delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action of detinue was brought in April, 1843, in the name of John Boyd, sueing as an idiot, by his committee, to recover two slaves which had been sold by Boyd in 1826, and for which a tract of land was conveyed to him in 1828, which was afterwards sold under an execution that issued on a replevin bond in which he had become security for his father. The cause was tried on the plea of non-detinet, and a plea denying the idiocy of Boyd at the time of his sale, which so far as it was material, amounted only to the general issue. The only
1. With regard to the first of the questions above stated, the doctrine seems to have been settled in England, and to have been recognized in this as well as other States, that an inquisition finding the person named to-have been of unsound mind from a preceding day, is admissible as evidence of his 'incompetency during the period indicated, even against strangers who were no parties to the inquisition. But it has not been held to be more than prima facie evidence as to the past condition of'the person. And although as prima facie evidence it might be sufficient, in the absence of all opposing testimony, to prove the fact, it must yield to the force of opposing testimony. The principle of its admissibility against strangers, seems to be, that it is a public proceeding, had under public authority, and in which the public are interested ; and that, therefore, all persons being, to some extent, interested and represented in the proceeding, all should in some degree, be bound by it. In England the character and effect of the proceeding, and especially in cases of idiocy, were such as that the King, by whose attornéy it was instituted, had an actually beneficial interest in opposition to that of the supposed non compos and his-relatives. And in the opposition of these interests there was a guarantee that either in the inquisition or in the traverse which was allowed, the truth might be fairly attained.But in this State, while the proceeding is instituted and conducted by the attorney for the Commonwealth, it is <often set on foot by the friends of the alledged non com
In this case the inquisition does not find Boyd to be an idiot expressly, but that he was of unsound mind from his birth; and there was no other evidence before the jury in this case, which authorized them to find that he was an idiot, according to any definition of that term which we have seen. If, therefore, the right of recovery depended upon his having been an idiot at the date of the sale, we should be decidedly of opinion that although in the absence of all other testimony as to his condition, it might perhaps have been inferred from the inquest, that he was an idiot from birth; yet as all the other testimony showed that he had been a person of very weak mind, but not absolutely an idiot, the motion for a non-suit should, on that ground, have,prevailed.
But as he had been regularly found to be of unsound mind, and had a right to sue by committee, his action should not be defeated on the general issue, by an incorrect discription of him in the declaration, if on other grounds he had a right to recover. He was a person even in 1826, of extremely weak mind, and the jury might
The question then is, whether, ujaon these uncontroverted facts, and without any evidence tending to prove fraud, or even inequality in the terms of the sale or any circumvention whatever, and in the case of a contract executed on both sides, the committee of the one party long afterwards found to have been non compos, can at pleasure avoid the contract on the ground of incompetency, after the non compos has received and enjoyed a fair equivalent in property better suited to his condition than that which he had parted with, and when there is no offer to restore, nor a possibility of restoring the property which he had received ? We think he cannot. The case of an executed contract such as has been described, stands on grounds different from that of an executory contract, and the general privilege of avoiding a contract of the latter kind, does not necessarily imply an equally unlimited privilege of avoiding, under all circumstances, one of the former'.. It is only recently that a man has
If there had been any evidence of fraud or imposition, or of inequality in the terms of the- contract, the ques-
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial in conformity with the principles of this opinion.