181 Ga. 40 | Ga. | 1935
Marvin Honea, Sam Daniel, and S. W. Sisk, alias W. C. Shaw, were jointly indicted for the offense of murder. Honea was placed on trial, and was convicted and sentenced to the death penalty. His motion for new trial was Overruled, and he excepted.
The first and second special grounds of the motion for new trial complain of the. admission, over timely objection, of evidence tending to show that the defendant, with others, engaged in a “hold-up” and robbery at Winder, Georgia, and a similar hold-up and robbery near the same place at a later date, each being staged in a manner similar to the one in which the present crime.was committed; the objection being that the transactions had no connection with the case at bar, illustrated no issue in the case at bar, and that the testimony was prejudicial to defendant. The court made the following statement: “Gentlemen, I think perhaps I made it plain enough to the jury before that you are trying this case and the issue as made in the particular indictment that you heard read to you at the outset of this case, and that you will have out with you when you retire to the jury-room. You are not concerned with any other transaction except that, and except the' issue made upon this particular indictment. The objection tp this testimony relating to another transaction would be sustained and this testimony excluded from your consideration for every other purpose; except one. Hnder the law, this testimony is admissible as it might or not throw, light on the question of identity, plan, or scheme, or motive, as applied to the particular transaction that you are now investigating. You should consider it only for that purpose. That is the only purpose for which it is admissible. It is admissible for that purpose.” In Morris v. State, 177 Ga. 106 (169 S. E. 495), Justice Bell said: “The evidence as a whole tended to show that the 'persons who committed the prior robbery were the same as those who committed the robbery in the course of which the decedent was killed, and that this defendant was among the number. In Wilson v. State, 173 Ga. 275 (160 S.
The third special ground of the motion assigns error upon the admission, over objection, of the following testimony of Tom Bagwell, a witness, who had been recalled by the State: “Q. You said when you were questioned by Mr. James that once before the 19th you had loaned this gun out, either to Honea or Sisk. If so, tell us when it was ? A. I did not loan it out.” The witness then made statements about getting one Cantrell to keep the gun for him, and the defendant objected to this because the State “was trying to rebut its own testimony by a State’s witness.” There is no merit in this ground; and if there were, the testimony objected to was harmless, as no connection was shown between any such loan to Cantrell and the defendant on trial.
Ground 7 is not passed on, as there is no sufficient assignment of error for this court to consider; only a question being
The defendant assigns error on the admission in evidence of two certain pistols, upon the theory that it was not shown that either had been used in connection with the crime for which the accused was on trial. These pistols were identified as being used in the general motive and intent of robbery, as discussed in paragraph 1 of this opinion, and the reasoning there set out, whereby certain evidence was admissible as part of a conspiracy, applies with equal force to the admissibility of the pistols. See 177 Ga. 107, supra.
Defendant assigns error upon the admission in evidence of testimony of Mrs. Albert C. Honea, mother of the accused, as follows: “It is correct that we had him committed to a reformatory in 1918. That was for stealing money from our home, from his own father and mother. That was what he was sent there for. That was not the first time he had gotten into trouble. That sort of brought to a climax the things at that period of his life. He was just a boy in his teens'. I don’t know that he- was showing a disposition to steal then.” The objection to the testimony was that “the law specifically states that the proceedings of a juvenile court are not criminal, that they are private, and can not be used against a defendant charged with crime.” This same witness, on direct examination for the accused, testified as follows: “My name is Mrs. Albert C. Honea. I am the mother of this defendant. He is twenty-eight years of age. Eegarding whether I have had any trouble with him, I noticed that his mind was deranged when he was about three or three and a half years of age, and as he grew older I noticed more distinctly that his mind did not develop with his body, and, from things that he would do and say, you could tell his mind was not right. For the last two years it was more noticeable ; and since he has been taking treatment from the doctor, since September, he has been walking the floor at night, could not sleep, had hallucinations. If you could just see him you would know that his mind was deranged.” The evidence objected to was not an offer to introduce any records of a juvenile court, but was evidently offered in connection with the plea of insanity of the defendant. This is borne out by the statement of the judge to the
The evidence unquestionably shows that the crime was committed in connection with an effort to commit a felony upon another, and that the accused killed the deceased without provocation and without any overt act on his part; and the court did not err in omitting to give in charge to the jury the law of manslaughter.
The evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict.
Judgment affirmed.
