98 U.S. 528 | SCOTUS | 1879
HOOPER
v.
ROBINSON.
Supreme Court of United States.
*531 Mr. Thomas W. Hall for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Stewart Brown and Mr. Arthur George Brown, contra.
*536 MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
As the facts of which the instruction given was predicated were all indisputable and undisputed, that instruction was equivalent to a direction to find for the plaintiffs. The same remarks apply mutatis mutandis to the instruction asked by the defendant. The case, then, resolves itself into this: Were the plaintiffs entitled to recover upon the case as presented in the record?
A policy like the one here in question, in the name of a specified party, "on account of whom it may concern," or with other equivalent terms, will be applied to the interest of the persons for whom it was intended by the person who ordered it, provided the latter had the requisite authority from the *537 former, or they subsequently adopted it. 1 Phillips, Ins., sect. 383.
This is the result, though those so intended are not known to the broker who procures the policy, or to the underwriters who are bound by it. Id., sect. 384.
One may become a party to an insurance effected in terms applicable to his interest, without previous authority from him, by adopting it either before or after the loss has taken place, though the loss may have happened before the insurance was made. Id., sect. 388.
The adoption of the policy need not be in any particular form. Any thing which clearly evinces such purpose is sufficient.
"It is now clearly established that an insurable interest, subsisting during the risk and at the time of loss, is sufficient, and that the assured need not also allege or prove that he was interested at the time of effecting the policy; indeed, it is every day's practice to effect insurance in which the allegation could not be made with any degree of truth; as, for instance, where goods are insured on a return voyage long before they are bought." 1 Perkin's Arnould, 238.
This is consistent with reason and justice, and is supported by analogies of the law in other cases. We will name a few of them.
A deed voidable under certain circumstances may be made valid for all purposes by a sufficient after-consideration. A devise to a charitable use may be made to a grantee not in esse, and vest and take effect when the grantee shall exist. The doctrine of springing and shifting uses is familiar to every real-property lawyer. They always depend for their efficacy upon events occurring subsequently to the conveyance under which they arise.
Where the insurance is "lost or not lost," the thing insured may be irrecoverably lost when the contract is entered into, and yet the contract be valid. It is a stipulation for indemnity against past as well as future losses, and the law upholds it.
Where a vessel insured for a stated time was sold and transferred, and was repurchased and transferred back within that time, it has been held that the insurance was suspended while *538 the title was out of the assured, "and was revived again on the reconveyance of the assured during the term specified in the policy." Worthington v. Bearse and Others, 12 Allen (Mass.), 382.
A right of property in a thing is not always indispensable to an insurable interest. Injury from its loss or benefit from its preservation to accrue to the assured may be sufficient, and a contingent interest thus arising may be made the subject of a policy. Lucena v. Craufurd et al., 3 Bos. & Pul. 75; S.C. 5 id. 269; Buck & Hedrick v. Chesapeake Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 151; Hancock v. Fishing Insurance Company, 3 Sumn. 132.
In the law of marine insurance, insurable interests are multiform and very numerous.
The agent, factor, bailee, carrier, trustee, consignee, mortgagee, and every other lien-holder, may insure to the extent of his own interest in that to which such interest relates; and by the clause, "on account of whom it may concern," for all others to the extent of their respective interests, where there is previous authority or subsequent ratification.
Numerous as are the parties of the classes named, they are but a small portion of those who have the right to insure.
Where money is advanced, as in this case, for repairs and supplies to enable a vessel to proceed on her voyage, the lender has a lien, not on the cargo, but upon the vessel, and the amount of the debt may be protected by insurance upon the latter. Insurance Company v. Barings, 20 Wall. 163, and the authorities there cited. If the owner of a vessel, being also the owner of the cargo, or the owner of the cargo, not being the owner of the vessel, procures a third person to make such advances upon an agreement that he shall be repaid from the cargo, and a bill of lading is furnished to him, he has a lien on the cargo for the amount of his advances, and may insure accordingly. Clark v. Mauran and Others, 3 Paige (N.Y.), 373; Dows v. Greene, 24 N.Y. 638; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 169. The assignment of a bill of lading passes the legal title to the goods. Chandler v. Belden, 18 Johns. (N.Y.) 157. The assignment of a debt, ipso facto, carries with it a lien and all other securities held by the assignor for the discharge of such debt. The Hull of a New Ship, 2 Ware, *539 203; Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cow. (N.Y.) 747; Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. (N.Y.) 80.
