68 Haw. 605 | Haw. | 1986
On February 7, 1980, the Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship Committee for the Heat & Frost Asbestos Insulator Trade (“HJAC”) informed appellant-appellee Arnold K. Kauhane that he was
On September 5, 1984, after a July 2, 1984 DLIR rehearing the Deputy Director reversed his original decision and ordered HJAC to reinstate Kauhane into the apprenticeship program. HJAC filed a Notice of Appeal to the circuit court on October 5, 1984 and Kauhane cross-appealed on October 18, 1984 contending that the Deputy Director erred in not awarding back wages, attorney’s fees and costs. After a hearing on June 3, 1985, the circuit court on September 6, 1985, based on procedural irregularities vacated the Deputy Director’s decision and order of September 5, 1984 and remanded the case to the DLIR for a new hearing. Kauhane timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2, 1985.
We question, sua sponte, even though the parties have not raised the issue in their appeal and cross-appeal, whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain HJAC’s appeal. See Territory v. Correa, 24 Haw. 165, 166-67 (1917).
HJAC is a joint apprenticeship committee, as defined by Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 372-7, authorized to recommend to the Director of the DLIR termination of an apprenticeship agreement. See Reg. XLIV, § 7(b), Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii; §§ 2h. & 10b., Apprenticeship Standards, Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship Committee for the Asbestos Workers Trade. The Director has the power and authority to ultimately decide whether the apprenticeship agreement is to be terminated. He is not bound to concur with HJAC’s recommendation. See id.
Under HRS §91-14, only a “person aggrieved by a final decision and order” is entitled to judicial review. HJAC’s legitimate interest was not injured in fact, and therefore HJAC is not aggrieved by the Deputy Director’s final decision and order reinstating Kauhane. See Mahuiki v. Planning Commission, 65 Haw. 506, 512-15, 654 P.2d 874, 878-80
Kauhane cross-appealed from the Deputy Director’s failure to award him back wages, attorney’s fees and costs. Kauhane was aggrieved by such action and thus had standing to appeal to the circuit court. We remand to the circuit court for a hearing to determine whether there is a basis, statutory or otherwise, for such an award.
The circuit court did not reach the issue in light of its decision to remand for a rehearing.