HOME FORWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tenna GRAHAM, Tanna Graham, and all others, Defendants-Respondents.
Multnomah County Circuit Court 15LT09162; A160851
Court of Appeals of Oregon
October 11, 2017
petition for review denied February 1, 2018 (362 Or 482)
288 Or App 227 (2017) | 404 P3d 1151
Stephen K. Bushong, Judge.
On respondents’ amended petition for reconsideration filed August 15, and appellant’s response to petition for reconsideration filed August 22, reconsideration allowed, former opinion (287 Or App 191, 401 P3d 797) modified and adhered to as modified October 11, 2017
Eric S. Postma and Bittner & Hahs, P.C., for appellant’s response.
Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and Garrett, Judge, and Duncan, Judge pro tempore.
PER CURIAM
Reconsideration allowed; former opinion modified and adhered to as modified.
Defendants petition for reconsideration of our decision in Home Forward v. Graham, 287 Or App 191, 401 P3d 797 (2017), in which we held that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining whether an act was “outrageous in the extreme” within the meaning of
In their petition, defendants argue, among other things, that the following sentence incorrectly states the standard applicable for determining whether an act is “outrageous in the extreme” within the meaning of
“An act need not violate a criminal statute to qualify as ‘outrageous in the extreme,’
ORS 90.396(4) , but it must either be comparable to the offenses listed under paragraph (f)—such as prostitution or burglary—or be ‘similar in degree’ to the conduct described in paragraphs (a) through (e), such as an act that ‘seriously threatens to inflict substantial personal injury’ on another person.”
Home Forward v. Graham, 287 Or App at 198 (emphasis added).
We agree with defendants that that sentence contains a misstatement of law insofar as it suggests that an act may qualify as “outrageous in the extreme” even if it is not “similar in degree” to the acts listed in
“An act need not violate a criminal statute to qualify as ‘outrageous in the extreme,’
ORS 90.396(4) , but it must be ‘similar in degree’ to the conduct described in paragraphs(a) to (e), such as an act that ‘seriously threatens to inflict substantial personal injury’ on another person.”
Otherwise, we adhere to our original opinion and reject the remainder of defendants’ arguments without written discussion.
Reconsideration allowed; former opinion modified and adhered to as modified.