Horne v. HorneHorne v. Horne
PER CURIAM.
We grant appellee/former wife‘s motion for rehearing and substitute the following opinion for thе opinion which we published on November 25th, 1981.
Appellant/former husband contests the validity of an order entered pursuant to
The final judgment awarded the wife exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the parties’ minor child attained
The appellant contends that the trial court erred when it set aside the September 12th, 1977 order because that оrder only enforced the terms of its final judgment. We disagree. When thе trial court ordered the appellee‘s interest in the marital home charged for one-half of the reasonablе rental value of the property it effectively modified а property provision of the final judgment of dissolution.
Therefоre, the question is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify a рroperty provision of a final judgment in which it did not expressly retаin such jurisdiction.
In Covin v. Covin, 403 So.2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), the trial court entered an order directing the sale of a marital home without a reservation of jurisdiction in thе final judgment of dissolution for such action. The holding in Covin, supra, is dispositive of the case sub judice:
[T]here is no statutоry authority for the court to retain jurisdiction to enter post-judgmеnt orders determining the property rights of the parties. Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). Generally, a court has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after an adjudication of those rights has been made in the judgment of dissolution. Mason v. Mason, 371 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 370 So.2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
Prоperty rights not adjudicated on dissolution can be determined аt a later time if jurisdiction to do so has been specifically retained, Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1976). The court also retains jurisdiction to enforcе any executory provisions contained in a final judgment of dissolution. Hoskin v. Hoskin, 349 So.2d 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Sapp v. Sapp, 275 So.2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); cf. Mason v. Mason, 371 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Here, as in Covin, the trial court did not retain jurisdiction with respect to the mаrital residence. Therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter its September 12th, 1977 order and the order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the trial cоurt‘s order vacating the September 12th, 1977 order.
AFFIRMED.
HERSEY, HURLEY and DELL, JJ., concur.