Hope v. SawyerHope v. Sawyer
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Treat
This was an action of ejectment brought by Sawyer against Hope, to recover the possession of lot one, in block twenty-three, in the city of Alton. It was admitted on the trial, that the defendant was in possession of the lot at the commencement of the suit. The plaintiff adduced the following evidence.
1. A judgment of the Madison circuit court, rendered on the third Monday of September, 1841, against the lot in question and other real estate, for the taxes due thereon for the year 1840.
2. A precipe for the sale of the property against which judgment was entered, issued on the 18th of October, 1841. 3. A deed for the lot from the sheriff to Robert Dunlap, bearing date the 3d of January, 1844, and reciting a sale of the lot under the judgment, on the 19th of October, 1841. 4. A deed from Dunlap to the plaintiff for the lot, dated the 20th of March, 1844. The
The defendant produced the following evidence. 1. Proof that all taxes on the lot had been paid up to the time of the trial. 2. A patent from the United States to Rufus Easton for a tract of land embracing the lot. 3. A deed from Easton to Whiteside and Reynolds for the lot. The certificate of acknowledgment on this deed was as follows: —
“ State of Missouri.
County of St. Louis, ss. This day personally appeared before me, the undersigned, clerk of the circuit court within and for the county of St. Louis, Rufus Easton, who acknowledged the foregoing deed, or instrument of writing, to be his act and deed, hand and seal, for the purposes therein contained. Given under my hand and seal of office, at St. Louis, this fifth day of November, 1821.
rQ , Archibald Gamble, Clerk,
’ ea ‘•* by E. Baker, Deputy Clerk.”
4. A deed for the lot from Whiteside and Reynolds to John Reynolds. 5. A deed for the lot from John Reynolds to the ■ defendant. The plaintiff objected to this evidence, and excepted to the decision of the court admitting it.
On the foregoing state of facts, the court found the issue in favor of the plaintiff, and rendered judgment for him.
The act of the 26th of February, 1839, under the provisions of which the lot was sold for taxes, required such sales to be made on the second Monday succeeding the term of the court at which the judgment was rendered. It required the collector to apply at the spring term of the court for judgment against the delinquent real estate; and to give six weeks’ notice in a newspaper of the application, and of the time and place of sale. It directed the clerk to docket the application at the head of the common law cases; and required the court to dispose of the same in a summary way, on the calling of the docket. It also required the clerk to record the proceedings and judgment in a book to be kept for the purpose; and within five days after the adjournment of the court, to issue a precept under which the sale should be made. Ought the sale to take place on the second Monday succeeding the first day of the term; or on the second Monday after the close of the term ?. The opinion was expressed in the case of Bestor v. Powell, 2 Gilman, 119, that the former day was the one intended by the legislature ; and, upon a further consideration of the question, we are well satisfied that such is the proper interpretation of the statute. It was, however, intimated in that case, that a sale made on the
Was the defendant in a position to object to the sale? Before a party is permitted to raise this objection, he must show that no taxes are due on the property, and that he is the owner thereof. The defendant proved that all taxes on the lot had been paid; and he also proved title in himself, unless the deed from Easton to Whiteside and Reynolds was improperly received in evidence. It is insisted that the certificate of acknowledgment on this deed is defective ; in other words, that the acknowledgment should have been made before and certified by the clerk in person. The objection is not well founded. The acknowledgment purports to have been taken by the clerk; and it is certified in his name, and under the seal of the court. Primé facie, this is sufficient. The seal of the court proves itself; and we must presume that it was affixed by the proper officer. The presumption is that the clerk was authorized by the laws of Missouri to act through a deputy, and that Baker was regularly appointed as such. The deputy had the power to use the name of the clerk, and attach the seal of the court. The act of an agent within the scope of his authority and in the name of his principal, is as binding on the principal and third persons, as if performed by the principal personally. It is the act of the principal, and not of the agent. The certificate in question was none the less the act of the clerk, because made by his authorized deputy.
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.