7 Conn. 478 | Conn. | 1829
The right of the plaintiffs to have any part of the fund in question applied to their benefit, must depend upon a construction of the assignment, and upon the facts found in the case. Before, however, attending to these, it may be proper, very briefly, to review the authorities relied on, by the plaintiffs, in support of their claim, and to see how far the principle established by those authorities' is applicable to the ease before us.
In Maure v. Harrison, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 93. it was adjudged, that a bond creditor “ shall in chancery have the benefit of all the counter bonds or collateral securities, given by the princi-
The principle to be extracted from these cases, is this — that when collateral security is given, or property assigned, for the better protection or payment of a debt, it shall be made effeclu-
Beyond this principle, however, it is believed, no case has gone. No court of chancery, it is believed, has interposed to grant relief in any case not falling within this well established principle of equity. Does the case before us fall within this principle ? And can the plaintiffs derive from it any aid whatever ? Was here a debt due from the bank to William C. Holly, which it w.as the object to secure, by this assignment ? So far from this being the fact, the case finds, that he was indebted to the bank to a very large amount. Was it the object of this assignment to make provision for the payment of Eagle Bank post-notes, generally, or of such as had been indorsed by William C. Holly ? It is impossible to draw that inference either from the language of the instrument, the objects of the assignment, or the facts connected with it and found in the case. What is the language of the deed of assignment, so far as it is applicable to this case ? The trustees are “ to secure, indemnify and protect William C. Holly against and concerning any indorsments of the said William C. Holly, on the post-notes of the said Eagle Bank, to an amount not exceeding twenty thousand dollars.” It is, I think, very apparent from the language here used, that the benefits of this assignment, so far as regards the post-notes, were intended to be personal to William C. Holly. It was to indemnify, protect, and secure him. This intent could hardly have been more obvious, had the parties expressly provided, that if Holly should be subjected on his indorsements, he should be indemnified to a certain amount.
Again ; what were the general objects of this trust ? They doubtless were to give a preference to a certain class of favour-ed creditors. Was it intended to give the holders of post-notes such preference ? Why should this be done; and what should entitle these creditors to a priority to other bill-holders? Like them they had received these notes, as currency, in the course of circulation ; and who these holders were, the bank
In further illustration of this remark, suppose that the trustees had paid out this fund to the plaintiffs, and William C. Holly should be afterwards subjected to the same amount, on his indorsements on the other post-notes, and should come into chancery for the fund ; — would it be any answer for the trustees to say, that they had paid it out, on the other notes, which he had indeed indorsed, but on which he had never been subjected? And a court of chancery will not, surely, compel the trustees to make a payment, which, if made voluntarily, would afford them no protection.
There are other considerations, which might be successfully urged; — but those which have heen suggested, are, it is believed, sufficient to evince, that the trust in question was not created for the payment of Eagle Bank post-notes, but for the mere indemnity of William C. Holly. If this conclusion be correct, it is most obvious, that the cases cited and relied upon, are wholly inapplicable. It as clearly follows, that Holly can have no claim to this fund, but on the ground of payments actually made upon his indorsements. Shepard v. Shepard & al. 6 Conn. Rep. 37. It also follows, that no third person can claim the benefits of this trust, but through William C. Holly, —and claiming through him, must stand in his place, and be subject to the same equity, to which he would be subjected, were he now claiming the execution of this trust. What that equity is, the facts found in the case, sufficiently disclose. It cannot be necessary to advert to them. It is sufficient to ob
It has been emphatically asked, What becomes of this sum of twenty thousand dollars, if [the plaintiffs are not entitled to it ? It is not necessary to answer this enquiry, to show that it does not belong to them. The enquiry, however, is susceptible of an easy and perfectly satisfactory answer. It sinks into a residuum. 2 Mad. Ch. 81. Willes 293.
I think that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief sought by their bill; and would therefore advise the superior court,that it be dismissed with costs.
Bill to be dismissed,
See note to United Society v. Eagle Bank, ante, 476,