Holyoke v. . AdamsHolyoke v. . Adams
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Folger
The Code of Procedure (§ 177) provides for a supplemental answer, alleging material facts which have occurred after the former answer. The result of the decisions in the Supreme Court, and in the other courts which have passed upon the question, is that this section is a substitute for the former practice, in actions at law of a plea puis darrien, and in actions in equity of a supplemental answer (Bate v. Fellowes, 4 Bosw., 638; Hoyt v. Sheldon, 4 Abb., 59; Slauson v. Englehart, 34 Barb., 198; Brown v. Richards, 4 Robt., 603; Garner v. Hannah, 6 Duer, 262), but with
It is next to be seen whether, in the case in hand, the order appealed from was a discretionary order, or whether the facts of the case warranted the exercise of the discretionary power of the court. I do not think that the facts of the case make any ground for a charge against the defendants, of unwarrantable delay in seeking to interpose their new defence. The time during which delay must be sought for, to be brought against them on this motion, is that elapsing from the obtaining of their discharge until the noticing of the motion. The discharge of one of them is dated the 5th of September, 1873, and that of the other 6th of January, 1874. The order in this action, to show cause, was obtained on the 9th of January, 1874. Nor was this the first attempt of the defendants to avail themselves in this action of the proceedings in the bankruptcy courts. The proceedings in bankruptcy were begun in October, 1872, against one and by the other of the defendants, and they moved for a stay of proceedings in this action pending the application in bankruptcy for a discharge. It thus appears that the defendants
It is said, that if the defendants are not permitted to plead their discharge, and judgment goes against them, then the obligation of the sureties will be fixed, and they, paying their undertaking, will have a claim against the defendants, not barred by the discharge. Without inquiring if this be so, let it be conceded. This too is in the spirit of the bankrupt act, for no discharge releases a person liable for or with the bankrupt, as a surety; and if not released, and compelled to pay after discharge, he must have a good right to call upon his principal, the bankrupt, as the sureties will in this case. The sureties were permitted by the bankrupt act to prove any debt for which they were liable if the creditors did not. And see how far the courts have gone, to sustain the right, got by acquiring a lien. In Peck v. Jenness (7 How. [U.S.], 612), it was held, under the bankrupt act of 1841, that a lien by attachment, was one saved by the provisions of that act, that though a discharge had been granted to the attachment debtor, and had been pleaded by him, that it did not affect the lien nor prevent the plaintiff from taking a qualified
It follows that the appeal from the order should be dismissed with costs.
All concur, except RAPALLO, J., not voting.
Appeal dismissed.