181 Ga. 139 | Ga. | 1935
This case came to this court on petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that “A provision in a fire-insurance policy, and in a statute of this State, voiding the policy upon an
The petitioner in its- application for certiorari contends that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is erroneous, for four rea
Ground (1) is too general to present any specific error and thereby invoke a ruling. Grounds (2), (3) and (4) will be considered together, because the correctness of the ruling of the Court of Appeals, that the alienation of the title to the property insured, under the circumstances appearing here, where the loss in no wise was affected thereby, did not avoid the policy, but that the policy was in force at the time of the fire, necessarily involves question (2) as to whether the policy could be revived where the assured only temporarily conveyed it to another, who shortly thereafter conveyed it back to the assured^ and will also include
From the record it appears that the policy here involved contained a provision that “This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void . . if any change, other than by the death of an insured, takes place in the interest, title, or possession of the subject of insurance (except change of occupants without increase of hazard) whether by legal process or judgment or by voluntary act of the insured, or otherwise.” It is not disputed that, after the issuance of the policy and prior to the fire, plaintiff executed and delivered to his brother-in-law, Crosby, a warranty deed to the property covered by the policy of insurance. On the same day, and after the deed to the property was executed and delivered to him, Crosby made a deed to the property back to Johnson. The deed to Crosby was recorded shortly thereafter. Crosby’s deed back to Johnson was not put on record until after the fire. Plaintiff testified that the reason he had made the deed to Crosby was because he was having difficulty with his wife, and was afraid that in the event of alimony proceedings his wife might get the property. He further testified he did not intend to sell the property to Crosby, and that the purpose of the deed was to keep down the alimony case, with no intention of selling it to him. The witness Crosby testified that he never intended buying the property from Johnson; that he never paid him anything for it, and never took possession of it at any time, before or after the fire; that Johnson remained in possession of the property at all times up to the date of the fire; that the policy of insurance had never been transferred to him, either before or after the fire; that he, Crosby, signed the deed conveying the property back to Johnson on the same date that Johnson had signed the deed to him; that the temporary deed to him was made to avoid, if possible, the filing of alimony proceedings by Johnson’s wife.
From the foregoing statement it appears that there was never a completed sale, there was never an intention on the part of the purported grantee to buy, nor did the grantor intend to sell, and the grantor never for an instant gave up 'possession of the property. According to the undisputed testimony, the alleged transaction was not a conveyance made for the purpose of reducing or diminishing the alimony of the wife, for, so far as appears from the record, she
Affifmed.