Walter L. Horn was insured under a policy issued by appellee, Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Company, which provided for coverage for loss of life while in a private passenger automobile. The insured died while a passenger in a ten-wheel 1964 Silver Eagle Scenicruiser bus, and appellee denied benefits to the beneficiary, appellant Jаckie W. Horn, on the basis that the bus was not a private passenger automobile within the meaning of the policy.
The triаl court granted appellee’s motion for sumrpary judgment, and appellant contends on appeal thаt the finding by the trial court that the bus was not a private passenger automobile within the definition of the policy is clearly erroneous. We affirm the action of the trial court.
The insurance policy defines “private passenger automobile” as:
... a four-wheel vehicle of the private passenger, station wagon or jeep type. It also includes an automobile of the truck type with a load capacity of 1500 pounds or less, designed for use on publiс roads.
The policy also provides coverage if the insured is riding as a passenger in a common carrier, but that provision has no application in this case. It was agreed that the bus belonged to the insured’s employer and wаs not being operated as a common carrier.
In construing the language in an insurance policy, if the language employed is ambiguous, then the court must construe the language strictly against the insurance company and all reasonable doubts decided in favor of the insured. Southern Title Insurance v. Oiler,
In National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Abbott, supra, the Arkansas Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether a half-ton pickup truck driven by the insured at the time of his death was within the meaning of a “privаte passenger type automobile” of the exclusively pleasure type. At trial, the court granted the benefiсiary’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed. The Supreme Court recognized thаt when policy language is clear and unambiguous, the court should decide, as a matter of law, the construction. Thе court found that the language in the policy was unambiguous and that coverage should have been denied. The beneficiary contended that there was ambiguity because the insured had used the pickup truck entirely for pleasure. The court stated that “ . . . ‘use’ does not govern whether the vehicle involved here was included in the coverage; rather, liability is determined by the ‘type’ of vehicle involved.”
The insurance company had the right to prescribe the kind of vehiсle it desired to cover by its policy, and it chose to cover a “four-wheel vehicle of the private pаssenger, station wagon or jeep type.” The vehicle in which the insured in this case was a passenger was a “ten-whеel Scenicruiser bus,” and is clearly outside the description of vehicles covered. The language employеd in the policy is not ambiguous and does not require interpretation.
Appellant relies upon the case of Coleman v. M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co.,
This court recognized in Coleman that cases which have dealt with situations similar to this case generally hold that the question of whether or not a vehicle is a "private passenger automobile” is a fact question which must be determined on the facts of each individual case. The term “private passenger automobile” was not further dеfined in the policy, and the court was unwilling to say that the finding by the trial court that the vehicle in question was not a private passenger automobile was clearly erroneous or against a preponderance of the evidence.
However, no fact question was presented in the instant case because the term “private passengеr automobile” was defined in the insurance policy in clear and unambiguous terms. National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Abbott, supra.
Rule 52 (a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that on appeal the trial court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Appellant urges that the finding of the trial court was clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence in this case. Rule 52 (a), however, has no application here, because we hold that the terms of the policy are unambiguous and thus not a question of fact but one of law.
Affirmed.