OPINION
{1} This сase is the latest in a series of cases involving appeals from decisions of the State Engineer. See Anthony Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Turney,
BACKGROUND
{2} Hоpe Community Ditch Association (Hope) filed applications with the State Engineer to change a point of diversion by drilling supplemental wells on land located partially in Chaves County and partially in Eddy County. Over the objection of Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District (PVACD), the State Engineer granted the application with certain restrictions and requirements. The decision was entered on January 16, 2003.
{3} On January 22, 2003, PVACD filed a de novo appeal in the district court of Chaves County (the Chaves case). PVACD served the State Engineer, but did not serve Hope. NMSA1978, § 72-7-KB) (1971) states,
Appeals to the district court shall be taken by serving a notice of appeal upon the state engineer and all parties interested within thirty dаys after receipt by certified mail of notice of the decision, act or refusal to act. If an appeal is not timely taken, the action of the state engineеr is conclusive.
On February 17, 2003, Hope filed its own de novo appeal in the district court of Eddy County (the Eddy case). All parties were properly served in the Eddy case.
{4} The State Enginеer moved to dismiss the Chaves case on the ground that an interested party, Hope, was not served with the notice of appeal in a timely fashion. New Mexico appellate courts have “repeatedly held that the district court does not gain jurisdiction over such appeals unless all parties are served within the thirty-day time frame.” AWSD,
{5} While the Chaves case was proceeding, on March 10, 2003, PVACD filed a responsive pleading in the Eddy case, which included a statement of issues pursuant to Rule 1-074 NMRA, a cross-appeal, a counterclaim аgainst Hope, and a cross-claim against the State Engineer. In substance, this document sought to raise the same issues that PVACD would have raised in its own appeal in the Chaves case, i.e., that the applications were defective, that the State Engineer’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious, аnd that the State Engineer’s decision was contrary to the applicable water law statutes and judicial decisions. The State Engineer moved to dismiss PVACD’s cross-appeal аnd other claims. Hope joined in this motion. Hope then moved to dismiss the Eddy case, representing that it no longer wished to pursue the appeal that it had taken. The district cоurt granted both motions. PVACD now appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Appeals from Decisions of the State Engineer
{6} The theory behind the jurisdictional nature of the requirement of properly serving all parties to a de novo appeal from the State Engineer is that the legislature has, by statute, set forth the steps necessary to transfer the authority over a case from an administrative agency to the judicial branch. Sеe In re Application of Metro. Invs., Inc.,
■ [2] {7} In this case, PVACD was aggrieved by the decision of the State Engineer and wantеd to appeal. According to Section 72-7-l(B), it was required to serve its notice of appeal on the State Engineer and all interested parties, including the applicant Hope, within thirty days of receipt of the State Engineer’s decision or the decision of the State Engineer would be conclusive. It is undisputed that PVACD did not comply with the jurisdictional requirement of service on Hope within thirty days, either in the Chaves case or the Eddy case. PVACD cites no case in which the jurisdictional requirement of service on interested pаrties within thirty days was excused. Accordingly, we hold that PVACD, having failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of its appeal from the decision of the State Engineer, was not entitled to have its appeal issues, challenging the decision of the State Engineer, heard in district court. See § 72-7-l(B) (indicating “conclusive” nature of action of State Engineer).
2. Res Judicata
{8} The form of rеs judicata known as claim preclusion prevents parties from relitigating claims after those claims have been litigated once. This doctrine
applies when the seсond suit has the following relationship with the first suit: (l)[t]he parties must be the same, (2) the cause of action must be the same, (3) there must have been a final decision in the first suit, and (4) the first decision must have been on the merits.
City of Sunland Park v. Macias,
{9} PVACD also argues that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the Chaves case nor was the decision in that case a final one on the merits because that case was dismissed on “technical procedural failings, prior to the identification or litigation of any substantive issues.” This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the requirements of claim prеclusion. So-called technical, procedural failings, if they result in dismissal of a case with prejudice, are sufficient to provide the foundation for claim preclusion.
{10} Wе have ruled that a dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata. See, e.g., Reed v. Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc.,
3. Other Issues
{11} We have considered PVACD’s other issues and find them to be without merit in light of our decision. Specifically, to the extent PVACD contends that it was entitled to file cross-claims and counterclaims becаuse appeals from State Engineer decisions are de novo proceedings governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, we need not address that contention because even if true, our decision on the preceding issues would preclude the claims under the circumstances of this case. Similarly, we need not address PVACD’s complaint that the trial court did not permit it to file findings and conclusions, nor did it file its own findings and conclusions, because the issues raised below and on appeal are legal issues based on the undisputеd facts recited in the background section of this opinion. See In re Adoption of Begay,
CONCLUSION
{12} The district court’s orders dismissing the Eddy case are affirmed.
{13} IT IS SO ORDERED.