38 Mich. 611 | Mich. | 1878
The questions raised in this case depend upon the construction to be given the written contract in view of the advances made thereunder.
Under this contract Sanford & Peck were to procure from certain lands owned by them, during the winter and spring of 1870 and 1871 not less than four million, and from that up to six million of pine saw logs. Hopkins & Co. were to “advance in cash from time to time as called for, to the amount of three dollars per thousand feet, say twelve thousand dollars upon four million feet of logs, and relatively the same for a greater number of thousand feet.” Certain other advances were to be made but no question arises concerning them. The referee found “that during the time said logging job was going on, the defendants, Hopkins & Co., advanced money to the plaintiffs, to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars,” and also made the other advances according to the contract. The referee also-found as a conclusion of law, that under the circumstances Sanford & Peck were not bound to furnish over four million, and consequently were not liable in damages for a failure to deliver beyond that quantity.
In this view of the case we are of opinion the referee erred. It certainly was optional with Sanford & Peek in the first instance under them contract to put in any beyond the four million, but when from time to time they called for and received the advance of three dollars per thousand feet, they thereby obligated themselves to put in to the extent of such advances, — noi> exceeding the six million, — as under this clause of the
The judgment must therefore be reversed and a new trial ordered, but should we not direct attention to another question, it might be claimed that we approved of the measure of damages, adopted by the referee for non-delivery of the contract quantity of logs, viz.: f 1.50 per thousand feet, that being the profits on manufacturing under the contract. The rule laid down by the court of exchequer in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch., 341, has frequently been recognized and followed in this State. In cases of breach of contract the damages “should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i. e. . according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or, such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it.” Was it according to the usual course of things from the breach of the contract in this case, that the'mill
The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial ordered.