32 Iowa 223 | Iowa | 1871
It will be observed that the judicial power of the United States, under this provision of the constitution, extends to three classes of cases, determined, respectively: 1. By the subject-matter of the action wherein the power is exercised; 2. By the parties thereto; and 3. By the remedy to be enforced or course of proceedings adopted. We will proceed, by considering the language used, to point out the reasons supporting this classification. In the course of this investigation, by regarding alone the true meaning of the words used, we will discover principles which will aid us in the final solution of the question of jurisdiction involved in this case.
The word “cases,” three times used in this section, must be understood in its legal, technical sense as meaning contested questions before courts of justice, suits or actions.
To this class of actions belong controversies between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States.
The second class of actions are those in which the jurisdiction of the Federal courts is determined by the parties. These are all actions against “ ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,” and “controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States. * * * And between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.” It is very plain that whatever may be the subject-matter of such actions, jurisdiction therein is conferred upon the United States. The use of the word “ controversies” in the latter part of the section, in the place of the term “cases,” before used, cannot fail to attract observation. It is broader in its meaning than the term it supersedes, especially as that term is qualified, when first and last used, in the section under consideration. It is not improbable that it is used for this reason. This appears quite reasonable, when we consider that, in some controversies in which jurisdiction is conferred, “ cases” or actions could not have been prosecuted before the constitution in any forum, as controversies between States, and actions against a State by citizens of another State, or by a foreign state, citizens or subjects, of which jurisdiction has been taken away by an amendment. As no actions could then be prosecuted in such instances, it may have been thought that no power
The third class of cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends, is determined by the remedy sought, the course of proceeding had, the form, manner and forum in which the actions are prosecuted. It is prescribed that the Federal jurisdiction shall extend “ to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” The word “jurisdiction” in this connection relates to the forum and course of proceedings. Thus we speak of cases of chancery jurisdiction, meaning thereby actions cognizable in a court of chancery .within the limits of the authority of chancery courts. In this class the judicial power conferred is limited by the authority of the court of admiralty; cases within its jurisdiction are cognizable in the Federal courts. It is readily seen that the parties to such actions have nothing to do in determining the jurisdiction to which they are assigned. And we think it is equally as plain that the same is true of the subject-matter of the action. As we have before pointed out, a “ case ” is a contested question before a court of justice, submitted in the form prescribed by law, which will call into exercise the judicial power.
Proceedings are necessary to create a case and enter into the idea expressed by the term. "When we speak of a case at law, in chancery or in admiralty, we mean a judicial question submitted to a court of one jurisdiction or another, according to the form of proceedings prescribed by law. The form of these proceedings, and-not the subject-matter of the case, determines its character and to which jurisdiction it belongs. The course of proceedings necessary to call into exercise the judicial power at once decides to what forum it must be assigned. The subject-matter of the
In this view a contested question, involving rights and property of parties, if the remedy sought is alone authorized by the proceedings peculiar to a certain forum, must be brought therein; but, if authorized by the proceedings of another, the action, at the option of the plaintiff, may be instituted in either court, both having concurrent jurisdiction. Such cases are of frequent occurrence in the administration of the law.
Upon this course of reasoning, based upon the constitu
Counsel for defendant contend that if this act, in effect, attempts to preserve jurisdiction in the State courts of any matter which, in a proper action, is cognizable in admiralty, it is in conflict with the clause of the constitution of the United States considered above. But as we do not hold that that clause confers exclusive jurisdiction in this class of cases upon the Federal courts, our discussion of that question is a sufficient answer to this position of counsel.
In case it be conceded that, under the constitution, congress may confer upon the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of all questions that may be cognizable in admiralty, it is, as we have just remarked, very clear that this
No issue was tendered in the petition as to the capacity of plaintiff to maintain this action, and its incapacity is not set up as a defense to recovery. Had the petition averred plaintiff’s capacity to maintain the suit, it would have been taken as true without a denial thereof in the answer. Rev., §§ 2923, 2925.
Upon the trial defendant admitted that plaintiff is an insurance company duly incorporated and existing under the laws of the State of New York. This is the only fact appearing in the record, other than the fact that the policy was issued and the loss thereon paid to Sturges, tending to disclose the power possessed by plaintiff, and whether it was authorized to accept an assignment of the bill of lading and of Sturges’ claim against defendant, and prosecute the action thereon.
The plaintiff, being a corporation, is presumed to be endowed with the usual powers necessary and proper to enable it, as such, to carry out the purposes of its existence. It was organized for the object of carrying on the business of insmance; it has the power so to do, and all incidental powers necessary or proper to carry into effect the general power to transact business of that kind. This is undoubtedly in accord with a rule applicable to all corporations. Angell & Ames on Corporations, §§ 110, 111; Matter of Howe, 1 Paige, 214; Insurance Co. v. Perkins, 38 N. Y. 404; Ferry v. People's Insurance Co., 2 Rob. 599; Beers v. Phœnix Glass Co., 14 Barb. 362; Barry v. Merchants' Express Co., 1 Sanf. Ch. Pr. 280.
In our opinion, the power to accept the assignment of the bill of lading and the claim of Sturges is necessary to enable plaintiff to carry on its business, and is, therefore.
Y. There was evidence tending to prove that one of the rudders of the steamboat towing the barge was wanting at the time of the loss. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury, in ’effect, that if the absence of the rudder did not contribute to the accident which was the occasion of the loss, then the want of it did not affect the defendant’s liability. The instruction was refused. An issue as to the unseaworthiness of the boat was not raised under the instructions given by the court and submitted to the jury, nor made by the pleadings. They were instructed to determine whether the loss was caused by the want of proper care, prudence and skill of the officers of the boat.
VI. Complaint is made on tbe ground that, after tbe filing of plaintiff’s second amended petition, tbe cause was conducted by attorneys of defendant on tbe supposition that plaintiff claimed under subrogation to tbe right of Sturges, and that counsel were surprised by tbe contrary view presented by tbe final instructions to tbe jury. Tbe record fails to support tbe question of fact here stated. It does not appear that tbe action was conducted as counsel state. Certainly no foundation for tbe statement is found in tbe amended petition itself, which, as we have before stated, avers that tbe assignments were made “ in furtherance of plaintiff’s right to subrogation,” and for tbe purpose of a settlement of tbe controversy and litigation relating to tbe policy of insurance.
"Wehave considered all objections made by tbe appellant and find no error in tbe proceedings. Tbe judgment is therefore
Affirmed.