Horn v. HornHorn v. Horn
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Cartwright
delivered the opinion of the court:
Bertha Horn, one of the defendants in-error, second wife and widow of Gustav A. Horn, filed her bill in the circuit court of St. Clair county asking to have her homestead set off and her dower assigned in certain property in East St. Louis which she alleged her husband owned in fee simple at the time of his death, on July 15, 1906. Among the pieces of property in which she claimed dower was lot 12, in block 175, of the town (now city) of East St. Louis. Among the defendants to the bill were the plaintiffs in error, five of the children and heirs-at-law’ of Emilie Horn, the first wife, and they answered the bill, denying that their father, Gustav A. Horn, was the owner of said lot or that the complainant was entitled to dower or any other interest therein. The answer set forth the fact that Gustav A. Horn had filed a bill in the city court of East St. Louis in 1888 and obtained a decree of said court, under which a master’s deed was made purporting to vest in him the interest which plaintiffs in error and their brother, Charles A. Horn, inherited from
The evidence showed the following state of facts: Emilie Horn held the legal title to the lot in question and died in 1886, leaving Gustav A. Horn, her husband, and nine children, her heirs-at-law. “Three of the children were infants born at the same time and about a week old, and they died a few days after their mother, leaving their father and the other six children their heirs-at-law. Charles A. Horn, one of the children, has conveyed his interest to his brother Theodore Horn. The January term of the city court of East St. Louis convened on January 2, 1888, and on January 9 Gustav A. Horn filed his bill in that court against his children, who were minors under the age of sixteen years, praying that the interest which said children had inherited from their mother in this lot be conveyed to him. He alleged in his bill that in 1877, nine years before the death of his wife, he was in poor health, and not expecting to recover made a deed of his property to his wife, in-eluding an undivided one-half interest
This is a collateral attack upon the decree of the city court and not a direct proceeding questioning the jurisdiction of the court for want of service. The jurisdiction is disputed upon the ground that the decree was entered at the same term of court during which the bill was’ filed, and if that is so, the city court had no jurisdiction over plaintiffs in error. To establish the fact alleged it was necessary for the plaintiffs in error to overcome the presumption which is always indulged in favor of the jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction when acting within the scope of their authority. The city court of East St. Louis was a court of general jurisdiction within the limits of the city, and defendants in error are entitled to the benefit of the presumption that it had jurisdiction to render the decree until the contrary appears. (Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158; Huntington v. Metzger, 158 id. 272; Cassell v. Joseph, 184 id. 378.)
The bill filed by Gustav A. Horn only asked that the title which the defendants in that bill inherited from their mother should be decreed to him. The decree only granted that relief and the master’s deed purported to convey only that interest. Neither the prayer of the bill, the decree nor the deed included the interest inherited from the three children who died after their mother and who had inherited one-third from her. They left their father and the six other children as their heirs-at-law, the father taking two shares and each of the children one share. The father took one-twelfth and each surviving child one-twenty-fourth, and the interest of the children is still vested in plaintiffs in error and is not subject to dower nor the lien of the trust deed.”
The court erred in sustaining the defense under the seven year statute of limitations, for the reason that there was no color of title to the interest inherited from the infant children. No defense was shown under the twenty year statute of limitations.
The decree is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views, herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.