Sylvester Immanuel Hopkins appeals from the trial court order authorizing the invоluntary administration of anti-psychotic medication. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Hopkins was originally certified for short-term mental health treatment in July 1987. After a short period of hospitalization, he was released on outpatient sta *625 tus in early August. He was returned to the hospital less than one month later, in a psychotic condition.
After his return, his treating physician filed this petition seеking an order for involuntary medication pursuant to § 27-10-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 11). After a hеaring on the matter, the trial court entered an order authorizing the administration of involuntary medications. The court’s order was made effective for thе remainder of Hopkins’ current certification, and for the balance оf any further short or long-term extensions of that certification.
I.
Hopkins first contеnds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order for involuntary mediсation because he was accepting his medication voluntarily. We disagree.
Section 27-10-111(4.5), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 11) provides that:
“In the event that a respondent refuses to accept medication, the court ... shall have jurisdiction аnd venue to accept a petition by a treating physician and to еnter an order requiring that the respondent accept such treatment, or, in the alternative, that the medication be forcibly administered to him.”.
The reсord shows that during the period of Hopkins’ release from hospitalization, hе had failed to take his medication. Subsequently, he was returned to the hospitаl in a psychotic condition, where he displayed a reluctance tо accept the medication while under supervision. For purposes of the statute, under these circumstances, he had refused to acceрt his medication during his release from hospitalization. Therefore, the trial court had authority to enter the order for involuntary medication.
We also nоte that the trial court’s order authorized the administration of medication only after Hopkins was given the opportunity to accept it on a voluntаry basis. Thus, to the extent that Hopkins argues that he was accepting the mediсation voluntarily, that portion of the trial court’s order authorizing the involuntarily administration of medication had no effect.
II.
Hopkins also contends that the scope of the trial court’s order was impermissible. We agree.
In
People v. Medina,
Here, the trial court order authorized the administration of medication for the balance of any future short or long-term extеnsions of Hopkins’ certification. This portion of the order went beyond the рermissible limits as outlined in People v. Medina, supra, and, therefore, must be reversed.
We reject the People’s argument that because the trial court order afforded Hopkins the opportunity to seek a new hearing on the need for continued administration of medication treatmеnt at the time of any future extension, his due process rights were protected adequately. The effect of accepting this contention would be tо shift the burden of seeking a hearing from the physician to the patient. In light of the severe infringement of individual rights that is a result of the administration of involuntary medication, such a holding would not comport with the interests of justice. See People v. Medina, supra.
The portion of the order authorizing involuntary administration of medication beyond the period оf the present certification is reversed. Insofar as it permits such medication during the present certification, it is affirmed.