Horgan v. Sandy CityHorgan v. Sandy City
PER CURIAM:
¶ 1 Patrick Horgan appeals the denial of a petition to expunge records of his arrest, investigation, and detention. See
¶ 2 “Probation and expungement of one‘s record are neither matters of right nor of grace, but can only be granted when they appear to be compatible with the public interest.” State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1975) (construing former Utah Code section 77-35-17 (repealed July 1, 1980)). Decisions regarding expungement will be set aside only if the court‘s exercise of its broad discretion “is shown to have been abused, arbitrary, or capricious.” Id. at 879.
¶ 3 Horgan‘s brief fails to comply with the provisions of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. First, it does not contain sufficient, accurate, and specific citations to the record and transcript, as required by
¶ 4 It is undisputed that Horgan was entitled to obtain a certificate of eligibility for expungement of records from the Bureau of Criminal Identification. See
[t]he court shall issue an order of expungement if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) the petition and certificate of eligibility are sufficient;
(b) the statutory requirements have been met; and
(c) it is not contrary to the interests of the public to grant the expungement.
¶ 5 While acknowledging that an expungement petition initiates a statutory civil proceeding, Horgan nevertheless argues that he was entitled to expungement as a matter of law and that Sandy City bore the burden of proof and was required to subpoena the victim to appear and submit to cross-examination. He also argues that the district court improperly required him to demonstrate that expungement would not be contrary to the public interest. These claims are without merit. The Utah Expungement Act became effective in May 2010 and applies retroactively. See
¶ 6 The district court‘s decision to deny expungement was not an abuse of its broad discretion and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, we affirm.
PER CURIAM:
¶ 1 Kelly Robbennolt appeals his conviction of forgery after a bench trial. We affirm.
¶ 2 “When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the trial court‘s judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, ¶ 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (internal quotation marks omitted). When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a defendant “must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court‘s findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings.” Id. ¶ 11 (citation omitted). To meet the marshaling burden, Robbennolt was required to “present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,” all of the evidence presented at trial supporting the findings he now resists. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ¶ 17, 124 P.3d 235.
¶ 3 Robbennolt fails to meet this burden. Instead, he merely presents some evidence favorable to him that he argues conclusively establishes that he had authority to give a partial deed of trust to the victim. This does not constitute marshaling. See id. Further, in finding Robbennolt guilty of forgery, the trial court necessarily relied on the direct witness testimony and did not give weight to the evidence as Robbennolt presents it. Testimony established that Robbennolt‘s authority to issue partial deeds of trust was limited to a specific need to correct errors for particular investors. He did not have authority to grant additional interests in the subject property or encumber it further. The evidence supports the trial court‘s conclusion that Robbennolt lacked the authority to grant the partial deed of trust and that he acted with the purpose to defraud. Accordingly, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.1
¶ 4 Affirmed.