KEVIN HOPE ET AL. v. FRANK CAVALLO ET AL.
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued June 6—decided September 20, 1972
163 Conn. 576
HOUSE, C. J., COTTER, SHAPIRO, LOISELLE and MACDONALD, JS.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Argued June 6—decided September 20, 1972
Philip R. Shiff, with whom was Alan H. W. Shiff, for the appellees (defendants).
COTTER, J. This is an action in two counts to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs as the result of a collision involving a motor vehicle owned and operated by the plaintiff Bernard M. Hope which had stopped for a red light and was struck in the rear by a two-and-one-hаlf-ton cargo truck operated by the defendant Frank Cavallo. At the time of the accident Cavallo was acting in the scope of and in the course of his employment with the Connecticut Air National Guard. The plaintiffs brought suit in the first count against the state of Connecticut and against Frank Cavallo individually in the second count of the comрlaint.
The defendant Cavallo filed a special defense to the second count of the complaint, alleging that at the time of the collision he was operating a vehicle in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment by the Connecticut Air National
The defendant state of Connecticut demurred to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failеd to state a cause of action against it because they did not allege that the vehicle operated by the defendant Cavallo was owned and insured by the state as required by
Motions for judgment in favor of the defendant Cavallo and the defendant state of Connecticut were granted. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendants and argue that the state owned the vehicle in question as required by
The plaintiffs assign error, inter alia, in the failure of the trial court to conclude that
Whether
In the Brown case, supra, which held that one may be the “owner” of a motor vehicle within the meaning of a statute although another has the strict legal title, the court stated: “The words of a statute are to be interpreted in their natural and usual meaning unless the context indicates that a different meaning was intended. By our statute words and phrases are to be construed according to the commonly plain usage of language.” It is significant that at the time Brown was decided the same language contained in
It is agreed that the truck in question was the “property” of the United States and that it was “issued” by the United States to the National Guard; that the truck was under the jurisdiction of the Connecticut Air National Guard State Military Department. The term “owner” is one of general application and includes one having an interest other than the full legal and benefiсial title. Coyle v. Swanson, 345 Mass. 126, 128, 185 N.E.2d 741. The word owner
This court has held that one may be the “owner” of a motor vehicle within the meaning of a statute although another has strict legal title; and that the word “owner” in the motor vehicle law in effect at the time, which provided that no suit could be had for injuries to a car unless the owner registered it, referred to any person having an interest in the property even under a special title. Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., supra. In other cases we have held that “[t]he word ‘owner’ . . . includes both the legal and equitable owner and anyone having an interest in the automobile under a special title.” Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Lighterage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn. 114, 120, 123 A. 16; Marciel v. Berman, 104 Conn. 165, 168, 169, 132 A. 397. A bailor may have a general and a bailee a sрecial ownership in the subject of the bailment. Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., supra; 2 Hale, Bailments, p. 56. In Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291, 298, we held that the term “owner” as used in the statute meant the person in control of the vehicle at the time and not necessarily the actual owner; and this court
The state of Connecticut had exclusive possession and control of the vehicle at the time of the accident; it was issued to the state by the United Stаtes government and there is nothing to indicate that the
Under the circumstances, as a matter of law, it cannot be said thаt the statute intended that the owner of a vehicle in the context in which it is used, must necessarily preclude from liability one who did not have legal title. Where the truck is in the continual, exclusive and total possession and use of the state, the statute contemplates that liability
The trial court had before it an affidavit that the “International 2 1/2 ton cargo truck from the 103d Tactical Control Flight, Connecticut Air National Guard . . . is under the jurisdiction of the Connecticut Air National Guard State Military Department.”
In addition, the text of the regulations of the departments of the Army and the Air Force describes the so-called “policies” in effect as follоws: “3. Policies. a. Military property is issued to a State for the purpose of arming, equipping and training federally recognized units of the National Guard. Such property may be used for inactive duty training, full time training duty, State military duty, or active Federal military services, and as otherwise authorized in this regulation.” These policies describe the broad and extremеly sweeping control and use that the state maintains over the property issued to it so as to create a special and almost exclusive
In addition, it should also be noted that, generally, the individual who must sustain the loss of property in case of destruction is considered the owner and “both in common parlance and legal acceptation, [the] property is his.” Hough v. City Fire Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 10, 19, 20; Chauser v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 413, 419, 196 A. 137; 63 Am. Jur. 2d, Property, § 32. Title 32, § 710 (c) of the United States Code, which provides for the issuance of property to the National Guard, states that if the property is damaged or destroyеd through negligence the money value of the property or the damage thereto shall be charged to the state, to be paid from its funds. The state of Connecticut would, therefore, bear the risk of loss for the National Guard truck in question.
The word “owned” as used in There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to be proceeded with in accordance with this opinion. In this opinion LOISELLE and MACDONALD, JS., concurred. HOUSE, C. J. (dissenting). I do not agree with the decision of the majority that the trial court was in error in finding that the military truck which was at all times the property of the United States government and loaned by it to the state of Connecticut was not a vеhicle owned by the state and, accordingly, there was no liability on the part of the state which had waived its sovereign immunity from suit only in instances involving motor vehicles “owned and insured by the state.” In interpreting the language of The majority opinion finds support for its conclusion in the fact that the truck loaned to the state by the federal government was covered by the automobile liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the collision, holding that “[t]he state recognized an ‘ownership’ in the vehicle by virtue of its contract of insurance.” To the contrary, I find that the provisions of the insurance policy clearly indicate recognition of the fact that the state did not own the vehicle. Thе policy in standard form covered vehicles “owned” by the state. If the vehicle was in fact owned by the state, no additional provision in the contract was necessary to cover its operation. Since, however, the vehicle was not owned by the state, to obtain coverage it was necessary to add a rider or speсial endorsement to the policy which was done by an amendment to the standard policy providing that coverage should extend not only to vehicles owned by the state but that coverage “shall include automobiles on loan to the State of Connecticut from federal agencies.” (Emphasis added.) I fail to see how the addition of a special rider affording insurance coverage to vehicles “on loan” to the state constitutes any recognition on the part of the state that the state was the owner of the vehicle loaned to it. In this opinion SHAPIRO, J., concurred.