Where a lien subsists either on the vessel or cargo, a third party may pay the debt, and, with the consent of the debtor and creditor, be substituted to all the rights of the latter. Dixon on Subrogation, 163; Garrison et al. v. Memphis Insurance Co., 19 How. 312; The Cabot, 1 Abb. (U.S.) 150. Where there is neither an agreement nor an assignment, there can be no subrogation, unless there has been a compulsory payment by the party claiming to be substituted. Sanford v. McLean, 3 Paige (N.Y.), 117.
Recurring to the facts, there are two points upon which we deem it proper particularly to remark:
First, We find no ground for any imputation of bad faith upon Hooper. We think there was no indirection and no purpose of concealment on his part. Before the insurance was effected, the underwriters had a clear right, if they so desired, to know for whom they were asked to insure. Buck & Hedrick v. Chesapeake Insurance Co., supra. They made no inquiry. This excused Hooper from making any communication upon the subject. When the insurance money was paid, although the face of the policy and other facts, patent and notorious, which must have been known to the underwriters, showed clearly that the advances were made, and that the insurance was effected by Hooper, not for himself, but for others, the underwriters were again silent. The draft on Good Brothers & Co. had then been sold, and Hooper had received the money. Thereafter he had nothing at stake but the solvency of the drawees. When the adjuster, more than a month later, made the inquiry, which should have been made before, Hooper had paid over the money. He then made a frank and full disclosure. We see no reason to doubt that if the inquiry had been made earlier it would have been answered in the same way. In this respect the underwriters have themselves to blame rather than Hooper. The record discloses no ground upon which, ex equo et bono, he can be called upon to pay back the fund in controversy.
Second, It does not appear in the record to whom the vessel and cargo belonged. There is not a ray of light upon the subject. In that respect the case is left wholly in the dark.
*540 The proof as to who were intended to be insured is that they were Good Brothers & Co., and no one else, though, according to the terms of the policy, payment in the event of loss was to be made to Hooper & Co. The former fact is established by the testimony of Hooper, and there is none other upon the subject. He is unimpeached, and his testimony is conclusive. The inquiry then arises, whether Good Brothers & Co. had any insurable interest in the cargo. It does not appear whether they had or had not. We have suggested several ways in which such an interest may have arisen, and have shown that under the policy in question it would have been sufficient if it had subsisted at any time before the loss was known to them. It may possibly have arisen in other modes. This brings us to the question of the burden of proof. Did it rest upon the plaintiffs or upon the defendant? In order to maintain the plaintiffs' case it was necessary to be made to appear that Good Brothers & Co., the assured, had no insurable interest in the cargo, the cargo being the thing insured. Upon both reason and authority, we think the onus probandi was upon the plaintiffs.
It was for them to make out their case. The premium had been paid, the loss had occurred, and the indemnity money had been received by the agents of the assured and paid over to their principals. The plaintiffs claim the right to go behind all this, and to reclaim from Hooper the fund thus received and parted with. It was incumbent upon them to establish every thing necessary to entitle them to recover, and they have no right to throw upon the defendant any part of the burden that belonged to themselves. For authorities upon this subject see 1 Greenl. Evid., sects. 34, 35, 80, 81, and the notes. Such is the legal result, notwithstanding the negative form of the averment, to be established.
But suppose the case were made out as against Good Brothers & Co., and that a recovery could be had if the action were against them, still it by no means follows that the plaintiff in error was liable.
There was laches on the part of the underwriters, or their agents, which is the same thing. Nothing in the record is clearer than that Hooper received the money as the agent of *541 the assured. It was his duty immediately to advise his principals and promptly to pay them. 1 Waite, Actions and Defences, 252, 255. This latter duty it appears he performed. He had then received no notice of the adverse claim subsequently made, and had no reason to expect it. His parting with the money is proof of his sincerity and honesty.
Under all the circumstances, we think he is entitled to the benefit of the principle which in such cases gives immunity to the agent and refers the party complaining for satisfaction to the principals who have received and hold the money.
There was error in the instruction given by the court to the jury.
The counsel on neither side referred to the state of the pleadings. We have, therefore, not adverted to that subject, but have considered the case as it was argued, entirely upon the merits.
The judgment of the Circuit Court will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion; and it is
So ordered.