ownership in the corporation. The purchase price agreed upon was $260,000. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff’
The ultimate question upon which the case hinges is one of estoppel and arises out of the following facts. In agreeing to
Counsel for the plaintiff contend that for several reasons which need not be enumerated here the circuit judge was in ■error in holding that all the elements of an estoppel were shown. Assuming that the facts proven were sufficient to give rise to -■an estoppel in the first instance we are of the opinion that as Davies & Company, before the transaction was closed by the 'transfer to it of the shares of stock and other property and the payment by it of the purchase money, namely, on March 6, had been furnished by the plaintiff’s agent and had in its possession 'the balance sheet for December 31, 1911, which showed the actual state of the account between the plantation company and Hackfeld & Company, the result which otherwise might have ■ensued was obviated. The evidence showed that during the ■period over which these negotiations extended and prior thereto the plaintiff was not on friendly terms with his brother Albert ■or Hackfeld & Company, and was in fact not familiar with the ■financial condition of the plantation company, and did not know ■the state of the account between J. M. Horner & Sons and their agent until after April 24, 1912, but we assume that the circuit .judge was right in holding that plaintiff’s ignorance did not ex
Counsel for Davies & Company contend that the agreement ■of December 5, 1911, was an executed contract and, as such, it could not have been rescinded. But the contract of purchase remained executory until the jmrchase price was paid and the title to the property transferred. And we think the view expressed by the circuit judge that Davies & Company was bound to complete the transaction at all events was a mistaken one. Davies & Company have evinced no desire to rescind.
In the absence of special' circumstances equity will relieve ■against a contract where the parties have acted under mutual mistake as to a material fact concerning the subject matter. But in order to establish an estoppel based upon a misrepresentation of a material fact the party asserting the estoppel must ■show that he relied on the representation and he cannot very well say that he relied upon an untruth when the truth was known to him. And it is laid down in the books as a rule of general application that there can be no estoppel by misrepresentation where the party asserting the estoppel knew the facts ■or had at hand ready means of ascertaining them. 11 A. & E. Enc. Law (2d ed.) 434; 16 Cyc. 738. These principles have been recognized in a great many cases among which the following may be referred to. City of Fort Scott v. Eads Brokerage Co., 117 Fed. 51, 56; Aldrich v. Scribner, 146 Mich. 609; Debenture Co. v. Hopkins, 63 Kan. 678; Ditch Co. v. Canal Co.
The case at bar does not fall within that class of cases in which it is held that a party who has been guilty of an intentional fraud which has misled another and caused a change of position cannot escape the legal consequences of his fraudulent conduct by showing that the fraud might have been discovered by the other had he used due diligence.
Erom what has been said it follows that the plaintiff is entitled to receive the fund in court. Plaintiff’s counsel now concede this to be the full amount due the plaintiff upon the accounting. The decree appealed from should be modified accordingly, and the case is remanded to the circuit judge.