Opinion by
Plаintiff Gary Hoover brought suit in trespass against Alice Sackett to recover $10,150.50 for damages to his truck as the result of an accident occurring on September 19,1968, at the intersection of Buffalo Boad and Water Street in the Borough of Wesleyville, Erie County. Buffalo Road runs in a general east to west direction and Water Street in a north to south direction. Sackett joined Herbert Higby as the additional defendant who was unrepresented by counsel at all times and against whom a default judgment was taken. *449 In a jury trial, after plaintiffs case was completed, the lower court entered a compulsory nonsuit against plaintiff Hоover in favor of the original defendant, Alice Saekett, and directed a verdict against Higby, additional defendant, in the amount of $10,150.50. The lower court refused plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and refused to remove the compulsory nonsuit, and judgment was entered on the verdict. Thus this appeal.
Taking the facts of this case and inferences reasonably drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff as we must
(Michigan Bank v.
Steesen,
On these facts the lower court granted a motion for compulsory nonsuit against plaintiff in favor of Sackett, the court stating: “I don’t even think there is evidence that she was negligent and if she was negligent, it certainly wasn’t the proximate cause of an accident which occurred a hundred and fifty five feet away.”
In its written opinion the lower court stated that when Higby approached the intersection of Buffalo Road and Water Street, “he suddenly felt ill and рassed out approximately twelve feet west of the intersection. After he lost consciousness his automobile collided with the Sackett vehiclе. . . In this finding the court was in error. Nowhere in the evidence does there appear any testimony that Higby passed out before the collision occurred. Higby’s testimony was that as he approached the intersection he felt as though he would “pass out” and because of this feeling he looked for a place to park. Considering this testimony in the light most favorable to plaintiff it can be inferred therefrom that Higby was still conscious at the time of the collision with plaintiff and therefore, his consciousness or lack of consciousness and the time of impact were matters for determination by the jury and not by the cоurt as a matter of law.
The court also committed error when it found as a matter of law that Sackett was not negligent. Her testimony was that she had enterеd the intersection on a green light, looked east and west, and yet did not
*451
see Higby who was traveling 20-25 miles per hour until his car was in front of her. Though there was evidenсe of the presence of a hedge on Water Street, it was shown that the hedge did not extend to the intersection and therefore did not block her visiоn. These circumstances call for the application of the rule that an operator of a vehicle cannot be said to have looked when he has failed to see what the physical facts declare he should have seen had he in fact looked:
Smith v. United News Company,
It was also for the jury to determine whether Sackett’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiff. Merely because plaintiff’s truck had been struck a distance of 155 feet from the initial point of impact between Sackett and Higby does not refute as a matter of law the possibility of Sackett’s negligence as the proximate cause of plaintiff’s damage. A determinatiоn of proximate cause does not depend, as does the issue of negligence, on the test of foreseeability:
Churbuck v. Union Railroad Company,
The law of Pennsylvania has been in accord with that so clearly enunciated by Justice Cabdozo in the classic case of
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff it is our belief that a jury could determine that Sackett was negligent in causing the impact with Higby and that that negligеnce, in a natural sequence of events, led to, and proximately caused the collision by Higby with plaintiff’s vehicle 155 feet away. “... the question of what is the proximate cause of an accident is almost always one of fact for the jury. Bleman v. Gold,
The fact that Higby may be found concurrently negligent with Sackett is immaterial to the plaintiff’s right of recovery against Sackett. In
Mellon v. Lehigh Valley Railroad,
supra, a train struck a taxicab at a crossing hurling the cab against a signal post. The signal рost fell and injured a pedestrian waiting to cross the tracks. It was there stated that if the negligence of the railroad was concurrent with that of the taxiсab driver, the railroad company remained liable to the injured pedestrian. The court there stated at p. 44: “There was no break in the chain of еvents from the time the train hit the cab until the post hit the plaintiff; so it cannot be found as a legal conclusion that striking the cab was not the proximate cause of her injury. See McCaughey v. Am. Ice Co. (No. 1),
We therefore reverse the action of the lower court refusing to remove the compulsory nonsuit and remand the case for a new trial consistent with this opinion.